kzucker
11-09-2009, 10:52 PM
In this issue ...
THE OSG REPORT
November 2009
Contents: p. 1) Action Item: Special Study Nr. 5
p. 2) Sample Text from SS Nr. 5
p. 3) 1806 Quiz: Win a Free OSG Game
_ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _
Operational Studies Group News, November, 2009 Page One
SPECIAL STUDY NR. 5 - 1806: The Coming Storm
The crossing of the Thuringerwald, the battles of October 14th, and the Pursuit
Publication date: December 2009
Production time is fast approaching, and that means ink, glue, and postage for one pound of words. Please confirm your pre-order now http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html
Take advantage of a substantial discount on Special Study Nr. 5 (plus great discounts on reprints of Nrs. 1-4).
The postage for one book is $7 US/Canada and $13 overseas. Please reply by email if you have any questions...
If you have not yet pre-ordered, you can still do so at the discount price. It would be great if we can get another 300 orders before we go to press! ... Please help us reach our goal http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html
PRODUCTION UPDATE
There are about 20 pages left to write, covering the 14th of October, day of the double battle. We originally planned to turn the book over to the printer on Thursday, November 12. Realistically, that may not happen until the end of November.
REMEMBER TOO...
We still have some 60-100 copies of each of six titles. But they won't last long...
1806: Rossbach Avenged (ziploc only) $31
The Sun of Austerlitz (ziploc only) $42
Seven Days of 1809 (boxed) $50
Four Lost Battles (boxed) $69
Napoleon at the Crossroads (boxed)$48
The Habit of Victory (boxed) $73
http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html
_ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _
Operational Studies Group News, November, 2009 Page Two
SAMPLE READ:
SPECIAL STUDY NR. 5 - 1806: The Coming Storm
Here is the opening page of Chapter Three
[ 3 ] The sound of two armies crashing
The armies of France, Prussia and Saxony were in the field and swiftly approaching the decision of the campaign.
The Emperor used his troops’s marching feet to win campaigns. An impatient man, he built his army to move with celerity and his orders were obeyed with dispatch.
The days were turning colder but dry, allowing the French to march straight across country, instead of being restricted to the roadways. An army marches on its stomach, and a rapidly moving army has a wide catchment area of supplies to draw on. To increase its mobility the French Army was broken up into semi-autonomous Corps, each with its own forage area.
"Since the Seven Years’ War, roads had been improved ... enabling armies to live off the land they marched through." The Prussian staff hadn't updated their doctrine to allow for this fact. They still dragged all their supplies with them, and thought 12 or 13 miles a long days’ march. They argued laborious deliberations in councils lasting days, rife with politics and crowned with compromise. Across the mountains, the French Emperor was drawing the reins of his Army into his and Alexandre Berthier’s hands alone.
The Prusso-Saxon Army was a rapid amalgamation of the troops of both countries. There were three separate armies, which arrived in Thüringia from different directions: Brunswick from Brandenburg, Hohenlohe from Silesia and Saxony, and Rüchel from Hannover. The Saxons were absorbed by Hohenlohe’s Army.
Generally, Saxon Brigades were attached to Prussian divisions. (Zezschwitz’s all-Saxon Division the exception.) The Duke of Weimar had an Advanced Guard Division operating independently across the Thüringerwald. Württemberg’s division was held as strategic reserve toward Halle.
Tauenzien, the Saxon General, had a Prusso-Saxon Division very forward, watching the passes to the southwest. This is where an aggressive and informed Prussian commander-in-chief would want to be. Unfortunately, the Duke of Brunswick was neither.
In the last ten days of September the Prussian army was still spread over a front of 190 miles. Rüchel and Blücher were in Hesse from Paderborn to Eisenach, Gotha and Erfurt; the main army was about Naumburg. Hohenlohe was in the country between the Elbe and the Mulde, around Zwickau. The Saxons had not yet completed their mobilization.
In the period from 5 to 8 October the Prussians were less widely dispersed: Rüchel about Eisenach, had outposts towards Hesse and Meiningen. The main army in the neighbourhood of Erfurt pushed its outposts south as far Hildburghausen [on the far side of the mountains]. Hohenlohe was at Jena and Roda with Louis’s advanced guard towards Saalfeld. Tauenzien was far to the left at Hof, Gefell, and Schleiz. The whole front still covered 85 miles in a direct line (see sketch map-NEW).
At that moment Napoleon had seven corps and the cavalry reserve assembled on a front of 38 miles, facing Tauenzien's corps of 7000 or 8000 men at a distance of three days’ march. As Prince Kraft remarks, it was Napoleon rather than the Prussians who was a position to interpose between the parts of the enemy's army.
_ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _
Operational Studies Group News, November, 2009 Page Three
WIN A GAME FROM OSG:
Please answer all three questions. You may select MORE than one answer to each question...
Question 1: What did Napoleon set-out to achieve upon crossing the Thüringerwald in early October, 1806?
a) Advance to the Elbe at Dresden,
b) Advance to Jena to cross the Saale,
c) Advance to Auma to seek battle,
d) Advance to Leipzig,
e) Fight a battle wherever the enemy might be found,
f) Advance on Wittenberg and Berlin.
Question 2: On what wing was Davout in 1806?
a) right
b) center
c) left
d) reserve
Question 3: Why was Napoleon unable to convert his battlefield success into a negotiated peace in 1806?
a) He insisted upon punishing the whole Prussian nation and his peace terms were onerous,
b) He refused to negotiate with all the Coalition Partners,
c) Queen Luise prevented the King from negotiating in good faith,
d) The Tsar refused to ratify the peace treaty.
Please send an email with your answers only (alpha-numeric). The first five (5) winning entries will receive ONE free OSG game of their choice.
Winners, at the sole discretion of the editors, will be announced in the December OSG Report. Enjoy!
-Kevin Zucker
THE OSG REPORT
November 2009
Contents: p. 1) Action Item: Special Study Nr. 5
p. 2) Sample Text from SS Nr. 5
p. 3) 1806 Quiz: Win a Free OSG Game
_ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _
Operational Studies Group News, November, 2009 Page One
SPECIAL STUDY NR. 5 - 1806: The Coming Storm
The crossing of the Thuringerwald, the battles of October 14th, and the Pursuit
Publication date: December 2009
Production time is fast approaching, and that means ink, glue, and postage for one pound of words. Please confirm your pre-order now http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html
Take advantage of a substantial discount on Special Study Nr. 5 (plus great discounts on reprints of Nrs. 1-4).
The postage for one book is $7 US/Canada and $13 overseas. Please reply by email if you have any questions...
If you have not yet pre-ordered, you can still do so at the discount price. It would be great if we can get another 300 orders before we go to press! ... Please help us reach our goal http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html
PRODUCTION UPDATE
There are about 20 pages left to write, covering the 14th of October, day of the double battle. We originally planned to turn the book over to the printer on Thursday, November 12. Realistically, that may not happen until the end of November.
REMEMBER TOO...
We still have some 60-100 copies of each of six titles. But they won't last long...
1806: Rossbach Avenged (ziploc only) $31
The Sun of Austerlitz (ziploc only) $42
Seven Days of 1809 (boxed) $50
Four Lost Battles (boxed) $69
Napoleon at the Crossroads (boxed)$48
The Habit of Victory (boxed) $73
http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html
_ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _
Operational Studies Group News, November, 2009 Page Two
SAMPLE READ:
SPECIAL STUDY NR. 5 - 1806: The Coming Storm
Here is the opening page of Chapter Three
[ 3 ] The sound of two armies crashing
The armies of France, Prussia and Saxony were in the field and swiftly approaching the decision of the campaign.
The Emperor used his troops’s marching feet to win campaigns. An impatient man, he built his army to move with celerity and his orders were obeyed with dispatch.
The days were turning colder but dry, allowing the French to march straight across country, instead of being restricted to the roadways. An army marches on its stomach, and a rapidly moving army has a wide catchment area of supplies to draw on. To increase its mobility the French Army was broken up into semi-autonomous Corps, each with its own forage area.
"Since the Seven Years’ War, roads had been improved ... enabling armies to live off the land they marched through." The Prussian staff hadn't updated their doctrine to allow for this fact. They still dragged all their supplies with them, and thought 12 or 13 miles a long days’ march. They argued laborious deliberations in councils lasting days, rife with politics and crowned with compromise. Across the mountains, the French Emperor was drawing the reins of his Army into his and Alexandre Berthier’s hands alone.
The Prusso-Saxon Army was a rapid amalgamation of the troops of both countries. There were three separate armies, which arrived in Thüringia from different directions: Brunswick from Brandenburg, Hohenlohe from Silesia and Saxony, and Rüchel from Hannover. The Saxons were absorbed by Hohenlohe’s Army.
Generally, Saxon Brigades were attached to Prussian divisions. (Zezschwitz’s all-Saxon Division the exception.) The Duke of Weimar had an Advanced Guard Division operating independently across the Thüringerwald. Württemberg’s division was held as strategic reserve toward Halle.
Tauenzien, the Saxon General, had a Prusso-Saxon Division very forward, watching the passes to the southwest. This is where an aggressive and informed Prussian commander-in-chief would want to be. Unfortunately, the Duke of Brunswick was neither.
In the last ten days of September the Prussian army was still spread over a front of 190 miles. Rüchel and Blücher were in Hesse from Paderborn to Eisenach, Gotha and Erfurt; the main army was about Naumburg. Hohenlohe was in the country between the Elbe and the Mulde, around Zwickau. The Saxons had not yet completed their mobilization.
In the period from 5 to 8 October the Prussians were less widely dispersed: Rüchel about Eisenach, had outposts towards Hesse and Meiningen. The main army in the neighbourhood of Erfurt pushed its outposts south as far Hildburghausen [on the far side of the mountains]. Hohenlohe was at Jena and Roda with Louis’s advanced guard towards Saalfeld. Tauenzien was far to the left at Hof, Gefell, and Schleiz. The whole front still covered 85 miles in a direct line (see sketch map-NEW).
At that moment Napoleon had seven corps and the cavalry reserve assembled on a front of 38 miles, facing Tauenzien's corps of 7000 or 8000 men at a distance of three days’ march. As Prince Kraft remarks, it was Napoleon rather than the Prussians who was a position to interpose between the parts of the enemy's army.
_ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _ _ _ _ .. _ . _ _ _ ... _ . _
Operational Studies Group News, November, 2009 Page Three
WIN A GAME FROM OSG:
Please answer all three questions. You may select MORE than one answer to each question...
Question 1: What did Napoleon set-out to achieve upon crossing the Thüringerwald in early October, 1806?
a) Advance to the Elbe at Dresden,
b) Advance to Jena to cross the Saale,
c) Advance to Auma to seek battle,
d) Advance to Leipzig,
e) Fight a battle wherever the enemy might be found,
f) Advance on Wittenberg and Berlin.
Question 2: On what wing was Davout in 1806?
a) right
b) center
c) left
d) reserve
Question 3: Why was Napoleon unable to convert his battlefield success into a negotiated peace in 1806?
a) He insisted upon punishing the whole Prussian nation and his peace terms were onerous,
b) He refused to negotiate with all the Coalition Partners,
c) Queen Luise prevented the King from negotiating in good faith,
d) The Tsar refused to ratify the peace treaty.
Please send an email with your answers only (alpha-numeric). The first five (5) winning entries will receive ONE free OSG game of their choice.
Winners, at the sole discretion of the editors, will be announced in the December OSG Report. Enjoy!
-Kevin Zucker