The Coming Storm

At first light on October 8th, 1806, the French Army's Avant Garde marched off into the Thüringian Forest. They had traveled from Bamberg, in northeast Bavaria, by the Main River as far as Hochstadt, ascending thence along the banks of the Rodach. Breaking their bivouac near the stream's source around Nordhalben, they climbed across a spur of the Thüringian Forest called the Franconian Forest; a range of hills 80 miles long, rising to a height of nearly 1000 metres. The advanced guard was the harbinger of a vast armament, Napoleon's main column marching 75,000 strong. "Napoleon's object being surprise, all the cavalry except a few vedettes were kept back behind the leading infantry."

Two other columns of French soldiers marched on either side along parallel roads to the north and south, effectively isolated because of the rugged terrain. Until they reached the more open country beyond the forest, these columns would be incapable of mutual support. As soon as communication was reëstablished, Napoleon's celebrated "battalion square" (bataillon carreé) of 180,000 men would swing into action.

"By dividing his army into three columns he saved at least four precious days in effecting the crossing of the forest." Still, placing the columns in isolation from each other was a calculated risk. "Napoleon anticipated that the Prussians might possibly await the arrival of the head of the three columns at the further side of the forest, hoping to defeat each detachment in turn."

Streaming forth out of the forest-clad northern slopes, Bernadotte's I Corps followed on the heels of the Avant Garde "in ‘masses of manoeuvre’ so as to crush at once" any resistance by the Prussian outposts. This innovation saved them the time normally needed to deploy, and afforded the enemy outposts no warning nor any chance to pull back. Davout's superb III Corps, Napoleon's "Tenth Legion," followed Bernadotte.

Exiting from the hills into the open country beyond the Saale River, six light cavalry regiments trotted to the front, personally directed by Murat. The troopers, of the Cavalry Reserve and I Corps, moved ahead to reconnoiter the roads, and quickly discovered the exact whereabouts of the foe. Unaware of the storm about to burst upon them, the Prussians and Saxons posted no guard on the exits from the hill country, deploying their screening force instead around Saalburg and Schleiz. Failing to patrol aggressively, they found themselves being hounded-off by the French horsemen. In the first clash at Saalburg, the enemy outposts received a rough handling, losing many prisoners as they fell back through the town. Suffering few losses themselves, the confident troopers encamped in the woods beyond Saalburg for the night.

Half a century had elapsed since the great Prussian victory of Rossbach, where Seydlitz's 38 squadrons of Prussian cavalry, supported by only seven battalions of infantry, routed 64,000 French and Allied troops. The decades passed and the aging victors of Rossbach rested on their laurels. They gained some limited successes against the fledgling armies of revolutionary France, but the clash at Saalfeld was their first experience of the new kind of warfare evolving in France.

The Theatre of Operations

The decision of the campaign would come in the rolling country of the Thüringian States west of Leipzig, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Reuss, and Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt. Austrian Territory forms the southeastern border of the stage. To the North and east lay Saxony. The Thüringian Forest forms the proscenium of the theatre, dividing the watershed of the Saale River, flowing northeast toward the Elbe, from that of the westward-flowing, Rhine-replenishing Main. Napoleon's troops climbed northeast from the valley of the Main by three parallel roads, across the Franconian Forest to the upper reaches of the Saale. Rising to altitudes of 2500 feet, the forest-clad mountains between the upper Main and the Saale are traversed only by these few roads clinging to the river valleys. Along the spine of the Franconian Forest the hills gradually descend to the Hof gap.

Hof, on the Saale, (see game map) marks the jumping-off point for the smooth descent into Thüringia. Through Hof marched the long columns of the southern wing, Soult’s IV Corps in the lead, Ney’s VI Corps half a day behind. Away on the northern wing, Lannes’ V Corps marched quickly through Gräfenthal, arriving on the Saale far ahead of Augereau’s VII Corps. From Saalburg in the center, the main column followed Murat’s cavalry, gradually climbing, as far as the town of Schleiz, up the western slope between the Saale and Elster.

The right (eastern) bank of the Saale is "a rolling plateau of well-wooded downs at a considerable elevation" above the deeply sunk river valley. "Through this plateau the tributary streams pass in valleys often broad and open," like the one leading from Pössneck to Saalfeld. "Farther north the plateau erodes" into the Leipzig plain.

Beyond the Saale, roads though unpaved were numerous. The opening days were dry, though turning colder, and the French infantry easily marched straight across parts of the plateau, outpacing the Prussians marching on the roads. "Since the Seven Years’ War, roads had been improved ... enabling armies to live on the land they marched through." Apparently the Prussian staff hadn't taken notice.

Culture

The valleys of the Saale and the Ilm formed a major center of learning. The University of Jena was founded in 1558. Jena, on both banks of the Saale halfway to the plain of Leipzig, was home to poets and philosophers of the Romantic school. This year of 1806 would bring an end to its most brilliant period, with lectures by Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schlegel and Schiller. Weimar, a centre of liberalism and art, was the grand duke's residence; from 1782 to 1832 Goethe lived there as the duke's privy secretary. Napoleon said he would rather have been the author of Werther than Emperor of Europe, and tried to cajole him into moving to Paris. Though the poet admired the Emperor, he stayed.

At the confluence of the Saale with the Unstrutt valley and its extensive vineyards, the city of Naumburg in 1806 was more than twice the age of Baltimore in 1995. Erfurt, founded in 742 A.D., came under the rule of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Mainz, and transferred to Prussia in 1803.

The Prussian Army

The potential manpower totalled 190,100 field troops.

TABLE          Infantry       Cavalry        Artillery      Lt./H Guns

Mobilized    139,700        41,100           9,300 296/600

Sept. 25th   136,000        35,000          15,000           250/300

About 23,000 men remained in Poland and Silesia. Garrisons, depots and fortresses across the realm absorbed a further 45,400. In September these troops concentrated around Weissenfels, Dresden, and Mülhausen in three field armies under Brunswick, Hohenlohe, and Ruchel, respectively. Blücher’s detachment from Ruchel’s Army took post forward in Göttingen.

FIELD ARMY         Total Men   Brunswick  Hohenlohe Ruchel

Early Oct.    129,500        58,000          46,500          25,000

Oct. 6th        131,250        60,750          42,000          28,500

Oct. 14th     109,575        49,800          37,775          22,000

Oct. 14th     103,580        50,545          37,775          15,260

The Prussians made so many detachments that on the day of battle at Jena and Auerstädt only 104,000 Prussians and Saxons faced the French on the two battlefields. After leaving detachments in Erfurt and Eisenach, Ruchel's force of 22,000 had dwindled to 15,260. Neither Eugen of Württemberg's 13,000 men at Magdeburg nor Weimar's 12,000 toward Meiningen, could reach the decisive battlefields. Troops of Blücher's command, joined with the garrisons of Hameln and Nieuburg under Lecoq, Hagken and Brusewitz, remained near Münster. A total of 12,000, they watched a Corps of 15,000 Dutch holding the crossing of the Rhine at Wesel.

The King placed no pressure on the small German states for support, thus forfeiting an additional 38,000 men. The Saxon army of 20,000 men, broken up and distributed partly to Tauenzien's division and Prittwitz's Reserve of Hohenlohe's Army, had little choice but to go along. Only Zezschwitz’s division was all-Saxon.

"After the Seven Years' War the Prussian army had stood still," living in the shadow of Frederick the Great and the memory of Rossbach. Besides its deficiency of skirmishers, the army suffered when Frederick's superb cavalry Corps and artillery reserve split up and operated under infantry commands. Man for man, the Prussian troops were the equals of their enemies. Though they fought well, they had not quite caught the new disease of nationalism smoldering in the hearts of their officers. Napoleon admired the light cavalry of the foe, and warned his subordinates to be on their guard against sudden attack. Superior to the French in action, though not as adept at gathering intelligence, the Prussian light cavalry was capable of creating havoc among infantry marching without a cavalry escort.

At Jena and Auerstädt the dreaded Prussian cavalry did not greatly distinguish itself, wasting its blood in futile attacks on unbroken infantry. "Even against French cavalry on equal terms it gained no marked success." The Saxon heavy cavalry under Kochtizky, riding splendid large mounts, and superbly disciplined, were the best in the world at the time. Though the Prussian cavalry completely broke up, the Saxon cavalry kept together until the end.

According to Clausewitz, muskets were after the pattern of 1754; by then, the worst in Europe. Later scholarship refutes this claim. Prussian marksmanship was acceptable by the low standards of the era. If most shots hit a large sheet representing the front of an enemy formation at 100 yards, that was good enough.

Historians may have exaggerated, too, the inadequacy of Prussian tactics. According to the received tradition, Prussian units failed to support each other's flanks, each division acting independently, in echelon. They could not adapt to undulating terrain; requiring instead clear ground and a defined front. They did not utilize cover and only the Schützen and Jaeger Regiments operated as skirmishers. "The fatal method of that epoch was to halt ... within the zone of the enemy's effective fire, forming line in order to act by the regulation fire of masses. Harassed by a galling fire from the swarms of skirmishers ... and unable to return it, the Prussian infantry was already shaken and demoralized." When volley firing finally began, it had "but little effect on the French," skirmishing in gardens and potato fields or behind village walls.

Morale might be described as a combination of intangibles that measure the determination to make war. Sometimes by a mere word or gesture, a leader's mood can infect a whole army. At the onset of the campaign, kindled by a desire to teach the French a lesson, Prussian morale was very high. The Saxons did not share in the political ambitions of the Prussian nation, and their morale was much lower.

On October 10th Prussian morale received a crushing blow with the loss of Prince Louis in the action of Saalfeld. Morale declined further as the troops, "marching and counter marching without even seeing the enemy," realized the incompetence at headquarters. On the day following the action of Saalfeld, among the fugitives sent to Jena to reorganize, the cry went up, "the French are in the town." This stirred a panic which first spread through the streets of Jena, within twenty-four hours paralyzing the whole army. "Some Saxon supply wagons coming from Neustadt actually turned around and never stopped in their flight until they were arrested by the real enemy in their efforts to escape from an imaginary one." The Saxon troops, who had not eaten for three days, sorely missed this convoy.

The Prussian supply system encumbered the army and limited its maneuverability. The main army close by Naumburg fared adequately, but Hohenlohe's troops went hungry from the 9th. The Saxons, whose supply columns came through Auma, were cut from their own sources when that town fell. "Many units--especially the hastily mobilized Saxons--were beginning to suffer from short rations." The immense magazines at Naumburg fell into Davout's hands on the 13th, along with a Prussian bridge train. A lack of firewood on the cold, damp October nights made the encampments bleak indeed. As morale began plummeting, the ranks of some Prussian units began to thin out.

"On the morning of the 12th the Saxon commanding officers approached Hohenlohe with a statement of the famishing condition of their men, and threatened to withdraw them again to Saxony." On the 13th, the ranking Saxon general sent a formal notice to Hohenlohe "announcing his intention to secede from the Alliance and to march his men back to Dresden." Addressing the complaints of his Saxon subordinates, Hohenlohe pointed out the worsening situation of his Prussian troops. He sent off urgent messages to "the Commissary von Goethe (the poet) at Weimar, for permission to requisition food and firewood. These requests remained unanswered, and the Prussians and Saxons spent the night before the battle shivering in their miserable bivouacs."

The French Army            Total Men   Cavalry        Guns

Early Sept. 160,000+     32,000          300+

Sept. 25th   162,000        28,464          300+

About 80% of the French field army was present at either Jena or Auerstädt; Bernadotte's I Corps spent the day of battle marching the wrong way. Not only did the French march more quickly to the decisive point, on the battlefield their veteran infantry was "flexible, quick and intelligent, although decidedly starved of fire drill." This flexibility, afforded by the kinds of formations the French employed, made them a potent force against the Prussians, who could not match their rapid evolutions nor quick changes of face.

"The Prussians attacked at the old regulation speed of seventy-five paces to the minute, while the French manoeuvred at the quick or double of 120 or 150. The consequence was that the French always succeeded in reinforceing their line in time to avert disaster."

Only the divisions of Gazan and Dupont had a high proportion of raw conscripts who, like the Prussians, were less flexible under battlefield conditions. Raw recruits and veterans alike were disoriented by the early morning fog. In their blindness friendly units could not cooperate nor even distinguish friend from foe. Napoleon had to postpone the attack on the 14th until 6:30 A.M.

Recently re-mounted on horses taken from the defeated Austrians, the French cavalry was well trained in "reconnaissance, screening and pursuit." Their results were, however, unsatisfactory. On the night of the 10th the Emperor was still unaware of the position of his principal foe, and all traces of the Saxons were lost. "Napoleon, little satisfied with his cavalry, authorized Lasalle to offer up to 6000 frs. reward for information of the Prussian point of concentration." Lacking the instinctual, native talent of their opposite numbers, the "standard of action in battle" of the French cavalry was also somewhat doubtful.

Losses in gun carriages and limbers from the previous winter's campaign of Austerlitz had yet to be made good. Though the lack of equipment made the guns hard to maneuver, the artillerists made up for this by siting their guns before battle to create sweeping fields of fire. Napoleon always paid special attention to gun placement.

As the Grande Armée organized for the coming campaign, Napoleon wrote in dismay to Berthier over the omission of bridging equipment from the situation report. One company of pontonniers joined the Grand Park and one each Corps, all but one assembling at Augsburg. Each of the seven companies, comprising 60 to 80 boats, could build a span of 350 to 500 feet in seven hours. Whether or not all the pontonniers arrived in time to march with their Corps, the lead elements of the army, Davout, Lannes and Bernadotte, likely had theirs.

Having benefitted from the recent Franco-Austrian war, Bavarian diplomats adhered to Napoleon's cause, while the Bavarian rank and file were mostly just going through the motions. The Bavarian troops were placed under the command of Napoleon's brother, Jerome. The two Bavarian divisions comprised over 14,000 men, but Deroi's Division mustered slowly, setting out from the Danube two weeks behind Wrede's, too late to participate in Jena and Auerstädt.

French Commanders

The most important generals, entrusted with executing all the Emperor's designs, commanded the six Corps d'armee. Davout, Soult, and Bernadotte usually commanded large Corps, whilst Ney, Lannes, and Augereau were entrusted with smaller ones of two divisions each.

On reconnaissance the cavalry, commanded by Murat, often delivered defective and misleading information. On the battlefield Murat sometimes handled his cavalry very indifferently. Bernadotte usually operated well in a semi-independent position, though he failed to appear at Auerstädt where Davout, probably the ablest of the marshals, distinguished himself nonetheless. At 36 he was bald, slightly stooped, and severely nearsighted. He wore a pair of special combat glasses fastened behind his head. In the rear guard, Ney excelled; in the front, or detached, he lost his head, running unnecessary risk without regard to orders. Lannes, a highly capable commander and confidant of Napoleon, led the northern wing of the army and was first to arrive at Jena, his mobile strike force strengthened by Suchet's veteran division. Soult lacked a sense of timing, though he always planned effectively. Augereau inspired confidence in his men, but lacked perseverance. His failure to follow close "on Lannes's heels shows a lamentable want of initiative."

Except for forces under his immediate command, Napoleon gave no orders throughout the afternoon and evening, when later reports might compel him to make a change. He rose about midnight, with all reports from the Corps awaiting him, and had at least two hours to issue orders in time for those troops within 20 hexes--four hours' ride--to move by daybreak.

Napoleon's personal staff surrounding him could instantly draft and dispatch his orders. As he moved from place to place on campaign, his company included Berthier, devoted Chief of Staff; Duroc, Marshal of the Palace; Caulaincourt, Master of the Horse; Clarke and other secretaries; aides-de-camp Lemarois, Savary, Rapp, Bertrand, Mouton; and orderly officers who actually rode the orders to the various Corps officers. On arrival at a halting place he required his own apartment and an office. In the middle stood a table with his map spread out and pins that marked the positions of the troops. At tables in the corners of the office sat the archivist and secretaries.

Napoleon's Chief of Staff, Berthier, had a large personal staff of aides-de-camp and orderly officers. They included Bruyeres, de Girardin, de Montholon, de Noailles and others known for their smart appearance. Andréossy, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, distributed the work amongst his subordinates. When Berthier received a written order he passed it to one of three sections. The first, under General Hastrel, was entrusted with dispatching orders and general communication. The second, under General Petiet, was charged with maintainence of headquarters, military police, and hospitals. The third, under Adjutant Boerner, handled prisoners of war and courts-martial. Sanson commanded the Topographical service, Songis the artillery, and Chasseloup the engineers. Intendant-General Villemanzy and his staff dealt with the commissariat, transport, clothing, equipment and hospitals.

Prussian Commanders

The Commander in Chief, Duke Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Brunswick, distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War. He served as field marshal commanding the Prussian armies at Valmy in 1792, and again as victor over the French at Pirmasens and Kaiserslautern in 1793. A nephew of Frederick the Great, he was a cautious soldier. He did not survive the campaign, and his son was killed at Quatre-Bras in 1815. He preferred music to the intrigues of court life, playing the violin well. He accepted command more from a military sense of duty than out of conviction: French spies reported that he was opposed to war with France. Just turned seventy-one, Brunswick was still full of vigour, but he proved indecisive as commander-in-chief, and the jealous Hohenlohe refused to obey his commands. Scharnhorst was appointed his chief of staff, "presumably to strengthen his initiative." All major decisions were referred to a council of war. The presence of the King's military and diplomatic suite at Brunswick's headquarters merely contributed to the confusion and indecision.

The mercurial Prince Friedrich Ludwig von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen had been highly valued by Frederick, and greatly distinguished himself in the wars against the French Republic. He "possessed some miltary talent, but was inclined to rash and hotheaded decisions and was somewhat unimaginative."

On the other hand, the Prussian officer corps contained men like Scharnhorst, Müffling, or the younger Kleist, who would later help deliver the Prussian nation during the wars of liberation. Kalkreuth gained a reputation at the siege of Mayence in 1793, and earned respect by his tenacious defence of Danzig in 1807. Schmettau, at sixty years of age, "was a retired warrior who insisted on getting back in harness. ... Blücher, the ablest of all, was already sixty-four years old." Ruchel was 62. The average colonel was in his mid-fifties.

"The faults of the generals were due largely to the fact that their army was not, as Frederick's had been, the tactical superior of the French. The framework of the military system, once broken, had no strength to stand. In the presence of the young and reckless French leaders, the old, weak, and irresolute Prussian commandants showed themselves incapable of resistance. ... How is it possible to expect the same indefatigable activity from Winning at 70, from Kalkreuth at 69, or from Hohenlohe at 60, as was found in Davout, Lannes, Murat, Soult, and Ney at 36 or 37?"

The Chief of Staff, General Phüll, had under him three "Lieutenant Quartermasters-General" (army chiefs of staff). Each had under him two Quartermasters, two Lieutenant Quartermasters, and a small survey establishment. The three sections under each Lieutenant Quartermaster-General were distributed to the three armies. There was nothing corresponding to Napoleon's staffs of Corps, for Corps did not exist. There was no functioning General Staff, no chain of command, no Corps Headquarters; the Division structure was new and untried. "The Commander-in-Chief's orders had to be transmitted to 14 divisions separately whereas Napoleon's operation orders were despatched only to six Corps commanders." "Orders issued from general headquarters therefore had to go into fantastic detail ... and generals frequently found it necessary to brief their regimental commanders in person."

The incompetent Colonel Massenbach, Hohenlohe's chief of staff, endeavored to perform Scharnhorst's duties as well as his own, and the latter, an original thinker among conformists, "was kept at a distance by the whole of his official superiors." Hohenlohe was in bad health, and his nerves were not in a condition to bear the shock of a great catastrophe; he was wanting in breadth of view, which placed him too much in dependence on Massenbach. The latter acquired over Hohenlohe an unfortunate influence which did much to ruin the Prussian cause.

Outbreak of War

In reaction to the treaty imposed by Napoleon in the wake of Austerlitz the year before, "a party of patriotic senior officers ... formed around the person of the beautiful and warlike Queen." For her consort Friedrich Wilhelm, the bleak year of 1806 progressed from one insult to another. His one consolation was the prized territory of Hanover, but at the end of July his ambassador to France reported Napoleon's secret offer to restore Hanover to the British. At this the level of war hysteria ratcheted-up, and on August 9th Prussia slowly began mobilization. Prussian troops crossed into Saxony on September 6th, occupying the capital of Dresden, and then moved toward the Thüringian Forest. The king, overawed by his legions, seemed convinced that their mere appearance in the field would cause Napoleon to release his grip on the Rhine.

On September 18th, Napoleon learned of the incorporation of the two Saxon divisions into Hohenlohe's army, an act he "regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war upon France." By evening Napoleon was convinced that war was inevitable. After this provocation, Frederick William allowed his senior officers to belive there was still a chance for accommodation with Napoleon. Thus, at the hour when the most superhuman efforts were required of Prussia, the Army and the nation responded feebly and slowly.

By contrast, on the 19th Napoleon issued orders for movements prepatory to early hostilities. The Prussian ultimatum, calculated to goad Napoleon into attacking, was only despatched on September 25th, the very day on which Napoleon set out to join his army. This document demanded the withdrawal of all French troops west of the Rhine and set a deadline of October 8th for a response. The mooted despatch only reached the Emperor's headquarters at Bamberg on October 7th. Correctly interpreting the Prussian occupation of Saxony, Napoleon had gained two weeks, and his early arrival in the Theater of Operations stunned the Prussian staff.

Napoleon aimed to destroy the Prussian army before Russian aid could arrive. Less than a year after Austerlitz, Russia had not fully recovered her war-making capacity. Bennigsen's Army of 60,000 men assembled at Brzesc (Berezhey) on the River Bug, with another 40,000 under Buxhöwden forming further in the rear. Contingency march plans called on Bennigsen to set out on September 25th, though his army could not have arrived on map before November 10th. In fact he awaited the French where he stood.

Napoleon needed to catch his Prussian adversary in a forward concentration, and avoid a protracted campaign in which the Prusians were allowed to close with their Russian allies. "The area between Dresden and Leipzig was clearly the strategical key to the situation." With Dresden in French hands, a Russian force would not be able to cross the Elbe. "No time was to be lost in seizing this excellent central position," from which to separate the two allies. Napoleon would have to march through the area of the game map to reach that position.

He laid down his objectives as Dresden and Berlin; not that he believed their mere occupation would bring victory, but he saw them as indicating the best lines of advance. By capturing their capital, Dresden, he would sever the Saxons from the Prussian alliance, and nterpose between the Prussian army and the advancing Russians. By drawing towards himself the former he would achieve his real objective, defeat and destruction of the enemy mass.

Napoleon realised that this strike would automatically unmask the Prussian plan; "for such an advance would either cut or threaten the lines of communication running from Jena to Dresden, Naumberg to Leipzig, and Magdeburg to Berlin."

Prussian Operational Goals

There were two broad alternatives open to the Prussians at the start of the campaign. The first of these was an advance against the French lines of communication. [Theatre map, at "B"]

The second alternative was to fight a series of delaying actions.

Only Colonel Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Brunswick's chief of staff, "was bold enough to suggest this plan." He proposed trading "space for time, fighting a series of delaying actions ... until Bennigsen came into action." The French would become weaker as they advanced into enemy territory because of detachments needed to guard their line of communications and other march attrition, while the Prussians, retiring upon their recruitment centers, could increase their numbers with each passing week. Once united with the Russians, they would be ready to risk a pitched battle.

The majority of the Prussian staff favored a more aggressive strategy: to take up forward positions and outflank the Grande Armée, either before or behind the Thüringian Forest. On October 5th their advance began: Hohenlohe from Jena-Erfurt-Rudolstadt, Brunswick from Langensalza-Erfurt, Ruchel from Eisenach and Blücher from Cassel. On October 9th Brunswick was near Erfurt, Ruchel in and around Gotha and Hohenlohe's main body at Mittel Pöllnitz. From these positions the Prussians could easily descend through Saalfeld on Napoleon's flank as he moved on Auma, or withdraw toward the Elbe.

"Covered by the Saale we could move in perfect safety by the great road to Merseburg and head the enemy off at or near that point, given very few arrangements (e.g., a pair of pontoon bridges at Freyburg) [Theatre Map, at "A"]. Or we might cross the Saale behind him ["B"] and attack him so that he would have no retreat open but into Bohemia [Austrian, and neutral, territory]. Whereas the enemy would then have no lines of communication open to him, we would retain the passages of the Saale and all North Germany behind us."

"The decision to be taken on October 6th was quite simple: to leave Tauenzien at Hof as a Corps of observation, with instructions to withdraw towards Naumburg," to delay the advance of the French along that route, to keep in touch with them and report their movements. "To occupy the passages of the Saale," since this river is an impregnable defensive line, and can only be crossed at Jena and a few other places, "and to place Hohenlohe behind Jena" as the advanced guard of the army. "Ruchel and Brunswick about Erfurt with outposts towards the Thüringian Forest and Eisenach," would make sure the French did not threaten from this direction.

French Avenues of Approach

On September 29th, Napoleon ordered Bernadotte to advance to Kronach, occupying the exits from the Saxon hill-country. At the same time he sent cavalry detachments into the hills as far as the Bavarian frontier, to mask the coming movements. On October 1st, Napoleon ordered the establishment of a bakery at Bamberg to make four days' rations for 80,000 men. Each man carried four days' rations of pain biscuité, and biscuit rations for ten more days were

MAP PAGE

held in the Corps bakeries at Würzburg. Departing Mainz on October 1st, Napoleon arrived at Würzburg on the 2nd, occupying himself "with the supply and security of his columns." On the 6th he assumed personal command of the army at Bamberg.

Two passages through the Thüringian Forest were open to the French: by way of Fulda and Eisenach, [see Theatre Map at "1"] over decidedly mountainous and poorly-paved roads, or via "the easier stretches of the Franconian Forest" [see map at "2"]. He opted for the latter.

Napoleon divided his army into three columns to speed the passage of the mountains. After reaching the open country at Hof, Soult's first care as commander of the right column should be to seek for direct communication with the central column towards Lobenstein, Ebersdorf, and Schleiz. This duty was equally inculcated on Lannes, whose Fifth Corps marched to the left. Bernadotte's First Corps followed the strong cavalry screen under Murat, who would feel in both directions. Emerging on the farther side of the Thüringian mountains, Murat sent one brigade northward toward Saalfeld to find Lannes, and another south toward Tanna on the road to Hof.

Writing to Soult, "the Emperor indicates Dresden, not Berlin, as his objective; he requires full and early reports from Soult of all news regarding events on the great road to Dresden." On which wing his opponent was massing he did not know; and, indeed, did not care much. For he was determined to advance in the direction which most threatened the enemy's communcations.

Napoleon with the central column made for Gera in the hope of arriving first and "catching the Prussian Corps one by one as they made their rendezvous" there, but he was mistaken. The true concentration was on the left flank of his advance. Continuing the march to the Elbe was now out of the question. "With the Prussian army standing fast about Erfurt and Weimar, he would never have marched away from it on Dresden." To do so would expose his own lines of communication.

Prussian Countermoves

On October 7th "it was seen that the Emperor was aiming at the left flank of the widely-dispersed allies, and this was placed beyond the possibility of doubt on the 8th, when Müffling reported the advance of the French north-eastwards from Bamberg." Finally realizing the direction of Napoleon's advance toward Bayreuth and Coburg, some of the Prussian staff "asserted that the only wise course in the light of the new situation was to hold the line of the Saale; others, that the whole army should unite to defend Leipzig." "Obviously the proper course now was a concentration of the whole army towards its left centre, which would bring it in turn on the left flank of the enemy's advance, forcing him to turn towards it."

At this time, the moment when the Campaign Game begins, the Prussians had most of their strength north of the Saale. This deployment "was correct; the only fault to be found with the orders was that, by detaching part of Ruchel's and Blücher's forces, as well as the advance guard of Weimar, against Napoleon's communications, they weakened the concentration by about 11,000 men at a time when every available man should have been brought to a central point." By awaiting Napoleon's attack across the Saale, "the strong line of that river, if properly defended, would be an obvious advantage." The other alternative was to march towards Leipzig, seeking to head off the French about that city. "Even in this case the Saale would be of great advantage in covering the right of the flank march, provided the passages at Dornburg, Camburg, and Kösen were firmly held; for the Saale is ‘a river deeply sunk, and offering few points of passage,’ at least in this part of its course."

Brunswick finally decided upon "a movement against the general direction of the French advance," massing the army west of the Saale to threaten Napoleon's flank. Crossing in front of the advancing French was not part of the plan. Misunderstanding his role, Prince Louis placed himself in the path of destruction.

The Prince, "potentially the best soldier of Prussia," counted six Saxon battalions among his ten battalions, 10 squadrons and two and one-half batteries. The action at Saalfeld on the 10th cost the Prussian cause 29 officers--including the Prince--and about 1,700 men killed and wounded, plus 34 guns. The ensuing retreat took perhaps another 1,300, some of the battalions engaged losing one-third to one-half their establishment strength by the 13th. Such levels of loss indicate a breakdown in unit effectiveness. So demoralized were the fugitives from Saalfeld flooding through Kahla that Hohenlohe had to send them to Jena to reorganize, where they spread panic among the unengaged troops. Lannes Corps lost 172 killed and wounded.

This minor engagement was a crushing blow to Prussian morale. The Army had been schooled in its invincibility, placing its faith in Prince Louis, the Queen and the other leaders of the 'war party.' Prince Louis's complete defeat was a consequence of an entirely uncalled-for act of daring, which caused Hohenlohe's Army to be struck by panic. This disaster compounded another, by General Tauenzien, who lost too heavily in his retreat from Hof. Driven hence by Soult's advanced guard, he then backed-into Bernadotte's I Corps, losing 400 men at Schleiz. From Schleiz he made for Jena, leaving Naumburg and Kosen unoccupied, thus failing in his mission to prevent the enemy from pressing forward along the Leipzig road unhindered and unobserved. Without reports of the enemy's movements, the Prussian Army was paralyzed.

Marches

Because of the enormous Prussian trains, a distance of 15 hexes seemed a long day's march. Orders specified two-hour intervals (two to three hexes) between successive divisions on the road.

FORCE          DATE            MILES          HEXES          TIME

Prussian Main 11th        13       12       into darkness

Schmettau 13th   8         7         9 hrs.

Ruchel          14th   6         5         4 hrs.

French Guard       8th-14th      18       16       24 hrs.

Davout         8th-14th      16       14       24 hrs.

Lannes         8th-14th      14       13       24 hrs.

Augereau    10th-11th    83       75       50 hrs.

Bernadotte 15th-18th    26       23       24 hrs.

Lannes         15th-18th    26       23       24 hrs.

The Grand Army’s Marches to the Battle of Jena

Distances in Miles/Hexes. e = engagement.

October        9th     10th   11th   12th   13th

I Corps (Bernadotte)     16/15 e         12/11 16/15 18/16 10/9

1st Div                                  30/27

III Corps (Davout)         20/18            14/13 14/13

1st Div                                              30/27

2nd Div                                            24/22            8/7

3rd Div                                             17/16 14/13

IV Corps (Soult)  21/19 8/7     18/16 16/15 27/25

Div                             26/24            10/9   13/12

V Corps (Lannes)            30/27            13/12 e         20/18            16/15 e         4/4 e

VI Corps (Ney)                 17/16 26/24            8/7     10/9   14/13

Div                             12/11

VII Corps (Augereau)   21/19 22/20            24/22            9/8

Prior to the 8th, during the marches of concentration, Napoleon considered it unnecessary "to fatigue his men by taking tactical precautions" or imposing march discipline. Bernadotte's Corps could not keep up the pace, stopping short of its objective on the 13th due to fatigue.

The basic 24-hour march was 20 miles. Napoleon had his dividers set to this distance in his map room. In short bursts a brigade or smaller-sized unit can cover two hexes per hour on the road; but every four hours a unit must halt for half an hour, plus seven or eight hours at night. A unit force marching could traverse a maximum of 28 miles per day, if enemy resistance was not anticipated.

Every few days a force must slow down to take-in stragglers. The army cannot carry out combined operations at these rates for much over a week at a time. Napoleon proposed a halt during October 10th and 11th to allow his army to fully close up, but the thunder of battle at Saalfeld stirred the French into motion. Again on the 13th Napoleon planned "a general rest for his army, every Corps of which had been marching hard, some of them fighting also, since the 7th or earlier. ... Orders were despatched for the collection of a great central magazine at Auma, by moving up the supplies on the road from Kronach. The day was to be employed by the Corps ... in filling up stores of provisions and ammunition." For the second time, the troops were denied their sorely needed rest. Ultimately they went straight into battle from the march.

For the French army, which subsisted largely on the local resources of the enemy's country, the Corps had to fan-out widely, concentrating only for short periods, just before and during great battles. To find enough food, a Corps must have an area in which to forage many times larger than its post on the battlefield. The French Army in 1806 numbered thrice the largest army ever commanded by Frederick. No one man could personally oversee the details of such an army spread over so large a tract. The intermediate Corps headquarters evolved to keep track of two or three divisions. An ordonnateur attached to Corps headquarters shouldered the responsibility for finding or manufacturing and distributing rations of bread, rice and salt, brandy, wine (or at least coffee) and fodder for the horses. Bake ovens could be constructed and in operation in 24 hours, but getting the food to the troops remained the ordonnateur's greatest challenge. The French Army daily required 8500 bushels of flour, delivered in round-bottomed wagons similar to the "Conestoga" in never-ending supply convoys.

To cut the presumed Prussian route of march toward Leipzig, Davout advanced northward. "The approaches to Leipzig revealed no sign of enemy forces on the River Elster. ... Orders issued to the army for the 12th therefore called for a wheel to the left to bring it face to face with the foe." This change of front ended the chance of a Prussian flank attack.

To keep the separate communications of the Corps from crossing as they changed front, Intendent General Villemanzy received the order to form a new Center of Operations at Auma. The strung out columns of French troops jammed the roads from the Thüringian Forest to Weissenfels, with the old Center of Operations near the western end of that line. All the supply wagons of all the Corps followed those same roads. A center at Auma would sort out those lines like the hub of a wheel, with traffic for the different Corps fanning out along different spokes.

Jena-Auerstädt: The Battle

At this moment the Prussians might have siezed an opportunity to recover from their reverse at Saalburg. Marshal Lannes' Corps, arriving first opposite the Prussian concentration, crossed the Saale on the 12th with no support, and only the single bridge at Jena behind them. Hohenlohe, assembling his forces, planned to drive Lannes back into the Saale at Jena on the 13th. With the river at their backs precluding all possibility of retreat, any reverse suffered by the French would have meant catastrophy. Just then, Colonel Massenbach brought an order from Brunswick which he interpreted as prohibiting any forward movement. This fatal blunder cost the Prussians the campaign, allowing Napoleon to complete his deployment undisturbed. "Had he been aggressive in defending the line of the Saale, the Duke of Brunswick might have had 80,000 men to hurl against Bonaparte on the 14th, who had only 60,000 at his disposal; he would still have had 25,000 to keep the passages at Kösen, Camburg and Dornburg against Davout, Murat and Bernadotte." Realizing that an attack along the Schnecke could succeed only at heavy cost, Napoleon decided to advance, under cover of darkness, by the narrow track which leads up to the Landgrafenberg, a path so narrow that the axles of the gun-carriages jammed into its rocky sides. "He seized a torch and urging on the gunners got the track widened, remaining on the spot until the first vehicle had passed through."

At the Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, the Prussian Army was effectively destroyed. The French lost 13,500 in combat while killing or wounding 24,700 Prussians and taking 19,300 captives, a total of 44,000 men (42% of the battlefield force).

Davout's Losses at Auerstaedt

1st Div          98 ofc.           2181 men     25% of total

2nd Div        30                               900     12%

3rd Div         134                 3500  41%*

Cav Bde        6                                  213     17%

Tot     268                 6794  25.5%

* Perhaps the heaviest loss recorded as borne by victorious troops in so large a unit as a division. (Augereau's Corps at Eylau, the only possible exception, would lose 57%.)

According to Davout's estimate, his Corps inflicted a total of 15,000 enemy casualties, comprising 12,000 killed and wounded, 3000 prisoners and 115 guns captured. The Duke of Brunswick himself was mortally wounded early in the battle. The pursuit of the Prussian main army continued only as far as Eckartsberga. Their retreat became a rout when it met the fugitives from Jena. At Jena the French lost not less than 6,500 killed and wounded, while the Prussians lost 26,000, including a much higher proportion of prisoners, about 15,000, and 200 guns. The pursuers halted at Weimar due to exhaustion. Murat's horsemen continued on to Erfurt, capturing 15,000 stragglers in the Fortress on the 15th.

Aftermath

After deducting those 10,000 and the Saxons, who pursued a separate peace, the main army still had some 32,000 men under arms. Saxe-Weimar with 12,000 men, hastily recalled from the Thüringian Forest, and 7,000 or so from Ruchel's command, tried to form a rallying point for the fugitives. Eugen of Württemberg with 13,000 men awaited orders near Halle. The long flight of these 64,000 falls outside the purview of this study. The Prussians did manage to inflict some reverses on their pursuers. Blücher's reputation was made in his defiant, stubborn refusal to surrender, even though the game was lost.

The mood of defiance was caught also in the Prussian court, surprising Napoleon by their refusal to surrender with the fall of Berlin. "Of Frederick William's 160,000 men who had entered upon the campaign, 25,000 had been killed and wounded, whilst 100,000 were made prisoners." The remainder either returned to Saxony or deserted. Napoleon's transport and cavalry would be augmented by 20,000 captured horses. Fleeing with a few bedraggled survivors into East Prussia, what remained of the Prussian command prepared to fight a new campaign beside their Russian allies. Stopping briefly in Berlin, Napoleon turned his eagles eastward into Poland by early November. Murat arrived in Warsaw on the 28th, Napoleon himself on December 18th. In their first brush with the Russians, the French were definitely checked. A long and bloody campaign in 1807 would follow.