BACKGROUND

The armed struggle between France and Russia that commenced in June of 1812 had its origins in the war of 1807 and the Tilsit treaty signed by the parties to resolve their differences.

At home after Tilsit, Tsar Alexander found himself out of step with his people. All classes of Russian society opposed the alliance with France. Although Napoleon pulled most of his forces back from Russia's doorstep in the year following Tilsit, he still maintained a garrison in the 'Grand Duchy of Warsaw,' the newly-created Polish state. The emergence of this state was considered a threat by the Russian nation. To compound this, Napoleon opposed the Tsar's geopolitical ambitions toward Constantinople and the Mediterranean Sea.

By the time of the Congress of Erfurt, where the Emperors met again in 1808, France had become embroiled in a guerrilla war in Spain which would continue to sap her strength indefinitely. While Napoleon saw too little cooperation from the Tsar in his embargo of British goods, for his part the Tsar could claim that he was observing his Tilsit undertakings, even to the detriment of his nation's merchant class and the value of the ruble, which was in crisis. Napoleon came away from the Congress seeing in Alexander more a rival than an ally.

Both Emperors gained further cause to complain in the aftermath of the French war against Austria in 1809. The Russians, who provided none of the military assistance required by treaty, nevertheless seized Austrian territory nearest their borders, while France wrested the province of Galicia from Austria and awarded it to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

Russian pride was injured when Napoleon abruptly announced his choice of an Austrian Archduchess as his second bride, surprising the Tsar who still believed the choice would be in favor of his sister. Into this atmosphere of hurt feelings, Napoleon added fuel by refusing to ratify the Convention on Poland, which would have proscribed the creation of a Polish Kingdom.

When Napoleon chose to tighten the continental blockade by annexing Holland and the German states of Hannover and Oldenburg, he further insulted the Tsar by confiscating the lands of the Tsar's new brother-in-law. In May of that year, when Sweden chose one of Napoleon's Marshals as their future King, this represented a further threat, since Bernadotte now commanded an army on Russia's northern doorstep.

To shore-up his flagging economy, in December 1810, the Tsar placed duties on all imported goods, including those of France. This was a direct challenge to the French "Continental System," and if Britain were to be defeated, the Emperor had to maintain discipline among the Continental powers.

Napoleon was now convinced that Alexander intended to make war upon France, and regarded an eventual contest as certain. At a diplomatic reception in Paris, in August of 1811, the Emperor deliberately insulted the Tsar. In February of 1812, he ordered the troops of Westphalia mobilized, and demanded troops from both Austria and Prussia. In March, he seized the province of Swedish Pomerania; in response to this and the economic hardships of the blockade, the new Swedish crown prince declared his neutrality. In May, Russia negotiated a treaty of peace with Turkey, which would release the Danube Army's considerable manpower.

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

The Russian Army

Tsar Alexander appointed Prince Barclay de Tolly as his Minister of War in 1810. Barclay reorganized the ground forces into army corps similar to the French model. Each Russian Corps comprised two divisions of infantry, a division or brigade of cavalry, one brigade of artillery, and a battery of horse artillery. Six Guard regiments, 96 Line regiments, 50 Light, and 14 Grenadier regiments made up the 36 infantry divisions. The cavalry comprised six Guard regiments, 8 of heavy Cuirassiers, 36 of Dragoons, and 16 of light cavalry (Hussars and Uhlans), not including the 15,000 lance-wielding Cossacks. The 37 artillery brigadescomprised five Guard batteries, 44 Heavy, 58 Light, and 22 Horse batteries. All told, the soldiers of Holy Russia numbered 211,000 front line troops, 45,000 men in the 2nd line, and 153,000 in garrisons and in reserve, a total of 409,000 men. Over half the front-line troops marched with Barclay's First Army of 127,000 (including 19,000 cavalry and 584 guns), while 48,000 marched with Bagration's Second Army, and the remainder went to Tormassov's Third Army or various Corps of observation in Finland, Bessarabia, and Georgia.

Though Barclay's reorganization indeed improved the fighting abilities of the front-line armies, his measures did not extend to the staff and support services. Staff officers remained inefficient, submerged in red tape, while the Administrative Services (transport, supply, and medical) were neglected.

Russian Army Leaders 1

Two commanders of the front rank shaped military thought...: Marshal Pyotr Rumyantsev (1725-96); and Marshal Alexander Suvorov (1729-1800).... [Rumyantsev] distinguished himself ... for establishing the basic strategic principle of Russian policy, the desirability of waging a war of movement rather than the static concentration of great armies in a limited arena. . 'The objective is not the occupation of a geographical position but the destruction of enemy forces,' Rumyantsev once declared; and this maxim ... was fundamental to the strategy of Marshal Kutuzov in 1812.

Suvorov is the most legendary of all Russia's generals. ... Suvorov concentrated on building up a communal spirit among his men and on inducing his subordinate officers to take rapid and unexpected decisions on the battlefield. He thought that tactical surprise was no less essential for success in a campaign than strategic surprise; and he summarized his principle of warfare in a laconic phrase - 'Intuition, Rapidity, Impact'. It seemed to him essential for an officer to be able to assess a situation swiftly, decide on an objective, and then concentrate all his resources on attaining it. Like Napoleon, he believed that opportunities are created by luck but exploited by intelligence. ... As a general rule of strategy, he maintained that a commander-in-chief should seek, not merely to break through the enemy line, but to strike at the very point where a reversal would endanger the whole enemy position.

Chief among [the] disciples of Suvorov were Michael Kutuzov (1745-1813) and Prince Bagration (1765-1812), both of whom were idolized by the armies they commanded.

Kutuzov, aging and ailing, had recently been relieved of command of the Danube Army for delaying the Peace negotiations with the Turks. Politically savvy, he understood the troops he had to lead, and had the confidence of the army. A zero as a tactician, he stayed away from the battlefield. Fully cognizant of his opponent's superiority, he sought to simply outlast Napoleon until winter arrived. Bagration, a fighter, was popular throughout the army. Far better-suited to lead an advance guard than running the affairs of an entire army.

There were, of course, other close companions and pupils of Suvorov who distinguished themselves in the campaigns of 1805-07 and 1812-14. Among them were General Miloradovich, General Raevski, and the Cossack commander, Matvei Platov. But there was also a group of senior officers who had never been members of the 'suvorov School', though some had served under him. The most prominent soldier in this category was General Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818).

Barclay, a capable officer, personally brave and cool-headed, lacked the abilities of a supreme commander. He stuck to a wise defensive strategy in the face of the clamors of a proud nation.

Tsar Alexander had a high regard for Barclay's administrative skill and sense of order, but he was a cautious man with a predisposition for retreat and it is only with the passage of time that the wisdom of many of his judgments has become apparent.

Two of the other senior commanders in the Tsar's army were non-Russian by origin, Levin Bennigsen (1745-1826) and Peter Wittgenstein (1769-1843). Both had a Germanic background which did not endear them to the increasingly xenophobic rank and file, nor to the nationally-conscious junior officers.

The French Grande Armée

The French Army had developed a "victor's complex," failing to assimilate the lessons offered by prior experiences. When in 1812 Napoleon began the drive on Moscow, he sought a chimerical strategic goal. His operational planning was as good as ever, but was ineffective in the absence of good roads and abundant crops. Worst of all, the French developed no tactics to overcome the Russians' massed batteries and sturdy divisions of Grenadiers.

The Army created by Napoleon for the invasion of Russia was about three times the size of those he had previously commanded. Infantry regiments were swollen from three to five war battalions, each no longer 2,400 but really a brigade 4,000 men strong.

The First Line comprised three armies totaling 444,975 men. Napoleon accompanied the 218,318 men of the central army with corps commanders Murat (22,503 cavalry), Davout (72,051), Oudinot (37,139), and Ney (39,342), plus 47,283 men of the Imperial Guard.

Prince Eugene commanded the first of two support armies (80,608 Italians and Bavarians), and King Jérôme Bonaparte commanded the second (79,404 Westphalians, Saxons, Hessians, and Poles).

An independent corps under Marshal Macdonald (32,497) protected the army's Northern flank; while a second flank guard under Prince Schwarzenberg covered the south with 34,148 Austrian troops.

In the Second Line, 165,000 men stood ready to come forward as reinforcements; and finally, 60,000 men of the Third Line garrisoned fortresses in Prussia and Poland.

Of the 614,000 troops in the First and Second Lines, about 302,000 were French, and the remainder came from a dozen different countries: 32,000 Italian, 190,000 German, 90,000 Polish and Lithuanian, Spanish, Dutch, etc.

Over 300,000 horses hauled this army into Russia: about 80,000 cavalry mounts, 30,000 hitched to the guns and wagons of the artillery, 74,000 other army horses, and 150,000 requisitioned horses (from Prussia, Poland, and Germany) pulling supply vehicles.

Formations of the Grande Armée

The Imperial Guard:

Mortier & Lefebvre (mainly French)

Old Guard Div. Dorsenne, Young Guard Divs. Delaborde & Roguet, Cavalry Div. Bessieres; all veterans of several campaigns. Attached: the Polish Vistula Legion (Claparede), two Italian Velite battalions, etc.

I Corps: Davout (French)

The re-numbered III Corps of Davout still included the divisions of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, the heroes of Auerstadt; along with new divisions Desaix and Compans. Cav. Brigades of Pajol & Bourdesoulle.

II Corps: Oudinot (two-thirds French)

Divisions Legrand and Verdier, Div. Merle (mainly Swiss); Cav. Brigades of Castex & Corbineau.

III Corps: Ney (40% French)

Divisions Gengoult & Razout (including two Portugese & one Illyrian Regts.); Division Marchand (Wuerttemberger) performed with distinction. By August, 4,000 effectives remained in Marchand's division; on 29 November, 30 men remained in march formation. Cavalry Div. Woellwarth was half Wuerttemberger.

IV Corps: Eugene (half French)

Divisions Delzons & Broussier each included two foreign battalions. Division Pino, Guard Bde., and Cav. Bde. were Italians who performed extremely well at Maloyaroslavets where they suffered heavily. Remnants still in the firing line at the Beresina.

V Corps: Poniatowski (Polish)

The largest allied contingent-it was going to be their war and they followed the Emperor willingly. Divisions Zaionczek, Dombrowski, and Kamieniecki. (Other Polish troops-the Vistula Legion, Guard Lancers, and three regiments in X Corps.)

VI Corps: St. Cyr (Bavarians)

Divisions Deroy and Wrede, plus cavalry. Bavarian desertion was high. Burned out in a series of actions around Polotsk; did not advance on Moscow. Joined the retreat but disappeared without a remnant. (One Bavarian regt. marched with X Corps)

VII Corps: Reynier (Saxons)

Divisions Lecoq and Gutschmidt, plus cavalry. Remained in Volhynia; did its duty but nothing more-Thielemann's detached cuirassier brigade had its moment of glory taking the Raevsky redoubt at Borodino.

VIII Corps:

Vandamme, Tharreau, Junot (Westphalian)

Divisions Tharreau, von Ochs, plus cavalry. Their homeland, a recent amalgam of north-west German states, included Brunswick, Hanover, and part of Prussia.

IX Corps: Victor

French, German, & Polish-Saxon Divisions

Divisions Partouneaux (French), Daendels (Berg, Baden, Hesse), Girard (Polish-Saxon) plus cavalry. Remained behind but followed the Grande Armée to protect the line of communcations. The Badners were the best of the German contingents. Stood with the Poles and Bergers in legendary rear-guard at the Berezina. The Hessians, from Hesse-Darmstadt, performed with distinction at Krasnoi.

X Corps: Macdonald (French & Prussian)

Divisions Grandjean and Yorck (Prussian), plus cavalry. The Prussians knew how to fight the Russians from long tradition.

XI Corps: Augereau

(French, Neapolitans, and Germans)

Remained in Prussia. Divisions Heudelet and Lagrange comprised provisional regiments. Division Durutte built around "deserters and cowards" regiments-draft evaders, prisoners, and untrained conscripts; the single battalion of decent troops were from Würzburg. Neapolitan troops of Division Destres had no love for Napoleon. Their desertion rate exceeded even the Spanish. Moved up to Vilna only in late October and assumed rear-guard duties from the Badners. The Neapolitan horse guard escorted Napoleon out of Russia. Division Loison moved forward with its German duchies Brigade under Anthing, while the French Brigade remained in Stralsund (on the Baltic coast).

Auxiliary Corps: Austrians

Divisions Bianchi, Siegenthal, Trautenberg, and Frimont (cavalry). A secret agreement between Austria and Russia constrained their employment. Performed at nominal levels.

I Cavalry Corps: Nansouty

Bruyere's Lt. Cav. Division had three brigades: Jacquinot, Piré, and Niemojewski (Polish and Prussian). St. Germain's and Valence's Heavy Cavalry Divisions.

II Cavalry Corps: Montbrun

Sebastiani's Lt. Cav. Division had the same make-up as Bruyere's. Heavy Cav. Divisions Wathier and Defrance.

III Cavalry Corps: Grouchy

Castex's Lt. Cav. Division was half French and half Bavarian-Saxon. Heavy Cav. Divisions Doumerc and Lahoussaye.

IV Cavalry Corps: Latour-Maubourg

Rozniecki's Lt. Cav. Division was Polish; Lorge's Heavy Division had Saxon and Westphalian brigades.

Reinforcements:

March Regiments (16 SPs in total)

1st Reserve Division (2 SPs); Polish Vistula Legion (1 Gde SP); Wuerttemberg (1 SP, III Corps); Westphalians (1 SP, VIII Corps-joined in Moscow); Austrian (1 SP); French (5 SPs); Poles (2 SPs-Smolensk garrison); Lithuanians (3 SPs).

Marches

Nothing in Napoleon's experience prepared him for this campaign. He had found certain procedures, such as the setting of a day's march, that had served him in the past. But, in Russia, Napoleon began to demand much more rapid marches than he had normally required of his army. In Russia, things began to go wrong, but instead of noticing the fault in his methods, he just kept pushing his troops until many of them passed beyond the breaking point.

Supply

In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy everything in their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible.2

Unlike their prior experience, the French in Russia would have little chance of picking up forage and fodder along their march to supplement their meager rations. Western Russia-the country called "Belarus," extending from Poland to Smolensk-was a semibarren wilderness. Beyond Smolensk, the land is more rolling and fertile. The invasion was delayed until the grass would be somewhat ripe and digestible for the horses.

An area of 4 sq miles with 400 persons per square mile could support 4,000 troops for 7 days, which meant that a force in extended (foraging) mode could pick up all the forage it needed as it passed through. In Russia there were only an average of 100 inhabitants per square mile, which meant the troops had to range farther and farther from their route of march in search of forage. Each hex contained about 10,000 people per hex: more for towns, and far less in open country.

The sullen emptiness of the steppe-land, where towns were often fifty miles apart and settlements marked as villages on a map were no more than collections of huts, imposed a distinctive character on warfare in the great plains of Eastern Europe and Russia.3 Estimate the population of towns according to the type style of the name: * (Bold) 4,000-8,000 * (Regular) 1,000-2,000, * (Italic) less than 1,000. Cities had populations of 100,000-250,000.

It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate then transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles-as biscuit, rice, &c: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country ... and these vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points.4

Twenty-six transport battalions carried rations for the first 25-40 days of the campaign-a period Napoleon believed sufficient to win a decisive victory. Seventeen-million pounds of rations were carried in 600 light wagons (1300 lbs. each), another 600 (2200 lbs. each), and 4530 four-horse wagons (3300 lbs each). From the supply source at Tilsit, further supplies would be transported by barge via the Niemen River as far as Kovno- beyond where the Niemen was no longer navigable-and thence by wagon. But the wagons could not keep up, and from the first day the Emperor's weakened soldiers began melting away from disease, made worse by malnutrition. By the time Vilna was reached around the 29th, the army had already lost 25,000 men. An overwhelmed Administration, not a lack of supplies, began the dissolution of the French Army. The Bavarian Corps, for example, lost 50% of its men to disease before ever making contact with the enemy.

Depots on the line of communication had a commandant and a commissary-of-war. They contained ammunition, magazines for bread ovens, flour, and a hospital. In these depots were left sick and tired men, regimental registers, papers, and everything that the soldier could not carry. There was a fortified base every 160-200 miles.

The administration was unable to extend the line of communications beyond Smolensk. During the retreat, the trains, gathered in the area around Smolensk, were allowed to fall into the hands of the Cossacks. The Russians also captured four million rations in Vilna alone.

Russian Plans

The most influential planners agreed that a decisive confrontation with Napoleon was to be avoided and that a scorched-earth policy and guerrilla operations were to go hand in hand.

Wolzogen ... wanted to see the formation of two separate armies with diverging lines of retreat ... If one came under attack, it would operate defensively while the other switched to the offensive. (This idea was to reemerge in full bloom in 1813.) None of them considered the possibility of carrying the war beyond the lines of the Dvina, Berezina, and Dnieper.5

The Weather

In northern latitudes, the variation in temperature can be extreme, swinging from sweltering heat to severe frost. The weather conspired against the French from the first day of the campaign. They were greeted with violent thunderstorms, hail, pouring rain, and mud. Thunder is an elemental force of nature. Its morale effect was profound. Everybody saw this and remarked on it. After the thunderstorms the French were awash in mud. Swampy places such as Polotsk bred disease, and in these places the French suffered as much attrition as they would have marching. Later the tropical heat turned to a dry dusty stifling heat that dried out the countryside. The Russians marched at night and rested during the days. By August the land had become parched. The soldiers were straining the mud through cloth to obtain water to drink, ingesting every kind of intestinal parasite.

During the stay in Moscow, the weather was quite pleasant. As the retreat got under way, the weather began to turn colder. Suddenly in early November the frost descended. Frozen water in the wheel ruts made it difficult for soldiers to make their way, eventually turning back into semi-liquid form, and once the whole layer of ice has been worn away you get this sort of doughy consistency of mud very cold but not quite frozen.

In the extreme cold, it is important to keep everybody moving, just to keep the body temperature up.

The French Plan

"In my view one of the basic rules of war is-don't march on Moscow" 6

The experienced French soldiers and especially the generals, all advised against this campaign, as though they instinctively knew that it was a mistake.

Because of a lack of roads, the French had only three possible axes of advance: (1) via Kovno-Vilna-Vitebsk-Smolensk-Moscow; (2) via Grodno-Minsk-Vitebsk, etc.; and (3) via Brest-Litovsk-toward the much richer countryside around Kiev. Among other considerations, Napoleon believed that the Lithuanian population in the Kovno-Vilna area would encourage his men at the start of the invasion, and provide safe passage for the wagons traveling along his Line of Communication.

Napoleon chose the crossing over the Niemen at Kovno; to drive thence on Vilna, with Eugene's Army protecting his right flank; and then, either (1) isolate part of Barclay's Army from its Line of Communication toward St. Petersburg or, (2) in a strategic envelopment like Ulm in 1805, trap Bagration's Second Army in the Grodno-Slonim pocket. To distract Russian attention from his principal line of approach, and hopefully tie-down Bagration's forces near the River Bug, he ordered Schwarzenberg and Reynier to advance from Lublin in the south, while Prince Jérôme marched eastward from Warsaw.



PROLOGUE: MAY-JUNE 1812

9 May: Paris

Napoleon departs from the Palace of St. Cloud.

16 May: Dresden

The Emperor arrives in Dresden, meeting with the Austrian Emperor, the King of Prussia, and the Princes of the Confederation.

29 May: Dresden

Napoleon departs on a tour of the important French bases of Thorn, Gdansk, and Königsberg.

31 May: Poznan

Napoleon announces his intention of establishing a General Confederation of the Polish nation.

7-11 June: Gdansk

The Emperor checks the fortifications and reviews the army on parade.

17 June: Insterburg

Napoleon arrives at GHQ, shortly to depart via Gumbinnen, and Stallupöhnen.

21 June: Vilkovischi

The Imperial entourage crossed the border (W0721) into Polish Lithuania.

22-23 June: Kovno

Napoleon undertakes a final two-day reconnaissance of Russian territory on the opposite bank of the Niemen.

THE CAMPAIGN

On their march through scantily-populated Poland and inhospitable East Prussia, troops were already suffering from fatigue and lack of rations before ever crossing the border. At first, the French advance into Russia was unopposed. Before the month of June was out, Napoleon realized that Barclay had fallen back and out of reach. At the same time, Jérôme was unable to prevent Bagration from moving north via Grodno to Barclay's support.

The Maneuver of Vilna

23-25 June: Kovno

The Central Army Group comprised three of Murat's cavalry reserve corps, Davout's I Corps, Ney's III Corps, and the Imperial Guard. At 10 in the evening of the 23rd, Davout's troops began crossing the River Niemen; followed by the remaining 130,000 infantry and cavalry of this group over the next three days. Macdonald's X Corps marched from Tilsit northward. From Kovno, Oudinot's II Corps marched north across the Vilia toward Kedainiai.

Jérôme's Army Group (V, VII, and VIII Corps)-of Poles and Germans, and Schwarzenberg's Austrian auxiliary corps- was still en route from Poland. The Polish/German IV Cavalry Corps operated with this Army Group throughout June and July.

Eugene's Army Group (IV, VI)-to link Jérôme's Army Group with the Center-was enroute from Poland to Pilona.

28 June: Vilna

The Russians abandoned the town, burning all the supplies stored there. In the following days, the French arrived and established their Center of Operations. Napoleon stopped in Vilna with the Guard through the 16th of July.

28 June: Develtovo

Rear Guard action: Oudinot's cavalry versus Wittgenstein's rear-guard plus elements of the Russian I Cav. Corps.

29 June: Reorganization

The Imperial Aide-de-Camp, General Mouton (Count of Lobau), was given command of a temporary corps comprising two of Davout's best divisions-Friant and Gudin-plus Claparede, the Vistula Legion, and Dutch Lancers. This force was placed under Murat's command in an attempt to pin Barclay. Davout with the balance of I Corps followed a more southerly route to block Bagration.

30 June: Grodno

Jérôme's Second Support Army crossed the Niemen and onto Russian territory.

1 July

The Emperor wrote to the Tsar, refusing negotiations: "I have received your majesty's letter. The war that divides our countries began with the Treaty of Tilsit. Your majesty told me: 'I will second you against England.' These words of your majesty changed everything; the Treaty of Tilsit was but a corollary."

5 July

The weather cleared after 8 days of thunderstorms. The cold rains and unripe rye had already killed 10,000 French horses. Blistering heat then set-in for the next five weeks.

7 July: Nesvich

Bagration granted his army a three-day rest after nine straight days of incessant marching. Jérôme was unable to interfere.

8 July: Minsk

Davout arrived hoping to cut-off Bagration. Realizing his peril, however, the Russian had turned to a more southerly escape route through Bobruysk. Napoleon's attempt to destroy Bagration's wing of the Russian Army had ended in complete failure.

8 July: [sic] Korelitchi

The Polish 2nd bde. of the 4th Lt. Cav. Div (part of Latour's IV Cavalry Corps) versus Platov's rearguard. The same forces (reinforced) clashed again further down the road at Mir on the following two days. The Russians lost under 300, the Poles and French around 950.

9 July: Vilna

The French Main Army set out toward Beshenkovichi, leaving behind 80 guns due to lack of horses.

14 July

Stung by his brother's insults, Prince Jérôme returned home to Westphalia. Victor temporarily took over his VIII Corps.

At Druya, Sebastiani's II Cav Corps was caught napping by Wittgenstein's cavalry. St. Geniez lost a light cavalry brigade.

15 July

The Sultan ratified the treaty with Russia, allowing the northward march of Russia's Danube Army.

The Maneuver of Vitebsk

Leaving Davout to pursue Bagration, retiring toward Borisov and Orsha, Napoleon determined to force Barclay out of his positions along the River Dvina-the fortified camps of Drissa and Dünaburg.

While Murat, Oudinot and Ney occupied Barclay to his front, Napoleon with the balance of the Main Army would maneuver across the Dvina further south and then swing northward to threaten his communications with St. Petersburg.

16 July: Vilna

Napoleon departed from Vilna on the 16th to join his main force, leaving Maret at Vilna in charge of the Line of Communications.

At Romanovo, a brigade of Latour's cavalry again clashed with Platov's Cossacks, losing 279 men to very little effect.

18 July: Glubokoye

Napoleon spent the day preparing to cross the Dvina. At the same time Barclay and his army abandoned Drissa without firing a shot. The Tsar departed the front for Moscow, entrusting the army to Barclay with the admonition to keep it intact, for "it is the only one I have."

21 July: Saltanovka

A large portion of one of Davout's cavalry regiments was surprised and captured.

22 July: Stary Bikhov

Bagration arrived with VIII Corps and Platov. VII Corps occupied Dashkovka, where it remained until the 26th.

24 July: Beszenkoviczi

In the course of a reconnaissance along the banks of the Dvina, Napoleon learned from captured Cossacks that Barclay had already retired to Vitebsk. The next day the entire army advanced from Beszenkoviczi.

24 July: Saltanovka

Platov's Cossacks crossed the Dnepr at Vorkolabov. The Frernch, expecting a Russian attack, waityed at Mogilev. Davout with only 13,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (Divs. Desaix, Compans and Valence, and Bde. Pajol), barred the road to Bagration's advanced guard under Raevski (22 bns., 8 sqdns, 72 guns of VII Corps plus 16 sqdns. of IV Cav. Corps), forcing his diversion further to the east, and delaying the unification of the two Russian armies. Davout lost 4,134 and Bagration 2,548.

24 July: Moscow

The Tsar arrived and began issuing conscription orders.

25 July: Novy Bikhov

Bagration's pontoon bridge was completed and the VIII Corps and 4th Cavalry Corps began to cross the Dnepr. The VII Corps followed them across on the 26th. Bagration's final march-via Propoysk, Cherykov, Krychev, Mstyslav and Khyslavichy-to Smolensk, was covered toward Mogilev by a strong veil of Cossack Regiments.

25-27 July: Ostrovno

Murat's advanced guard-comprising Nansouty's Cav. Corps and Div. Delzons, later joined by Div. Broussier-engaged three successive Russian rear-guards under Ostermann (18 weak bns., 20 sqdns.), Konovnitzyn (3rd inf. div., 32 sqdns.), and Pahlen (4,000 infantry and 32 sqdns.). In three days of delaying actions both sides lost about 3,500 men.

27 July: Vitebsk

Napoleon defers his attack upon Barclay for one day to allow all his forces time to catch up. Barclay employed the pause to slip away with his Army.

28 July: Vitebsk

The French arrived in the evacuated town. There was now little hope of preventing the union of Bagration and Barclay. The Maneuver of Vitebsk had failed. The Center Army Group had lost 65,000 men and Davout's Army Group over 30,000. More than 50,000 French were collecting into marauder bands in the rear areas. The French Center of Operations was ordered up to Vitebsk.

31 July-1 August: Smolensk

Barclay's First Russian Army arrived in the holy city.

The Tsar departed from Moscow en route to St. Petersburg.

3 August: Smolensk

Bagration's Second Army arrived. The Russians still under arms united at last, 125,000 strong, having lost nearly 50,000 soldiers-but only 6,700 in combat. The French Central Army Group (not including St. Cyr, Oudinot, Latour, or Reynier) still numbered 185,000 men-having lost 100,000, including 9,400 in combat.

The Maneuver of Smolensk

The French thus far had occupied all of Lithuania without a major battle. The Emperor hesitated, and his future course remained for several days undecided. He realized that even if Alexander wished to negotiate, it would be politically impossible for him to do so without a major battle. To bring on the day of battle, Napoleon announced to his marshals that he would march on Smolensk.

Duroc and Berthier insisted that the Russians were luring them to their destruction. In an eight-hour interview, Count Daru, the Intendant General of the Army, pointed out that their immense baggage train, herds of cattle, and hospitals were far to the rear and unable to catch up. The Army was effectively beyond its LOC. They should stop and organize, and prepare to winter in Vitebsk. The Emperor insisted that he would succeed where his predecessor, Charles XII of Sweden, had failed.

And so he made plans to cut the communications of the now-united Russian Armies. Two columns would cross the Dnieper at Rasasna and Orsha, intending to turn the Russian left and sever the road to Moscow. Vitebsk would serve as the center of operations for the first phase of the operation and then it would shift to Orsha. The French LOC would follow the route to Borisov-Minsk-Vilna. On the French left, Macdonald's mission would be to cover the Niemen River supply line, and eventually to capture Riga. Before this operation could get underway, however, the Russians took the initiative.

7 August: Vitebsk

Napoleon issued orders for the sustenance of the army. Ten thousand quintals of rye and grains, captured along the right bank of the Dvina, were to be placed in magazines in Vitebsk. Bessieres was ordered to provide a cavalry escort for three convoys of 70 wagons each from IHQ. In addition, the Guard was ordered to send its wagons to assist in transporting the grains. If necessary, the wagons already holding flour at IHQ were to off-load and assist in moving the grains to the magazines. General Chasseloup was ordered to create work crews to repair all the mills, to get them in working order as soon as possible.

7 August: Smolensk

The Russians advanced in three columns against the French left wing: Tutchkov toward Kovalevskoie, Docturov to Moszinki, and Bagration to Prikas-Vidra.

8 August: Inkovo

Docturov's Adv. Guard and Pahlen's III Cav Corps surprised General Sébastiani with 3,000 cavalry. Napoleon ordered the army to concentrate at Lyosno in case of a Russian offensive.

11 August:

With no further sign of a Russian move, Napoleon put his army in motion toward its staging areas for the delayed offensive. The fighting strength of the French Main Army was now just 156,000.

12 August: Smolensk

Bagration turned around and retraced his steps toward Smolensk.

13-14 August: Volkovaia

While the Russians marched to Volkovaia, the French Army crossed the Dnieper on four temporary bridges.

14 August: Krasnoe

Murat forged ahead with the advanced guard to reach Krasnoe. There he launched piecemeal cavalry attacks against Neveroski's 8,000 infantry, allowing him to execute a fighting withdrawal and reach Smolensk. Neveroski lost 1,500 and Murat 500 men.

15 August: Smolensk

Barclay hustled back toward Smolensk. Raevski's Corps occupied the town.

16 August: Smolensk

Murat and Ney (later joined by Davout and Poniatowski) watched Raevski (and later Docturov).

17 August: Smolensk

Fighting in the suburbs. The French lost 10,000, and the Russians 13,000 men.

18 August: Smolensk

Bagration marches for Solovievo. French inactive.

At Polotsk, Gouvion St. Cyr with 35,000 troops defeated Wittgenstein's 20,000, temporarily neutralizing the threat to the northern flank.

19 August: Valutina

Murat & Ney pursued Barclay's rearguard (Eugen) and Tutchkov.

Napoleon's third attempt at decisive battle ended in failure, and he contemplated bringing the campaign to an end. "We will drive them a little further back for our own comfort. I will dig myself in. We will rest the troops; the country will shape up around this pivot-and we'll see how Alexander likes that." This would allow the administration to reorganize the army's supply line.

The Maneuver of Borodino

Napoleon changed his mind about a continued advance, convinced that the Russians would fight a major battle before abandoning the most holy city of the realm. A decisive victory followed by the occupation of Moscow would inevitably bring peace. "To force the Russians to battle, and to dictate peace ... was the only means of safety that now remained. ... We could hope for no repose till we had gained one decisive battle."

25 August: Smolensk

The French began their advance in three columns with 124,000 infantry, 32,000 cavalry, and 587 guns. Behind them, confusion on the LOC meant meager supplies, while ahead they found only blazing villages.

26 August: Lusky

Bagration established his HQ in the village near Vyazma.

27 August: Rouibki

Advanced Guard Affair: Murat versus Russian cavalry rear guard.

28 August: beyond the Vyazma

Another cavalry clash.

29 August: Zarevo-Saimishtshe

Prince Kutuzov arrived to the thunderous cheers of the soldiers, raising their morale at once. At the same time arrived 15,000 regular reinforcements and 10,000 militia.

29 August: Gzhatsk

Miloradovich reinforced the army with 15,589 militia from Moscow.

2 September: Gzhatsk

French strength was 128,000. A further 6,000 disabled were expected to return in five days.

2 September: Kolotsk Monastery

Bagration established his HQ 12 kilometers west of Borodino, near Gridnevo.

4 September: Gridnevo

Advanced Guard Skirmishing, Murat versus Konovnitzyn.

5 September: Borodino

Struggle for possession of the Schevardino Redoubt. Gorchakov versus Compans (and later Poniatowski).

6 September: Borodino

The Russians dug in: 72,000 infantry, 14,500 gunners with 640 guns, 10,000 militia, 17,000 cavalry and 7,000 Cossacks, extending their lines over a 5-mile front.

7 September: Borodino

A frontal attack by 103,000 French infantry and gunners, 28,000 cavalry and 587 guns; a battle of attrition and brute force. Napoleon's failure to commit the Guard enabled Kutuzov to retire, unpursued, with 76,000 men. Losses: French about 28,000, Russians 44,000.

10 September: Krimskoye

A reinforced Russian rear guard threw back the French advanced guard. Both sides lost about 2,000 men. The Russian main army withdrew behind the Nara at Krutiza.

11 September: Mozhaysk

Meeting Encounter, Skirmishing and Cannonade.

14 September: Moscow

Murat entered the city, followed by Napoleon and IHQ, who finally reached their goal: the Kremlin. The Russian rear guard was only five miles outside the city. A mass exodus of Moscow's population of 250,000 jammed all the roads heading east.

The Wait

This miraculous conquest cast a halo of glory around us. Henceforth people would believe that the air we breathed was redolent of prodigies and marvels. And when these proud thoughts gave way to more moderate sentiments, we told ourselves that the promised end of our labors was there; that at last we were going to stop, since we could no longer surpass ourselves.7

By directing all his efforts against Moscow, Napoleon thought that he was striking at the heart of Russia. So how great his dismay must have been when he saw that the Russians looked on their ancient capital as no more than a vast accumulation of stones, with which Russia's destiny was not bound up in any way! From that time onwards he must have had a presentiment of the tragic outcome of his venture.8

Napoleon was bound to stay in Moscow as long as there was even a glimmer of hope that he might, after all, find some sort of accommodation that would make it possible for him to come away from this misadventure with no more than a black eye.

The sobering truth about Borodino came to Alexander soon enough. The news, first of the retreat and then of the loss of Moscow, arrived like a strike of lightning. Following on the heels of the elation over the supposed victory, the depression over what was seen as a defeat was all the greater. The idea that the French had occupied Moscow overshadowed all else, including the more detailed accounts of the battle, as well as the news of the burning of the city.

The so-called French party, [the peace party] lead by Chancellor Rumanzov, had been in favor of a peace treaty and now raised its head again. Even the dowager empress and the passionate Grande Duke Constantin both spoke of peace, though both were Napoleon-haters. But Alexander was the one who counted, and he soon regained his composure.9

15-18 September: Moscow

Moscow burns. Twenty to 25 percent of her abandoned buildings remained standing, including the Kremlin. Kutuzov marched to E3912, but turned back to Podolsk and took the highway south to Tula.

20 September: Moscow

Napoleon sent a letter to the Tsar, carried by a high-ranking prisoner. He reported the devastation of Moscow and blamed Russian incendiaries. "If your majesty still conserves for me some remnant of your former feelings you will take this letter in good part."

25 September: Mozhaysk

Sent to clear Cossacks from the Army's LOC, the Guard dragoons were ambushed by them.

2 October: Tarutino

Kutuzov with 60,033 men reached the army's base camp: the army had lost half its manpower in attrition and battle. However, 87% of the remaining men were old soldiers. Several thousand Cossacks soon joined them.

3 October: Moscow

With no reply forthcoming from Alexander, French troops in Moscow were ordered to concentrate in preparation for a possible move. Matthieu Dumas, chief commissary, estimated it would take at least 50 days to reach the Niemen. This estimate proved to be exact.

4 October: Moscow

A delegation headed by Lauriston departed for St. Petersburg to open peace negotiations. Kutuzov halted the party and forwarded Napoleon's letter to the Tsar, along with his advice not to negotiate. Every day the Cossacks brought in 50-100 French prisoners. In five days, 1,342 wounded prisoners were delivered to Kutuzov; many more were killed. By mid-October the Russians claimed to have taken 15,000 prisoners.

14 October: Moscow

Lauriston was despatched for Kutuzov's HQ a second time. But the Tsar formally forbade his generals from receiving any further communication from French headquarters.

The Retreat-Moscow to Smolensk

Napoleon decided to march through the unspoiled countryside southwest of Moscow. The French set-off down the old Kaluga road through Troitskoye to reach the important road junction of Malo-Yaroslavets, which would allow the choice of two routes toward Smolensk, either via Medyn or Kaluga. The day Napoleon decided to retreat, Kutuzov attacked Murat's cavalry reserve.

18 October: Vinkovo

Murat (25,000 men including 10,000 cav., 180 guns) versus Bennigsen. Murat lost 2,000 killed, 1,500 prisoners & 38 guns.

19 October: Vatutinka

The French began their retreat from Moscow. Eugene's corps led the march, followed by Ney's, the Old Guard, two-thirds of Davout's, the Young Guard, Morand's division of Davout's corps, and the Guard Lancers. The head of the column reached Vatutinka; Mortier with 8500 Guards remained in Moscow. The French army totaled about 108,000 men and 569 guns.

22 October: Moscow

Mortier left Moscow, ignoring orders to destroy all public buildings, including the Kremlin.

22-23 October: Paris

The Malet plot. For a few hours, an abortive coup nearly took control of the government.

23 October: Malo-Yaroslavets

The van of the French III Cavalry Corps pushed two battalions of Cossacks out of Malo-Yaroslavets. The Russian army moved to intercept the French at that town. The Russian army totaled about 97,000 men, 20,000 Cossacks, and 622 guns.

24 October: Malo-Yaroslavets

Docturov counterattacked and threw two French battalions out of Malo-Yaroslavets. Both sides reinforced. After 18 hours of fighting, the Russians turned back. About 24,000 troops fought on each side, with 8,000 Russian and 6,000 French casualties.

25 October: Fominskoye

Ney attacked towards Fominskoye but made no headway. Napoleon judged an advance past Malo-Yaroslavets towards Kaluga impossible, and decided to continue through the countryside devastated during their advance.

26 October: Gorodnya

Napoleon, reconnoitering ahead of his army without his guard, was almost captured by Cossacks. Kutuzov and the main Russian army retired towards Kaluga.

29-30 October: Borodino

The French army marched across the gruesome battlefield of September.

31 October: Vyazma

The French reorganized while Russian units began to appear on a parallel line to the south. Platov's Cossacks began picking off stragglers and guns, and constantly skirmished with the French rearguard.

31 October: Czasniki

Wittgenstein (30,000 men) managed to push past Victor's IX Corps (also 30,000). The French lost 800 and the Russians about 400 men.

1 November: Zarevo

Miloradovich met up with Eugene. The French army slowed to allow the rearguard under Davout to catch up. Napoleon ordered all troops to march in closed squares to minimize losses to Cossacks. The temperature dropped to 14° F at night.

3 November: Vyazma

Miloradovich advanced against the main road from the south, attacking Davout. Eugene ordered an about-face to assist. The French continued to retreat in front of the Russians towards Ney's position in Vyazma. At last, the I Corps broke. Davout's men streamed through the town in disorder. Ney and his corps assumed rear guard duties.

These Corps had 73,283 men on 19 October. Of the remaining 37,500 effectives, two-thirds were engaged this day, suffering 4,000 casualties and several thousand prisoners. The Russians engaged about 23,500, along with 3,000 Cossacks, and lost 1,800. Kutuzov and the main army of about 60,000 stayed out of the fight.

5 November: Semlevo

Ney's rearguard skirmished with the Russians. The French exhausted their food supplies. The temperature at night fell to 5° F, with snow.

6 November: Dorogobuzh

Word reached Napoleon that Victor on his northern flank was defeated on 31 October by Wittgenstein. Miloradovich pushed Ney towards Dorogobuzh, where the Marshal unsuccessfully attempted a stand.

9 November: Smolensk

Napoleon reached Smolensk and learned the Russian had taken Vitebsk. Platov surprised Eugene at a river crossing, forcing a loss of thousands of stragglers, 60 guns, and all the corps' baggage.

10 November: Smoliany

Victor made up for his blunder at Czasniki by attacking Wittgenstein who would now be unable to unite with Tschitshagov to block Napoleon's path.

The Retreat-Catastrophe

Il neigeait. On était vaincu par sa conquête. Pour la première fois, l'aigle baissait la tête.10

12 November: Smolensk

Ney fought a sharp action against Karpenkov at Tsuginovo, falling back in turn to Smolensk. Eugene fought his way through to Smolensk. While in Smolensk, Napoleon recovered stragglers, reorganized his army as much as he could, and distributed waiting supplies. After this, the French army numbered about 49,000 men under arms, and 300 guns (though 112 of these would have to be abandoned due to a lack of draft teams).

16 November: Smolensk

Ney abandoned Smolensk, his Corps numbering 8,000 infantry, 300 cavalry and 12 guns, followed by about 7,000 stragglers.

17 November: Krasnoe

Davout was held to have deserted Ney and smudged his reputation as a leader in battle.

18 November: Krasnoe

A Russian greeted Ney with a demand to surrender. "A Marshal never surrenders. There is no parlaying under an enemy's fire. You are my prisoner!" Ney's column ran into 40 Russian guns, which erupted with heavy cannister. After losing 5,000 men in several attempts to break through, Ney withdrew towards the village of Dniakova, whereupon he led his weary men through the darkness toward the Dnieper.

20 November: Syrokorenie

By midnight Ney's corps began crossing the Dnieper, but the ice was too thin for his wagons and artillery. On the following two days the rearguard covered 45 miles despite continual harassment by the Cossacks.

21 November: Orsha

Reduced to 1,200 men, Ney's Corps reached Orsha, raising the morale of the entire army.

26-28 November: Studienka

The French Army crosses the Berezina and into Lithuania.

5 December: Smorgoni

Napoleon departs from the army, accompanied in his sledge by Caulaincourt, en route to Ogrodniki and Tobolewo. Duroc and Mouton followed in another sledge.

8 December: Augustów

The Emperor arrives safely in the first Polish town at 8 p.m.

8-9 December: Vilna

French stragglers arrived.

9 December: Lomza

The Emperor arrives and meets with the department prefect.

10 December: Vilna

Murat abandoned 20,000 men remaining in hospitals from earlier in the campaign.

10 December: Warsaw

Napoleon stops for five hours, to meet with the Ministers of the Polish government. Departs at 5 p.m. for Kutno and Poznan.

11 December: Kovno

The remnant of the former Grande Armée passed out of Russia, the last man over the bridge fittingly the indomitable Marshal Ney. They marched down the left bank of the Niemen toward Königsberg.

12 December: Poznan

The Emperor stops briefly on his way to Glogau, Dresden, and Paris.

14 December: Slonim

Schwarzenberg and the Austro-French forces abandoned the pursuit of defeated General Sacken.

18 December: Bialystok

Schwartzenberg's force arrived safely in Poland.

19 December: Riga

Macdonald retreated from the vicinity of Riga, the Prussians in the rear.

30 December: Tauroggen

Count Yorck signed the Convention of Tauroggen, whereby his force of 17,000 Prussians became neutral.