Operational Art in 1813

[kzucker]

OPERATIONAL ART AND THE 1813 CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY

http://cgsc.cdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=837&REC=14

This monograph explores the question of whether the campaign of 1813 falls within the U.S. Army's understanding of Operational Art, which "determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight over time." It examines in particular the Coalition Trachenberg plan. Napoleon does not come off well, being criticized for classical thinking in his strategy of retaining fortresses. (.pdf)

If you wish, skip to the good part, "Fall 1813 Operations," starting on page 24.

[Thanks to Mikolaj for bringing this monograph to my attention.]

[kzucker]

We would like someone to write a precis of the above paper for Wargame Design Magazine, and just reprise some of the high points, such as Epstein's definition of modern war. What makes this monograph of special interest are two things. First, it expands the definition of Operational Art to include Napoleon and his later opponents. Second, the choice of the 1813 campaign as the example in favor.

He spends time looking at Austrian Logistics in 1813 and really gives the idea that a general would have to select a limited number of different Supply Sources. Logistic preparations seem to imply immobile stockpiles placed along certain mountain passes prior to the campaign. (I can imagine a new rule where you might have to write-down your choice of 3 potential Supply Sources pre-game, and maybe open up others at a big cost in APs.)

He writes, regarding Dresden, "the Trachenberg plan had never intended an offensive battle against Napoleon and his main army by a single coalition Army - particularly a strong defensive position like Dresden." However, Napoleon was not there when they originally chose Dresden as a target, and Leipzig had been the original target, changed only when the armies were en route.

He discusses some of the friction between Bluecher's HQ and his subordinates, particularly Langeron. He quote's Gneisenau's statement that "in modern military annals, no example of such a succession of bloody and eventful days is to be found as those between the 18th and 29th August 1813."

He states "More than half [I] Corps destroyed - crushed between Allied forces advancing up and down a narrow valley." By this time both armies had mostly exited from the mountains; and more than half of I Corps escaped, when Kleist's Corps was momentarily scattered by the stampeding Frenchmen.

The article focuses on Napoleon's moves during the month of September, which is hardly touched upon by most historians. First, his move east against Bluecher; his return to Dresden, and second withdrawal of the Bohemian army; Napoleon's failure to attack Alexander's column, upon tidings of Dennewitz; phantom battle at Pirna; his rushing north, and then east, to repulse Bluecher near Bautzen on the 22nd. "All this marching and countermarching had the result of another [battle] defeat on the strength of the Grande Armee as thousands of Napoleon's young conscripts dropped out of the ranks. Hunger also became a huge problem as the rapidly shifting moves outstripped Napoleon's careful logicstics arrangements." But those arrangements were only enough to last until Sept. 4th anyway, as the plan had been to wrap-up the campaign at Dresden.