Background
After winning two major battles in the Spring of 1813, Napoleon agreed to an Armistice, ostensibly to prepare a path for peace, but actually as a cover for further war preparations. During the Armistice, Napoleon’s administration completed the organization of five new brigades and six divisions of light cavalry; three divisions of heavy cavalry; seventeen line infantry divisions; two Young Guard infantry divisions, one division of Guard Cavalry, and one of Old Guard infantry.

With the failure of peace negotiations, the Austrian Emperor agreed to join the Coalition, and so, despite the recruitment of his army, Napoleon was not only outnumbered but strategically surrounded by three large armies: Bernadotte’s Army of the North, Blücher’s Army of Silesia in the east, and Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia. The Allies had devised the Trachtenberg plan by which any one of these armies would retreat when faced by Napoleon in person, coordinated with an advance by the other two Armies. This plan was the undoing of Napoleon.

With the expiration of the Armistice, Napoleon ordered Marshal Oudinot to capture Berlin while he advanced eastward against the retiring Blücher. Schwarzenberg’s move toward Dresden caused the Emperor to turn command of the Army of the Bober over to Macdonald, ordering him to hold the river line to shield Oudinot’s advance. Instead Macdonald continued the offensive, crossing the swollen Katzbach stream in a driving rain on the 26th. Blücher caught him in the act of crossing and the Army of the Bober collapsed.
On the next day, at Dresden, the Emperor won his last major victory in Germany, costing the Coalition 35,000 men. During the pursuit into the mountains, General Dominique Vandamme with the French I Corps was caught between Ostermann’s Russians and Kleist’s Prussians, losing 15,000 men at the Battle of Kulm.

SUPPLY AND MORALE
The Coalition forces defending Berlin suffered declining morale due to a lack of provisions. Despite their proximity to the Prussian capital, supply arrangements broke down immediately.

French Forces
The French infantry, mainly youths officered by newly-promoted survivors of the campaigns in Spain and Russia, retirees, and recalled soldiers, excelled in the use of cover such as woods or a ravine.

Coalition Forces on August 15th
The Prussian Army:
in Silesia
Guard (inf. and cav.)—7,001 men, 16 guns
I Corps, Yorck—38,484 men, 104 guns
II Corps, Kleist—37,816 men, 112 guns
in Brandenburg
III Corps, Bülow—41,135 men, 80 guns
IV Corps, Tauentzien—33,170 men, 42 guns
Partisans (Lützow, Reiche, Schill)—4,068 men.
Siege Troops—30,070 men, 40 guns.

Prussian Landwehr
These troops were completely untried and their value unknown at the start of campaigning on August 15th. Bernadotte had little confidence in them, and Napoleon shared this opinion. “All this swarm of Cossacks and pack of bad Landwehr infantry will retreat to Berlin if your march is determined,” he wrote to Ney before Dennewitz.

The Russian Army:
in Silesia
Langeron—34,551 men, 130 guns
Sacken—18,553 men, 60 guns
Wittgenstein—34,926 men, 92 guns
St. Priest—13,586 men, 36 guns
Guards & Reserve—44,347 men, 182 guns
in Brandenburg
Winzingerode, Woronzow, Tschernitschew— 29,357 men, 92 guns
attached to Bülow—1,160 men, 22 guns
attached to Tauenzien—318 men
in Mecklenburg—6,525 men, 16 guns

The Austrian Army:
in Bohemia—127,345 men, 280 guns
between the Ems & Traun—30,070 men
in the interior—35,557 men
Two-thirds of this force were recruits of three months training. The cavalry was good, the artillery fairly good, but the infantry was “below the standard of the other armies, having neither the dogged pertinacity of the Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians.”

French Leaders
Of the original Corps Commanders employed in 1805, only Marmont, Mortier, Augereau and Ney were available in the theater. Bernadotte, become Crown Prince of Sweden, fought for the Allied cause. Davout—no longer the “Iron Marshal” of yore—defended Hamburg. Soult fought in Spain, Lannes had died in 1809, Bessieres at the Battle of Bautzen in the spring.

Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio
Oudinot commanded the elite Grenadier division in 1806, expanded to the size of a small corps (21,000 men) in 1809. In 1812 he commanded the II Corps (37,000 men) and fought in battles around Polotsk. In 1813 he was given command of the XII Corps. He allowed his personal feelings to override his better judgement by “deliberately obeying” a catastrophic order of Marshal Ney at Dennewitz. “Though no doubt a capable commander of a division, perhaps even of a single corps, (he) was not of the calibre to command an army of 70,000 or 80,000 men. Whether any of Napoleon’s lieutenants was fit for it is perhaps doubtful. Of those then in Germany, Davout, Marmont, and St Cyr were alone possible. The last-named marshal himself says … ‘In my opinion there was not then in the whole of the belligerent armies a single man capable of commanding a greater number (than 50,000 men).’”

Marshal Etienne Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum Served in Italy, and commanded Armies in Rome, Naples, and the Grisons. In 1809, he marched north and won his Marshal’s baton at the battle of Wagram. In independent command of the XI Corps in Russia, he accomplished little at the siege of Riga, but brought his sole French division back in good order. He was 48 years old in 1813. Like all other generals in the French Army—except one or two—he lacked the qualifications necessary to lead an army.

General Dominique Vandamme, Count of Unsebourg Another excellent executive officer of a division who had been elevated to Corps command. He spoke German, led the Bavarian Corps in 1807, the Württemberg Corps in 1809, and the Westphalians in 1812. He was a bit too aggressive at Kulm, and failed to provide security for his I Corps. Napoleon stated that a general should ask himself, several times a day: “What if the enemy suddenly appeared on my flank, rear, etc.? If the answer is embarrassing, then you are not well-posted.”

Marshal Michel Ney, Prince of the Moscowa
A fairly good Corps commander, his executive ability was much-impaired in the absence of his long-time Chief of Staff, Antoine de Jomini, who departed during the Armistice to offer his services at Blücher’s headquarters. Ney, “the bravest of the brave” had a tendency to forget his rank and join the fray as a grenadier. He had many admirable qualities, but was out of his depth as an Army commander.

The Berlin Campaigns
(area of Grossbeeren—upper right—and Dennewitz —lower left—game maps).
 

French Forces
Durutte’s 32nd Division was assembled toward the end of 1812 in Berlin from refractory troops (deserters and cowards), and covered the retreat of the Grande Armée at the bridge of Volkovich on 13 November. The division did not perform well at Grossbeeren, joining the retreat of the Saxons without firing a shot.

THE GROSSBEEREN CAMPAIGN
As the Armistice expired, Napoleon ordered Oudinot to capture Berlin, cut off Bernadotte’s Army and perhaps bring about his withdrawal to the coast. The Emperor highly estimated the moral effect of the capture of the Prussian capital, an administrative and recruiting center vital to the Prussian war effort.
The Prussians had built a defense line south of the capital among the marshes between the Nuthe and Notte Rivers. This line was inadequately defended by two brigades, Borstell’s Fifth, in Mittenwalde, and Thümen’s Fourth, in Trebbin. Recent rains had flooded the region and rendered the road to Trebbin impassable.
On August 17th Oudinot concentrated three Corps at Baruth, three days’ march from Berlin. Reynier’s VII Corps joined the force on the following day. Leaving Bertrand in Baruth, Oudinot took XII Corps on the 19th to Luckenwalde, with Reynier behind, following trails to Schönefeld. Thümen, in Trebbin, reported Oudinot’s appearance at 7 P.M Bülow marched out of Berlin with two brigades to Klein Ziethen. Bernadotte ordered the Russians and Swedes away to the west, to Beelitz and Potsdam.

On the 21st, Bertrand marched to Sperenberg and Saalow, camping in the woods around Schünow. Reynier took Nunsdorf, and camped at Christinendorf. Oudinot and Arrighi attacked Trebbin at 1 P.M. and captured it in a four-hour shirmish. The road to Berlin was now open, and Thümen and Borstel were exposed to defeat.
Stedingk with the Swedish Corps was ordered to Saarmund, to meet Bülow’s two brigades there. Bernadotte believed that Napoleon was present with Oudinot’s Army, and wanted to withdraw over the Spree. Bülow refused to retreat, and Bernadotte agreed not to remain south of Berlin until he could prove that Napoleon was present. He sent Bülow from Saarmund to Heinersdorf to block the road to Berlin, while the Swedes and Russians moved to Ruhlsdorf and Gütergotz.

Continuing his march, Oudinot prepared to cross the Nuthe Canal at Thyrow, Wilmersdorf,
Wietstock and Jühnsdorf. XII Corps on the left, was to march via Ahrensdorf, VII Corps in the centre, via Grossbeeren, and IV Corps on the right, via Blankenfelde. The terrain, bisected by streams, gullies, marshes and woods precluded mutual support among the three columns.

Bülow ordered Thümen to Heinersdorf and (disobeying orders from Bernadotte) sent Borstell to Birckholz.
Allied outposts at Trebbin and Munsdorf were forced to retreat. At 3 P.M. on 23 August, Reynier's VII Corps captured Grossbeeren and proceeded to bivouac for the day. Reynier's right was secured by the town of Grossbeeren and a canal just east of the town. On the left, in open ground, Reynier ordered Lecoq to form a large divisional square protected by a few guns.

Approaching from the north, Prussian General von Bülow was determined to retake Grossbeeren.
The battle opened with an artillery duel at 5 P.M. Borstell's Brigade attacked Grossbeeren from the east. At 6 P.M., Krafft's Brigade was ordered to attack from the north, while Hessen-Homburg attacked the Saxons around the windmill height (in the fields west of Grossbeeren).

This concentrated attack by three Prussian brigades was too much for Sahr’s Saxon Division. Falling back in disorder, the retreating Saxons took Durutte’s Division (sent by Reynier to reinforce the Saxons), with them. Both Sahr’s and Durutte’s Divisions took refuge in the woods south of Grossbeeren. An attempt by Lecoq to take the windmill height failed. With two divisions in flight, Reynier had no choice but to order a retreat.
Meanwhile, at 8 P.M., Fournier's Light Cavalry Division appeared on the scene. Half an hour later, Guilleminot's 14th Division arrived. Both had been sent by Oudinot from Ahrensdorf to reinforce Reynier. However, it was too late. The battle was lost. Oudinot withdrew and Berlin was saved.
 

Conclusion
What if the Emperor had pressed ahead in person with the advance on Berlin? All would then hinge on a great battle at Dresden. He would be marching to the recapture of Dresden instead of to its rescue. Meanwhile Macdonald’s collapse would enable Blücher to intervene on the Elbe by the 31st. Blücher and Schwarzenberg’s juncture would bring about the decisive battle of the campaign. Napoleon would have had to win without the supplies stored in Dresden.

THE KATZBACH CAMPAIGN
Napoleon left Dresden in the afternoon of August 15th, reaching Bautzen on the 16th. There he heard of the transfer of the Russian Army (except Sacken’s Corps) from Silesia to Bohemia.

In the evening of the 17th Napoleon was at Reichenbach, on the 18th at Görlitz. Here he learnt that Wittgenstein, with 40,000 Russians, had reached Bohemia, and that the Austrians had passed the Elbe for parts unknown. Napoleon moved to Zittau on the 19th, to get a clearer picture of the enemy’s intentions. During the day he went forward in person with a strong reconnaissance as far as Gabel, inside Bohemia.

He was back at Görlitz by 2 P.M. on the 20th, ready to move against Blücher, who that evening stood east of the Bober opposite Löwenberg. By then Napoleon had reached Lauban, on the Quiess, and issued orders for the attack.

Blücher determinedly avoided combat according to the Trachtenberg principles, and played cat and mouse with Napoleon, waiting to turn around and strike at Macdonald once the Emperor had moved off.

On the 22nd, the Emperor heard from St. Cyr of the danger threatening from Bohemia. Turning the command of the Army of the Bober over to Macdonald, he hastened back toward Dresden with the Guard. Macdonald was ordered to protect Napoleon’s communications toward Zittau as well as Oudinot’s flank. To prevent Blücher’s interference, Macdonald was to push the Prussians back beyond Jauer and then take post on the Bober, with three divisions of III Corps near Bunzlau and three divisions of XI Corps at Löwenberg, the 4th division in reserve on the Queiss, and the V Corps near Hirschberg.

Napoleon ordered Marshal Ney to Dresden, so as to leave only one marshal on the Bober. Misinterpreting his orders, Ney marched with his III Corps towards Bunzlau.

After a combat at Goldberg on the 22nd, Blücher fell back on Jauer on the 23rd, expecting to be attacked next day. Descrying Napoleon’s departure in the ensuing quiet, Blücher decided to advance. Ignoring his own orders, Macdonald at the same moment decided upon an offensive across the Katzbach.

French Forces
(On August 24th, the Army was deployed as described in 22.24.)
III Corps (Souham)
4 divisions, 8th-11th, Marchand’s having been provisionally transferred to the XI.
V Corps (Lauriston)
4 divisions, 16th-19th
XI Corps (Gérard)
4 divisions, 31st, 35th, 36th, 39th divisions
II Cavalry Corps (Sebastiani)
2nd and 4th Light, 2nd Hvy Cavalry Divisions

The Battle of the Katzbach
Macdonald ordered III Corps “to cross the Katzbach below Kroitzsch, and to reach the Liegnitz-Jauer road. XI Corps (less Ledru’s divions) and Sebastiani to cross the Katzbach at Kroitzsch, then to cross the Niesse and march towards Jauer… V Corps (only two divisions) to advance from Goldberg by Seichau on Jauer along the left bank of the Neisse. The Marshal, alarmed by the appearance of St. Priest on his right flank, detached Puthod’s division of V Corps, to reach Schönau on the 27th, and to detach one brigade still farther to the right to Hirschberg, whither also Ledru’s division of the XI Corps was to go.”

“Before Blücher’s orders of 11 A.M. on the 26th issued, the two advancing armies had met and begun the battle.
“At the commencement the opposing forces were thus grouped—

“On the left bank of the Neisse, Langeron with 31,000 men faced Lauriston with 23,000. Langeron’s position ran from the Neisse along the Silberfliesz brook and the Plinsengrund.

“On the plateau of the right bank were the allied forces of Yorck and Sacken, 55,000 strong; against these were advancing, though much separated, the XI and III Corps, and Sebastiani’s cavalry, about 67,000 in all.
“Blücher was quite as surprised to find the French on the offensive as Macdonald was to find Blücher advancing.”
The French reached the plateau in two columns. Their cavalry, mingled in with their marching column, caused much confusion as it pressed forward through the infantry.

By 2 P.M. part of the XI Corps and Sebastiani had reached the line Klein Tinz-Gross Janowitz-Ober Weinberg while the others were still struggling to climb onto the heights from the Neisse. Opposite them were 55,000 Prussians and Russians of Yorck’s and Sacken’s Corps. Souham with the III Corps, which had started out for Dresden, had not yet reached the Katzbach.

 

“Blücher advanced with Yorck’s men, encouraging them, and telling them to use the bayonet, as their muskets would not go off” in the heavy rain. A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued. “In one place the pile of overturned guns and ammunition wagons completely blocked the Nieder Krain road…. The whole of the French who had ascended the plateau from the Neisse were sent streaming down again in wild confusion. The river, which had been small in the morning, was now a raging torrent, in which many of the fugitives were drowned in attempting to cross it elsewhere than by the overcrowded bridge at Nieder Krain. That village was captured by the pursuing Prussians before darkness finally stopped the combat.” The Prussians lost about 35% of their forces engaged. The French lost 36 guns, 110 wagons, and 12,000 to 14,000 prisoners.

THE KULM CAMPAIGN
Leaving Görlitz on the 24th, Napoleon was at Bautzen by 3 P.M. By 7 A.M. the following day, he was at Stolpen, where the road branches toward Königstein on the Elbe. Any thoughts of debouching by that fortress into Bohemia were dashed by Gourgaud’s report on the state of readiness of the Dresden fortifications, and Napoleon decided to march direct to the Saxon capital with the bulk of his forces.

The Prussians began their attack on the outskirts of Dresden early in the morning of the 26th. “The early attacks spread alarm among the inhabitants, who were aware that the allied troops were especially bitter against them.”
Leaving Stolpen in his carriage at 5 A.M., the Emperor mounted his horse as he reached the outskirts of Dresden, galloping into town between 9 and 10 A.M.

Coalition Forces
The Allies marched on Dresden with over 120,000 men. Of these some 38,000 men were lost in the battle of the 26th-27th and the subsequent pursuit. The whole left wing beyond the Weisseritz— manned by the Austrians of Weissenwolf, Meszko and A. Liechtenstein’s columns—was practically destroyed. By the 29th the French had collected 12,535 prisoners in Dresden; this number had reached 23,518 (including 15,000 Austrians) by the 8th of October.

French Forces
Ist Corps—General Vandamme
1. Inf. Div. Phillipon—9,624
French Cohorts and 3rd bns.—New Cadre and Conscripts.
2. Inf. Div. Dumonceau—10,245
French Cohorts and 3rd bns.—New Cadre and Conscripts.
23. Inf. Div. Teste—9,741
Formed during the armistice. French conscripts.
21. Cav. Bde. Gobrecht—809
Hamburg Lt. Lancers and Anhalt Chas.
Artillery & Train—1,191
Troops en route—1,415

Vandamme’s force comprised the I Corps, above (less all but one of Teste’s brigades—Quiot); the 42nd Infantry Division, attached from XIV Corps; Corbineau’s cavalry; Reuss’s brigade on loan from II Corps; and the bridge train, taken up from Pirna, intended to be thrown across the Elbe further up.

Topography
The Erz Gebirge (“Ore Mountains”), a ridge running from the Elbe River SW along the Austro-Saxon frontier, has peaks above 2500 feet. From Aussig to Pirna the Elbe twists around this mountain chain in a horse-shoe bend.
Five roads traverse these mountains: (1) from Pirna through Peterswalde to Kulm; (2) from Maxen through Glashütte and Dittersdorf, Furstenwald and Muglitz to Priesten; (3) from Dippoldiswald to Altenburg, Zinnwald, Eichwald and Teplitz; (4) the main road to Dux; (5) the road from Marianberg to Komotau.

From Dresden to Kulm
After their defeat at Dresden, the Coalition forces were struggling back across the Erz Gebirge via the roads named above into Bohemia. The French pursued, hampered by a lack of cavalry, in several columns: (1) Murat, driving straight west toward Freiburg. (2) Marmont, whose orders were late, to follow the enemy main body on Dippoldiswald; (3) St. Cyr on Dohna and Maxen; (4) Mortier with the Young Guard following the Elbe toward Pirna, where initially Napoleon planned to move his HQ; (5) Vandamme advancing toward Berggieshübel on the Peterswalde road.

The original orders for the Coalition retreat were drafted by staff officers Toll and Radetzky, at 4 P.M. on August 27th. These called for three separate columns:
1. Barclay (with Wittgenstein’s Russians, Kleist’s Prussians, and Ostermann’s Russo-Prussian Reserves) via the Peterswalde road. To avoid Vandamme, Barclay instead ordered:
a) Reserves via Zinnwalde;
b) Kleist via Glasshütte;
c) Wittgenstein as rearguard on the heights of Leubnitz (Klüx) and Prohlis;
d) Ostermann by Peterswalde or by Maxen if Vandamme stood in the way.
2. The Austrians east of the Weisseritz would retreat by the Zinnwalde Road. They reached Altenberg on the 28th, and Dux on the 29th. Their rearguard under M. Liechtenstein was at Wendisch Carsdorf on the 28th, Falkenhain on the 29th, and Altenberg early on the 30th.
3. Klenau with the remains of the Left Wing (Czöllich and A. Liechtenstein) was ordered via Tharandt and Freiberg to Marienberg and Komotau. Due to Murat’s advance, Klenau moved by Potzschappel, Gittersee and Rabenau to Pretzschendorf on August 28th; Waltersdorf on the 29th; and Marienberg on the 30th.

Convinced that the Coalition main body was going by Dohna and Dippoldiswalde, Napoleon hoped to reach Teplitz by the shorter and better road through Peterswalde, with the three nearest corps of Vandamme, Mortier, and St. Cyr. Reaching Teplitz, first he would inflict great damage on their columns as they debouched in disorder from the mountain passes, pursued by the rest of his army. He rode off to Pirna intending to arrive early on the 30th.

However, at 4:30 P.M. on the 29th he received reports that the “enemy army is retiring by Altenberg on Teplitz,” and, concluding that Vandamme would not encounter any serious opposition near Kulm, he redirected Mortier and St. Cyr, and returned, himself, to Dresden.

That day, Vandamme fought a series of actions on the Peterswalde road against Eugen of Württemberg and Osterman with the Russian Guard. Starting out in the morning at Hellendorf, there were rearguard actions at Peterswalde, Nollendorf, and Vorder Tellnitz.

Vandamme took possession of Kulm at 10 A.M. His troops were still spread-out in a long column in the pass over the mountains. Believing that “he was only going to have another small rearguard action like those he had already had earlier in the morning, he sent Reuss’ brigade to try and cut the Russians from the mountains by their left.” Osterman had 14,700 men with his left on the wooded heights above Straden (2013), his centre in and west of Priesten (2317), and his right between Priesten and Karwitz (2419).

Vandamme took Straden but was quickly thrown back. Then, as nine battalions of the 42nd division arrived, it was taken again. With more troops arriving, Vandamme advanced against Priesten, took the village and then lost it again.

At 2 P.M. Philippon arrived with fourteen fresh battalions. Priesten was once again taken, and lost, by Vandamme. At 5 P.M. Vandamme made his decisive attack. But Coalition reinforcements under Barclay were now beginning to arrive, particularly cavalry, which drove the French back.

Marmont, following Wittgenstein, reached Falkenhain on the Zinnwald road. St. Cyr, following Kleist, had a sharp fight with him at Glashütte. In the mistaken belief he was opposed by a flank guard and not a rear guard, St. Cyr shifted over to the Rheinhartsgrimma valley, leaving Kleist on his own and unpursued.

During the night elements of Vandamme’s force continued to arrive. Several columns of Coalition troops were nearby: Colloredo and Bianchi south of Teplitz, Chasteler on the road to Dux, Wittgenstein on the heights of Altenberg. The head of Kleist’s column reached Furstenau (1105).

Proceeding directly to Ebersdorf (1909), Kleist learned that the direct roads over the Geiersberg, by Graupen (1216) and (1813), were blocked by friendly troops. The other forest roads, running through deep valleys, were impracticable for large forces, so Kleist chose to march through Streckenwald (2603) to Nollendorf (3603) and cut his way through Vandamme’s Corps.

His orders were for assembly at 3 A.M. The troops set out at 5, and by 8 A.M. they had reached Nollendorf, but confusion caused delays and the head of the column only began to appear around the bend (3507) about 11 A.M.
The battle at Kulm began at 7 A.M. Vandamme had his right up in the hills above the Eggmühl, his centre across the Teplitz road in front of Kulm (2714), and his left stretching as far as Böhmisch Neudörfel (3019). After his losses of about 6,000 on the previous day Vandamme had about 32,000 soldiers remaining. Having suffered equal losses, the Coalition forces facing him numbered about 44,000 men.

After taking the Striesowitz Berg, the Russians began to move on Arbesau (3212). Vandamme set up a defensive flank with Quiot’s and Duhesme’s brigades, and Kulm itself seemed untenable.

Then cannon shots were heard from the direction of Tellnitz. Vandamme, who believed Mortier still had orders to support him from Pirna, was convinced the troops were French; very soon he realized the truth. Deciding to abandon his artillery, he tried to fight his way through Kleist’s Corps about Schande, Arbesau and up the highway. Part of his troops actually managed to get beyond Nollendorf. Kleist himself only escaped capture by taking by-paths through the woods. Vandamme was captured as he sought to escape alone into the hills.
The I Corps had been half-destroyed. Prisoners numbered 8,000 to 10,000; probably altogether 11,000 killed and wounded, 82 guns, 200 wagons and several generals. The Coalition probably lost more than 4,000 men.
The Emperor finally ordered Mortier to support Vandamme on the 30th, when it was too late. Had the order been dispatched by 5 P.M. on the 29th Mortier could have reached Peterswalde early on the morning of the 30th, and would have attacked Kleist at Nollendorf.

Marmont drove Wittgenstein’s rear-guard from Altenberg, and again from the Zinnwald plateau (0807). Reaching almost up to Eichwald (0118), in the evening he heard through St. Cyr of Vandamme’s disaster.

Conclusion
Knowing his own worth in battle and the miraculous effect of his presence on the young troops, the Emperor stands accused of not going where the action was. It is difficult to see how he can be defended from this charge—certainly not on the grounds of indigestion.

Why was Napoleon not in personal command at all four of these battles? The Emperor could not be everywhere, but might have been present at two, if not three of them. He might have been at the battle of the Katzbach—he had just been with Macdonald days before that battle. He didn't plan on going with Oudinot to Berlin. Had he been with Vandamme and Mortier at Kulm, the damage to the Bohemian army would have been severe.

His original plan to follow up behind Vandamme with the guard was correct. He changed his mind, some authors speculate, because of a dish of rabbit with garlic that made him feel ill. Also at that time he received news of the first two lost battles, and went back to Dresden instead of leading the pursuit, from where he could better evaluate the intelligence he was getting. The idea that the Allied army had retreated along one and the same road might have been succeeded by the realization that they had taken several roads.

Napoleon is out of step in this campaign, and the Coalition holds the overall initiative, controlling events while Napoleon is reduced to delayed reactions, usual to cancel or weaken an offensive of his own—which alone could restore him the initiative.

THE DENNEWITZ CAMPAIGN

Coalition Forces

III Corps, Bulow
3rd Bde Hesse-Homburg, 4th Bde Thümen, 5th Bde Borstell, 6th Bde Krafft.

IV Corps, Tauentzien
1st Bde Dobschutz, 2nd Bde Lindenau

French Forces

IV Corps, Bertrand
12th Div Morand, 15th Div Fontanelli, 38th Div Franquemont, 24th Lt Cav Bde Jett, 27th Div Dombrowski, 18th Lt Cav Bde Krakowski.

VII Corps Reynier
24th Div Lecoq, 25th Div Sahr, 32nd Div Durutte, 26th Lt Cav Bde ___,

XII Corps Oudinot
13th Div Pacthod, 14th Div Guilleminot, 29th Div Raglovich, Cav Bde Beaumont.

III Cavalry Corps Arrighi
5th Lt Cav Div Lorge, 6th Lt Cav Div Fournier, 4th Heavy Cav Div Defrance.

By the end of August, Napoleon’s strategy lay in ruins. With Oudinot’s reverse at Grossbeeren, Bernadotte was free to descend on the rear of the Grande Armée and its vital supply line on the Elbe. To parry this threat the Emperor was determined to capture the Prussian capital and secure his northern flank. Leaving four corps at Dresden under Marshal Murat, Napoleon prepared to move north with the Imperial Guard, the VI or VIII Corps, and a portion of the I Cavalry Corps. These units, numbering 18,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry as they reached Grossenhain on the 31st, were temporarily recalled upon tidings of Vandamme’s reverse at Kulm.

On September 2nd, Ney was placed in charge of the Army of Berlin and ordered to march to Baruth by the sixth, to attack Berlin on the ninth or tenth. Ney was instructed to avoid Oudinot’s mistake: “He was so clever that he allowed one of his corps to be isolated and defeated. If he had boldly attacked the enemy, he would have defeated him everywhere.” The Emperor was prepared to resume his march on Luckau to support the offensive on Berlin, but a renewed offensive movement by Blücher caused him to delay the move by the Guard on Luckau, recalling the troops that had already set out. He promised Ney on the 3rd that he would quickly march on Berlin after dealing with Blücher, but only started to move the VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps north early on September 6th. Once again, the move was cancelled when news arrived of Schwarzenberg’s new advance toward Dresden.
Marshal Ney, still believing in a junction with Napoleon, started the offensive with a march eastward toward Dahme. On September 5th Oudinot’s Corps advanced to Zahna, Reynier to Bülzig and Bertrand to Euper. At Zahna, General Dobschütz’s twelve battalions, supported by cavalry and artillery, were driven back upon Zallmsdorf. The French bivouacked for the night at Leetza, Zallmsdorf and Sayda.

The Prussian von Bülow ordered his Third Corps to Werkzahna in order to shadow Ney’s advance on its left. However, Borstell’s 5th Brigade was detained by Bernadotte at the defiles of Köpnick, Woltersdorf, Werkzahna and Kropstädt, depriving Bülow of a quarter of his strength. Bülow’s cavalry reached Kurzlipsdorf in the evening—a mile from the French at Seehausen and Naundorf—followed by his three brigades and guns which arrived by daybreak. Bernadotte ordered the Swedes and Russians to concentrate at Lobbesse.
On the 6th Ney continued his march toward Dahme, with Reynier moving on Rohrbeck and Bertrand marching through Dennewitz to reach Jüterbog. Oudinot was ordered to Öhna, but had to wait for VII Corps to pass first through Gadegast.

Bülow watched Bertrand’s IV Corps march along the main highway toward Jüterbog. He ordered his Corps to Eckmannsdorf, where a chain of low hills provided cover for an attack. Each brigade formed two lines with the right on Dahna and the left on the road to Dalichow. At 9 AM the lead units of Bertrand’s column crested the chain of hills south of Dennewitz. Tauenzien, who attempted to maneuver around Bertrand’s column to unite with Bülow, was caught in the open plain northeast of Dennewitz. Bülow advanced with Thümen’s brigade on his left and Krafft on the right, marching past Kaltenborn to Niedergörsdorf. The marshy Ahebach stream, arising there, and fordable only with difficulty, divided the battlefield. A strong southwest wind created swirling dust clouds that intermittently reduced visibility to 100 yards.
Tauentzien’s single reserve infantry and four Landwehr regiments were driven back —the Kurmark Landwehr broke and ran. He launched his nine squadrons of Landwehr cavalry against Fontanelli’s Italian Division which succumbed to this unexpected charge. French cavalry under Lorge, sent to break up the charging Prussians, were thrown back through their supporting infantry in turn. Finally the experienced Morand stopped the Prussians in their tracks. But the panic continued to spread through Dennewitz, infecting Bertrand’s baggage train.

During the respite obtained by the Landwehr cavalry’s incursion, von Bülow deployed his corps from Niedergörsdorf, causing Ney to withdraw upon Dennewitz. The fate of the battle then devolved upon control of the hills northwest of the town, the commanding Denkmalsberg and the adjacent Windmill Hill. Morand was driven out of the hills and back into a gully between the Windmill Hill and the Pine thicket. Supported by Durutte‘s divison, just arrived (from Reynier’s Corps), Morand retook the Windmill Hill until forced off by Prussian guns on the Denkmalsberg.

Ney refused to abandon the ground north of the Ahebach, counting on the arrival of Reynier and Oudinot to redress the balance of forces. The arriving VII Corps deployed between Dennewtiz and Gölsdorf; further reinforcements drove the Prussians from Gölsdorf. Panic was beginning to spread in Prussian ranks.
Borstell arrived on the battlefield only at 3 P.M., as he spent the morning awaiting permission from Berndadotte to leave his assigned position. He then marched to the sound of the guns, deploying west of Gölsdorf.
A Saxon advance beyond Gölsdorf would decide the battle, and the approaching Swedes could not arrive in time to stop them (only some Swedish cavalry and horse artillery were able to participate in the pursuit).
Seeking to regain the northern sector, Ney sent Durutte’s second brigade against the Dennewitz Windmill Hill, against a murderous fire from the Denkmalsberg. Outflanked by Thümen’s troops from the Pine Thicket, they were forced to relinquish the hilltop again. By 4:30, Durutte’s division was back behind the Aheback.
Still determined to reach Jüterbog, Ney ordered Bertrand into one more attempt. Fatally depriving Reynier of the troops needed to hold-off the Prussian attack on the far left, he ordered Oudinot’s XII Corps out of the line in order to support Bertrand.

To restore his troops morale, Bülow ordered his right wing to advance. This attack, corresponding with Oudinot’s withdrawal, spelled the end of Ney’s offensive. Krafft’s Prussians pried the village away from Lecoq’s Saxon troops by 4 P.M. The Prussians lost 40 officers and 1,228 casualties in retaking Gölsdorf; and 49 officers and 1,318 men in storming the hills north of the village. The Saxon defenders lost 1,500.
The victory cost the III Corps 200 officers and 6,500 men, plus 3,000 in Tauenzien’s Corps. The Army of Berlin lost 8,000 dead and wounded, 13,500 prisoners, 53 guns, and 412 wagons—over one-third of the army.