Background
Welcomed as liberators in 1806, within three years the French in Germany were resented as an army of occupation. Still, compared to the guerrilla war developing in Spain, Germany was slumbering.
By invading Spain in 1807, Napoleon found his quag-mire, and he would fight the remainder of his wars in Cen-tral Europe with one hand tied behind his back. After attending to his shaky alliance with Russia at the Congress of Erfurt in September 1808, the Emperor departed to cure his Spanish ulcer by attending to the fighting there in person. Austria ventured to take advantage of his absence and regain some of her lost territory.
Napoleon became aware of Austrian troop mobiliza-tions and on January 23rd, 1809, he departed for Paris to prepare for the coming campaign. He again settled on Vi-enna as his ultimate objective; but realized the Austrians would be ready to march before he was. The French and their allies were as yet widely dispersed—during the cam-paign’s opening stages they would be on the defensive. The theme of the Abensberg-Eckmühl operation is the French Army’s transition from delaying defense— while awaiting reinforcements—to the offensive.

The Theatre of Operations
Because its level course made it the natural route for inva-sion of the Austrian heartland, Napoleon twice used the Danube River valley to strike at the Austrian capital.
The theater of the campaign is bounded by the Da-nube and Isar Rivers in eastern Bavaria, an area 50 miles long and 25 to 30 mi. wide. The country south of Ratisbon has wooded hills 90-120 meters above the valley of the Danube. (Elevations on the game map are shown in meters; e.g. “∆ 412.”)
Landshut was the residence of the Bavarian dukes from 1204 to 1503, who built the castle of Trausnitz. Indus-tries included brewing, textiles, furniture, chocolate and tobacco processing. The Archduke Charles staged his cen-tral attacking column through the town.
His objective was Regensburg, the Roman Castra Re-gina, established on a site which, as Goethe put it, “was bound to attract a city.” It became the capital of the Dukes of Bavaria in AD 530. The Imperial Diet met there from 1663 until dissolved in 1806.

The Austrian Army
After its disastrous defeat in 1805 the Austrian Army im-plemented a modernization program, though the French still held the tactical edge. In fighting Davout’s III Corps they were opposed to the best of the French, and acquitted them-selves well. Their failure was due to a lack of initiative on the part of their leaders. By the time of Wagram, the Austri-ans had revised their antiquated and leisurely concepts of war and were on a fairly equal footing with the French for the first time.

I. Armeekorps, G. d. K. Graf Bellegarde– 25700
24 Bn., 14 Sqn., 62 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos. (+ 2 Bn., 2 Sqn. detached in Bohemia).

II. Armeekorps, FZM. Graf Kolowrat– 22151
19 Bn., 7 Sqn., 65 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos.
Detached: 1 bn. for the siege of the fortress Oberhaus (Passau)
attached: Brigade Rottermund: 12 Sqn.(Dragoons) – 1549, 2 Pontoneer Div. with 50 Pontoons.

III. Armeekorps, FML. Fst. Hohenzollern– 23603
25 Bn., 8 Sqn., 96 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos.

IV. Armeekorps, FML. Fst. Rosenberg – 15000
14 Bn., 15 Sqn., 62 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos. (+ 5 Bn., 1 Sqn., 1 Batt. with FML. v. Dedovich and GM. v. Rein-wald detached for the siege of Oberhaus (Passau)
attached: Brigade Vecsey: 5 Bn., 8 Sqn. – 6191
arriving as reinforcements a few days later: 2 Bns.

V. Armeekorps, FML. Archduke Ludwig– 24191
28 Bn., 24 Sqn., 96 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos.
arriving as reinforcements during the advance to the Isar: 1 Line Bn. and 3 Bns. Vienna Volunteers.

VI. Armeekorps, FML. Freiherr v. Hiller– 31792
28 Bn., 24 Sqn., 96 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos.
arriving as reinf. on 18. Apr: 3 Bn. Vienna Volunteers.

I. Reserve Korps, GdK. Fst. Liechtenstein– 14369
12 Bn. (Grenadiers), 24 Sqn. (Cuirassiers), 34 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos.

II. Reserve Korps, FML. Frh. v. Kienmayer– 6690
5 Bn. (Grenadiers), 24 Sqn. (12 Cuirassiers/12 Dra-goons), 20 Guns, 2 Pioneer Cos.

Austrian Commanders
The Archduke Charles, the Emperor’s brother, had fought to modernize the Army after the cataclysm of 1805. The only Austrian in a class with the best of Napoleon’s Marshals, he succeeded to some degree over considerable resistance from conservative officers like Hiller. His reforms did not lead to marked increases in initiative among the higher echelon. He was seconded by chief of staff Johann v. Prochaska and aides-de-camp Grünne, Colloredo, v. Wimpffen, and Auer-sperg. The jealous Hiller was imposed on him by the Em-peror. Hiller’s idea was to reconnoiter in person and then ride back to instruct his idling troops. Posted to guard the left of the army, Hiller sidled to his right, allowing Massena to slip by toward Landshut. The Archduke Ludwig, also placed on the Army’s left wing in a post most likely to en-counter Napoleon, was only 25 years old and—despite his complete lack of experience in war—resented his subordina-tion to Hiller. Kolowrat, Liechtenstein and Kienmayer fought well at Austerlitz in 1805. A few brigade command-ers held promise—Radetzky, Thierry, Nostitz, Vecsey, Crenneville, Kayser, and Stutterheim.

The French Armée de l’Allemagne
The Army of Germany was not the instrument that Napo-leon had used to such devastating effect in 1805-07 against Austria, Prussia, or Russia. Most of those troops were dead, debilitated, or transferred to Spain. An important exception was III Corps. Aside from these proven veterans, two new Corps were created—the II and IV—supplemented by two-plus Corps of German Confederation of the Rhine troops. Of the 114,635 French troops, 23,300 were conscripts (con-centrated in Divisions Tharreau, Claparede, Molitor and Boudet) and half of these were completely untrained. The army lacked the cannon needed to bolster its untried forma-tions.
Each infantry division comprised two or more brigades, each of two or three regiments. The regiment was the sol-dier’s “nuclear family” which looked to his needs, and it was to the regiment’s eagle that he rallied on the battlefield. Each regiment comprised two or three battalions in the field and one in the depot at home, which provided a stream of re-placements from the same area. The battalions in turn con-tained seven “line” companies, plus one of tall grenadiers, and one of light and nimble voltigeurs.
The Cavalry comprised three divisions of armor-clad cuirassiers on huge Belgian mounts; a single light division of hussars and chasseurs; plus the light cavalry brigades attached to the Corps.

II Corps—Oudinot – 21388
Oudinot’s Grenadier division (which had been depleted by drafts for Spain) was expanded to two divisions with the introduction of raw conscripts, including beardless youths of 17. Their designation, demi-brigades d’elite, was entirely misleading—less than one-third of these troops had previ-ously seen combat. Hampered by inflexibility on the battle-field, the two divisions had good cadre that, with experience, improved.
1. Inf.-Div. Tharreau: 16 Bns., 18 Guns – 7145
2. Inf.-Div. Claparede: 16 Bns., 18 Guns – 8860
Lt. Cav.-Brig. Colbert: 9 Sqds. – 2183
3. H Cav.-Div. Espagne: 16 Sqds., 6 Guns – 3200

III Corps—Davout – 60597
The incomparable III Corps had stopped a force of double its numbers at Austerlitz in 1805 and again at Auerstadt in 1806. Under the stern gaze of Marshal Davout, the combat-proven divisions of Gudin, Friant, and Morand had not noticeably declined in effectiveness despite serious casual-ties in three campaigns. All their regiments were capable of deploying into skirmish order like light infantry. These three were joined by St. Hilaire’s division, formerly of Soult’s old IV Corps, which included one of the most formidable of all French infantry regiments—the 57th. Each of these four main divisions contained 15 battalions, 15 guns, and 11,350 men (on average). Demont’s Reserve division comprised 10 understrength battalions of new recruits, with 15 guns—3215 men. The Corps light cavalry component under Mont-brun was expanded in proportion to the infantry, with 24 Sqds and 5218 men. St. Sulpice’s independent Cuirassier Division was attached—16 Sqds., 6 Guns, 3411 men.

IV Corps—Massena – 37559
A mixture of veteran and conscript French troops plus two German brigades. Division Legrand included one brigade of French and one of Baden troops—mainly conscripts with a cadre of veterans of the 1807 campaign. Their Dragoons were attached to Marulaz’s Light Cavalry. The 24th Light and 4th Line Regiments under Carra Saint Cyr were veter-ans; the division also contained a brigade of Hesse-Darmstadt troops. Molitor and Boudet had large proportions of new recruits.
Inf.-Div. Legrand: 13 Bns., 24 Guns – 10458
(includes Baden Brigade of 7 Bns., 12 Guns—
5517 infantry in three regiments and one Jäger battalion, 435 Light Dragoons, 348 gunners.)
Inf.-Div. Carra St. Cyr: 14 Bns., 18 Guns – 11553 (includes the Hessian Brigade of 6 Bns., 6 Guns.)
3. Inf.-Div. Molitor: 10 Bns., 12 Guns – 7166
4. Inf.-Div. Boudet: 7 Bns., 12 Guns – 5628
Lt. Cav.-Div. Marulaz: 18 Sqds. – 2765

VII Corps—Lefebvre (Bavarian) – 27603
The Bavarian army had made the transition from the inflexi-ble drill of the 18th century to the adaptable tactics of the French. Mobilized on 25th February 1809, the Army com-prised 13 Infantry Regiments, 7 Lt Infantry battalions, 2 Rgts. of Dragoons, 4 of Light Cavalry, and 20 batteries of Artillery, 13 of which served with VII Corps.
1st Div.—Crown Prince Ludwig: 9 Bns., 6 Sqds., 18 Guns – 8782
2nd Div.—Wrede: : 9 Bns., 8 Sqds., 18 Guns – 8944
3rd Div.—Deroy: 10 Bns., 8 Sqds., 18 Guns – 9751
Artillery Reserve: 18 Guns
Each division comprised two infantry and one cavalry bri-gades, supported by four batteries.

VIII Corps—Vandamme (Württemberg) – 12242
A wagon train provided by Württemberg brought supplies from their own depot at Heidenheim (north of Ulm) to troops in the field. The light infantry brigade of Hügel featured prominently in the battle of Abensberg.
Inf.-Div. Neubronn: 14 Bns. – 9615 (two infantry bri-gades and Hügel’s Lt. Infantry brigade)
Cav.-Bde. Wöllwarth: 16 Sqds. – 2214 (2 brigades)
Artillery: 22 Guns (459 artillerists, three batteries)

Independent Units
Div. Rouyer (German states): 9 Bns. – 6777
1. H Cav.- Div. Nansouty: 24 Sqds. (Brigades Defrance, Doumerc, and St. Germain), 12 Guns – 4833

French Commanders
The leaders of this rapidly assembled French Army were still the best in the world, though some showed signs of decline. By this time Lannes was the equal of Davout or Massena in his prime. Bessieres, Oudinot, Lannes and Mas-sena were recalled from Spain. Massena had not served under the Emperor for ten years, and his initiative was flag-ging. Oudinot was an old grenadier, who impetuously put himself in the front ranks. Davout was a meticulous organ-izer and strict disciplinarian who also grasped strategy—a rare quality among all Napoleon’s marshals. Vandamme was abrasive and failed to cooperate with the other Corps Officers.
To find the necessary officers and NCOs for the newly-created formations, every expedient was resorted to, with officers drawn from depots, from retirement, from academies, as well as thousands of newly-commissioned sergeants.

French Plans
Napoleon selected the fortified town of Regensburg (Ratis-bon) on the Danube as his center of operations. From this bridgehead he would be able to parry an Austrian thrust regardless of which bank it followed. “Napoleon planned to form a new version of his famed bataillon carré around Ratisbon, capable of meeting an attack from any direction and of turning any situation to the French advantage. A combination of unanticipated Austrian aggressiveness and plain bungling on the part of poor Berthier, hopelessly out of his depth amid this welter of instructions, was to lead to the near ruination of Napoleon’s carefully considered schemes.”

Austrian Plans
By avoiding large detachments on secondary fronts, the Austrians were able to concentrate almost 200,000 men for the attack on Bavaria. The Archduke Charles favored a surprise attack against Davout’s command from Bohemia. However, poor communications with Bohemia would delay baggage trains. The Aulic Council, which had to approve war plans, were in favor of a more limited offensive from the south bank. This would alleviate communications and supply problems, protect Vienna from a French advance on that side, and place the army in a position to support the forces of Archduke John in the Tyrol. With news of Oudinot’s and Massena’s threatening appearance at Ulm, Charles was forced to adopt the lesser strategy, and it took two weeks to transfer six corps from Bohemia across the Danube.
Two Corps—Bellegarde’s I and Kolowrat’s II Corps —remained in Bohemia to attack from Cham toward Ratis-bon. After crossing the River Inn at Scharding, and the Isar at Landshut, the Austrian center and reserve would advance on Kelheim to cross the Danube behind Davout and possibly cut his line of retreat, while the left wing guarded against a move by Massena and Oudinot from the west. Due to Berth-ier’s misunderstanding of his master’s intentions, Davout was ordered to retreat by the south bank, directly into the path of 127,000 Austrians.

The Outbreak of War
The Austrians made no formal declaration of war, merely handing a note to M. Otto, head of the French legation at Munich. This provided a degree of surprise, although the maneuvers of the Austrians in their approach to the frontier were known. Initial concentrations in Bohemia, north of the Danube, led Napoleon to think the main attack would come from that side.

Opening Moves
Davout marched from Erfurt to Nuremberg to block any Austrian moves westward from Bohemia. Oudinot’s II Corps moved to Augsburg, and Massena’s IV Corps to Ulm. The French army was well positioned to deal with an offensive on either side of the Danube. Marshal Lefebvre’s VII Corps was pushed forward along the Isar River to screen these deployments against any Austrian moves south of the Danube. As in 1805, Austria began the campaign there.


The Campaign

Set-up each day’s March Tables as you read along.

16 APRIL Landshut
Deroy’s Bavarian Division delayed the Austrian crossing for a few hours, then fell back before Radetzky’s Avant Garde on Siegenberg on the Abens. Wrede and the other Bavarians gathered in support.

17 APRIL
Austrians scouts reached Siegenburg, Rohr and Eckmühl; Traffic behind them became entangled at the bridges.

18 APRIL
Charles directed four Corps to intercept Davout south of Regensburg, while the three Bavarian Divisions prepared to stop them at the Abens River line.

19 APRIL Bad Abbach
After finally collecting at Ratisbon, Davout’s Corps was marching toward Neustadt in four columns when his flank-ing cavalry came into contact with the heads of Charles’s northbound columns. Charles now believed the game was in his pocket and that the anticipated opportunity of destroying Davout had materialized. Fortunately for the French, the Austrian attack failed to account for Davout’s rapid west-ward movement, and as a result two of their three columns struck empty air south of Regensburg, only the westernmost corps making contact with Davout’s rear guard.

20 APRIL Teugn-Hausen
Divisions Friant and St. Hilaire found little difficulty in repulsing the ill-directed and lethargic Austrians with heavy loss, while their compatriots, Morand and Gudin, hurried their divisions westward through the dangerous Saal defile to join up with the Bavarians who were also hotly engaged. Their meeting actually took place in the vicinity of Abens-berg, whither Lefebvre had retired during the preceding 24 hours.

Abensberg
The attack by the French center, beginning at 9:00 AM, took a little over two hours to crash the brittle barrier formed by Archduke Louis’s Vth Corps. By midday, Napoleon’s stra-tegic penetration was accomplished, and it appeared that nothing could save the Austrian army from piecemeal de-struction.

22 APRIL Landshut
Withdrawing from the vicinity of Pfaffenhofen, Hiller was able to re-cross the Isar safely with the remnants of three corps, leaving a strong garrison to hold the Landshut bridges. Although the piles were already on fire, Mouton—who would gain his fame at Lobau later in 1809—gallantly led his men over the river bridge, captured the island in the middle, then stormed over the second span of the crossing into Landshut itself, entirely disregarding the fact that the enemy were still massed in the town. Seeing Mouton leading the way at Landshut Napoleon exclaimed, “my lamb (mou-ton) is a Lion.”

Lindach
Charles intended to move two corps to Abbach to secure undisputed control of the river bank and cut Napoleon off from the Danube and his presumed lines of communication. The Austrian troops met stiff opposition from Davout, who had been left to defend this front, when at 1:30 PM the sound of gunfire from the south revealed the approach of Napoleon and the main body. Davout lost no time in order-ing his men to attack along the whole line, despite their numerical inferiority, and this action had the desired effect of pinning the Austrians.

Regensburg
At 5:00 PM, Colonel Coutard’s garrison regiment surren-dered, opening Charles route into Bohemia where Belle-garde’s and Kollowrat’s corps awaited him.

Eckmühl
The rearguard action by the Austrian IV Corps against superior numbers: the Bavarian divisions of Deroy and Prince Royal attacking the right of the Eckmühl position while General Demont moved up the valley of the Gross Laber to cover the crossing of Napoleon’s advanced guard under Lannes. Very soon General Vandamme’s Württem-bergers captured Buckhausen. Lannes’s two divisions fell on the Austrians holding the eastern approaches to Eckmühl, Gudin’s troops seizing the important heights of Rogging. Napoleon’s favorite frontal attack linked with an outflanking column was working with great efficiency. The 10th Regi-ment of Light Infantry succeeded in storming the village of Laichling and soon after took possession of the wood of Unterlaichling

Alt Eglofsheim
With his southern flank of the point of collapse, the Austrian commander in chief ordered an immediate retreat to Regens-burg. This movement proceeded throughout the darkness, covered by the cavalry.

23 APRIL Ratisbon
During the night the Austrians crossed the Danube on a pontoon bridge downstream from the town. Their cavalry covering this operation were driven in by Nansouty. In the afternoon Charles abandoned Ratisbon, and during the French “bombardment” of the town’s ancient walls (with 12-pounders) Napoleon was slightly wounded. Some kind of breach was made and two of Lannes’s aides-de-camp scaled the wall near the Straubing Gate. Gudin got through the gate and reached the bridge, trapping the remaining Austrians in the town.
Napoleon ordered Massena to Passau, downstream from Straubing, while Davout crossed the Danube to follow Charles; and Lefebvre with Deroy’s and Demont’s divisions followed by Prince Royal marched to Landshut.

Continuation of the Campaign
Charles’s force reached Cham, in Bohemia, with Bellegarde following. Charles took 90,000 men further into Bohemia to reorganize, sending Kolowrat toward Pilsen to watch Saxony. Hiller turned on Bessieres, catching Wrede and Marulaz with their backs to the Rott River. The French retired to Vilsbiburg and Hiller escaped. Massena occupied Linz on 3 May, driving Hiller from Ebelsberg to Krems and then across the Danube at Mautern. Lannes reached Vienna on May 10th. Charles united his army to oppose the French crossing at Aspern-Essling on May 21st, and drove the French back onto the Island of Lobau. The second French crossing succeeded on 5-6 July, at the bloody battle of Wa-gram.