OSG Report / August

[kzucker]

THE OSG REPORT
August 2010

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Napoleonic Tour 2011
The Campaigns for Germany, May 23-28, 2011
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Be a part of Wargaming History by Making History!
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Why is OSG the most revolutionary simulation publisher anywhere? Read this timeless interview with Kevin Zucker...
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Contents: p. 1) The Coming Storm Designer's Notes
p. 2) The Coming Storm Progress Report
p. 4) Letters and New Quiz
p. 5) Quiz Results
p. 11) Order Form

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Operational Studies Group News AUGUST Page One
The Coming Storm Designer's Notes

The Coming Storm is a very big game. It is more than four full-sized battle games - with 22 square feet of map surface - since we are including two scenarios with completely separate set-ups for each battle: The approach to battle, starting on the day before, and then the actual battle itself. The approach to Friedland scenario is neat, since it uses two of the four maps (Eylau-Friedland). And of course, there is the campaign scenario as in 4LB. There are "only" two counter sheets (over 500 counters); however the evolution of the armies from battle to battle is complex.

All told, the new game is twice as extensive as Four Lost Battles.

Right now I am working on the approach to battle and the battle scenario set-ups for Jena-Auerstädt. I am not sure if there has ever been a game with both battles on one map; I doubt it. It makes for interesting permutations: will Bernadotte show up at either battle? Or will the Prussians stand and fight around Jena with their entire force? This the player can try, if the game starts on the 13th (approach scenario) - provided he doesn't draw the mandatory retreat card.

We have already received over 300 pre-orders. For those on the fence there is still time to get this game at the pre-order price (see "Four Ways to Save" at the top of this message).

The design intent of NLB, NAL, 4LB and TCS, is to show what it was like to command a Napoleonic Army, within the parameters of a playable game ...

Command doesn't mean "total control;" rather, reliance upon a faulty Human- and Horse-powered Command Structure.

Command limitations of intelligence are critical. Did the army employ scouts all the time, or not? You cannot organize a victory party until you have beaten the enemy, and you cannot beat them if you cannot find them (or, if they find you first).

Vedettes are Cavalry regiments broken down into patrols. Scouts were not 100% effective. Of course, once you are in a squared-away battle, you can visually see the enemy. Vedettes are not necessary for any units that you have a LOS to.

Remember Napoleon's famous (perhaps deluded or disingenuous) rallying cry at Waterloo?... "Voila Grouchy!" It was not Grouchy, arriving with reinforcements. It was the Prussians...

OSG endeavors to make the rules as short as possible by constantly trimming the "verbiage."

Brevity brings clarity. We write rules that repay a close reading. We do not add "fiddly" rules for the heck of it. Any rule that appears in print is advancing the design intent.

Napoleon's Last Battles was built on the "chasis" of Napoleon at Waterloo, a perfect gem for a set-piece battle at the brigade level. However, if you try to simulate the entire Waterloo campaign within a battle game's rules, it just doesn't work. Considerations of command - which can be glossed over if units are already deployed on the battlefield - cannot be ignored during the approach to battle.

In 1815, Napoleon knew where the British and Prussians were encamped in French-speaking Belgium. But in Four Lost Battles, blind meeting engagements, we require more uncertainty in the design.

Uncertainty calls for hidden movement and "dummies." Those scouting cavalry regiments were always used to obtain information on enemy deployments while at the same time screening friendly forces from enemy probes.

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Operational Studies Group News AUGUST Page Two
The Coming Storm Progress Report

Maps. The first stage of map development is to create a "Vector" map that shows the location of all terrain; after we have corrected the vector map, the second stage is to apply the photoshop textures (tree patterns, tile roofs for the villages, etc.) and prepare the final graphic files for the printer. We have three of the four vector maps completed, and about half way with the fourth. Since these were based on cartography dating from around 1860 we still have to "unbuild" some roads that weren't there in 1806. (The reason we use 1860's era maps is because the mapping was not done scientifically prior to that era.) Joe Youst and Kenneth Li are working on the maps.

Counters. Basically done, there are some corrections to the Russian initiative ratings, which came out too low overall ... David Jones took apart my rough draft and put it back together, and that was a huge contribution (there are 14 data points for each unit). We will probably catch a few more things as playtesting proceeds.

Product Package. Final corrections are done and this is all ready for the printer. You can see the front and back of the game box at Napoleongames.com, handsomely designed by Robert Tunstall.

Rules. The Basic rules are 95% identical to Four Lost Battles. There are a few rules sections that are getting downsized in order to present a sleeker game design (such as vedettes). You can read about that over on the Napoleon at Leipzig folder. The Scenario information is still under development... this week I completed the set-up and reinforcement tables for the French at Jena-Auerstadt. Since there are two days of battle for each game, there are two complete set-ups: a) The day of battle, and b) The approach to battle.

Charts & Tables. These haven't changed a lot, however Jason Roach has produced a 4-page cheat sheet that contains summary info at a glance (while he was re-developing 4LB over the past two years). Jason also updated the 4 LB rules and has been coordinating playtesting.

Cards. The card decks are 75% identical to the original 4LB. There are 12 new Tactics cards (another innovation that Jason came up with) that have a special rule for their use during Combat. The cards are basically done but will be edited one more time. Knut Grünitz is doing the graphic design.

Unit Manifests. I had to create a new style set-up table. Once I had the right format, then it was just a matter of filling in data - about 320 data points for the game as a whole. Even though I have 99% of the information in the Special Studies, it is still an involved task just going through and plugging in the info.

Playtesting. Our playtesters are busy printing out components and making counters. Two of the games are not ready for playtesting, as I am still finishing up the necessary set up information.

[kzucker]

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Operational Studies Group News AUGUST Page Three

We have added a new set of clean, simple, Vedette and Combined Arms Rules. Thanks to Dave Schubert and Steve Carey for their contributions (see below).

VEDETTES

Vedettes have no combat ability. They have a (0) combat strength to indicate they may not attack or defend (in parenthesis).

Reconnaissance
Vedettes perform Reconnaissance in order to reveal the identity of hidden enemy units. A Reconnaissance is performed at the end of the Movement Phase for phasing vedettes in an enemy ZOC, or by a non-phasing vedette (should the owning player choose to reveal it) at the moment an enemy unit moves adjacent to the vedette. (The owning player may chose not to reveal his vedette.) Resolve the Reconnaissance on the Reconnaissance table.

A vedette that is stacked with other friendly units may perform Reconnaissance. If such a vedette encounters an enemy vedette, the enemy vedette may immediately perform a recon as well.

After performing Reconnaissance a vedette must make a retreat before combat, or either 1 or 2 hexes at the owning player's choice. If retreat before combat is not possible, it is eliminated.

RECONNAISSANCE TABLE
Roll one d6
1 reveal top 3 remaining enemy units (including vedettes)
2 reveal top 2 remaining enemy units
3 reveal top enemy unit
4-5 no result
6 roll again-
1-3 no result
4-6 vedette eliminated

Modifiers: -1 if any friendly cavalry leader is within command range of recon; +1 if enemy force contains cavalry units (or vedettes).
Eliminated vedettes may only return to play through reorganization.
A player may recon an enemy occupied hex more than once per turn. EXAMPLE: the player scouts an enemy stack with 2 vedettes, rolling a 1 and then a 2 (no modifiers applied). He thus may reveal the top 3 enemy units in the stack.

Reorganization
A cavalry unit which has broken down into vedettes is eligible for Reorganization (returning at reduced strength), using the normal Reorganization rules, once all its own vedettes have been eliminated. This strength reduction represents stragglers and isolated pockets of vedettes not returning to formation.


COMBINED ARMS

The attacker (only) may gain a +1 column shift in Combat if he has at least one SP each of Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry participating in the same attack. If the defender also has at least one SP each of Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, then there is no bonus.

Vedettes are disregarded when determining Combined Arms bonus. The Combined Arms bonus does not apply against defenders in Town, Chateaux, or Marsh, nor across a River bridge (across Streams OK).

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Operational Studies Group News AUGUST Page Four

Letters
I'm anxious to receive the game when it is published. All glimpses of the components look attractive and up to 4LB standards, and I'm really looking forward to it. I'm also impressed with the additional playtesting of the 4LB system and, incidentally, hope that the graphic color set-up sheets will be available for immediate download; they proved their worth as a convenience for 4LB.

Sincerely enthusiastic, Karl Hundley

I played VG's 1809: Napoleon on the Danube a couple of weeks ago and I thought it was a great game. The attrition table took a little getting used to, but the results were right on target. reaction march is awesome! I only wish I'd had some OSG-style vedettes to scope out enemy dispositions before having to commit my recon units to battle. we used counter sleds to increase the fog of war and they worked very well.

I've been reading the first volume of John Gill's 1809 Thunder on the Danube to prepare for the game - it's superb! can you suggest a reading list for TCS?

Thanks, John Holme

QUIZ: WIN A FREE COPY OF "THE COMING STORM"

One winner will receive a free copy of The Coming Storm. Three runners-up will receive a $40 credit good toward any OSG product in print or in pre-order. Winners are selected at the sole discretion of OSG's panel of experts.

1812 Campaign
What were Napoleon's key mistakes that brought on the catastrophic outcome of the Russian invasion? Please select only the TOP FOUR most important reasons.

a) Failure to take Poniatowski's advice and invade the black earth belt
b) Bringing in too many troops at one time
c) Failure to supply the army properly
d) Failure to engage the First Army separately when the opportunity arose
e) Failure to listen to his advisors who recommended stopping at Smolensk
f) Failure to commit the Guard at Borodino
g) Failure to offer acceptable terms upon reaching Moscow
h) Failure to press on toward the southwest at the outset of the retreat

Please send an email with the top 4 answers. If you wish, include a short discussion.

[kzucker]

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Operational Studies Group News******** AUGUST Page Five
QUIZ RESULTS

Question: Why was Napoleon with over half a million men unable to stop the onslaught of 600,000 Coalition troops?

a) The theatre was too large.
b) Napoleon's subordinates were unable to function independently.
c) Napoleon was too attached to fixed points such as Dresden and the Elbe.
d) Napoleon's LOC was cut.
e) Man for man French troops were not as good as in previous campaigns.
f) Napoleon's old genius was burned out and he was ill.
g) None of the above.
h) All of the above.

OSG's Panelists chose answers B and E as the most correct, but also allowed answers A and C. No one selected D. Answer F was judged "incorrect." In fact, all the answers were arguable, so we have presented the responses below.

The winner is Lennart Schulz-Althoff. He will receive a free copy of "The Coming Storm." The three runner-ups were-
David C. Johnson
Bart Brodowski
Mikolaj Lenczewski
Each will be awarded one $40 credit good for purchases direct from OSG. Congratulations to all... Thanks to everyone who participated! I appreciated all the insightful comments below.

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Operational Studies Group News******** AUGUST Page Six
QUIZ RESPONSES

#1 Lennart Schulz-Althoff
a) No.
Napoleon and the Grande Armée had fought over much larger areas, especially in Russia. But also in the campaign of 1806, which started nearly in the same region but ended high up in Eastern Prussia.

b) YES.
Napoleons Marshals were not able to perform on their own. They depended on orders or oversight of their Emperor. Neither Oudinot, nor Ney or Macdonald were able to win a battle against their opponents. The only Marshall who maybe was able enough to perform better was Davout and he was at the lower Elbe to guard Hamburg.

c) No.
Napoleons main magazines were at Dresden, that is right. And his LOC runs down the river Elbe. But he was not fixed to it. His armies were spread out in Saxony, Silesia and in the vicinity of Berlin. Napoleons principle was that the army would live out of the country so it would be independent from ist magazines and able to move rapidly. He did not abandon this principle. On the other hand he had to defend his magazines at Dresden against the Army of Bohemia which cumulated in the Battle of Dresden. But he was not too atached to fixed points.

d) NO
Napoleons LOC runs down the river Elbe. Late in the autumn campaign the Army of the North and the Army of Silesia cut this line when they crossed the Elbe. But at this point Napoleon had abandoned the eastern parts of Saxony including his, now depleted, magazine at Dresden. His LOC was now running directly through states who were allied to him in the Confederation of the Rhine. One after the other this allies changed the sides but his LOC was only in serious trouble an literally cut, when the Bavarians abandoned him. But that was after the Battle of the Nations.

e) YES
The Grande Armée of 1813 was an army of new conscripts. They maybe had the fighting spirit as any other army Napoleon had ever commanded, but they lacked the experience. The army had not enough experienced officers and NCOs. The only experienced troops left after the catastrophe in Russia were fighting in Spain and were badly needed there. Especially the cavalry was only a shadow of its former glory.They had lost not only the seasoned troopers but above all the trained horses.

f) No.
The, in many eyes, most brilliant campaign of Napoleon, the defense of France, was yet to come. So his genius was not burned out. But the strategie of the coalition included on decisive point. The Armies were to give battle to the french as long as Napoleon was not present. If he was personally commanding, the Coalition forces were to back down and evade. So Napoleon was not able to come to grips with his enemies and not able to use his genius. At Leipzig he was literally surrounded and numerically inferior. Then even a genius may fail.
If he was ill, I do not know. What I know is, that he was ill at Waterloo and that this affected the outcome of the battle. But if he was ill in the autumn campaign in Saxony I think the would have lost it much earlier than he actually did.
g) No
h) No

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Operational Studies Group News******** AUGUST Page Seven
#2 David C. Johnson

ANSWERS - A, B, C, E
a. YES. Theatre was too large for the command and control required by Napoleon to successfully maneuver his forces. Technology of the day meant that his plans, no matter how brilliant, were often unrealistic in execution due to the great distances the dispatches had to travel. By the time the dispatch arrived conditions had changed and the Marshal on the receiving end often could not adjust to the changed situation. Related to b.
b. YES. Napoleon's subordinates, in particular Marshals Oudinot, Ney, MacDonald and others were not up to the task of independent command. With large forces many, many miles from the Emperor they were given increased responsibility due to the distances and size of the theatre. As Marshal Marmont warned "It is to be feared that on the same day your Majesty wins a great victory you will learn that your subordinates have lost two."
c. YES. Napoleon time and again was fixated on fixed points like Berlin, Dresden and the Elbe during the campaign. These political and logistic objectives repeatedly conflicted with the Emperor's military objective of decisively defeating the armies arrayed against them. Forces needed for a decisive battle against either the Bohemian Army or the Silesian Army were diverted towards capturing Berlin twice and later St Cyr's forces, ultimately needed at Leipzig, were left behind at Dresden guarding supplies and Saxony.
d. No. Napoleon's LOC to France may have been interrupted at times by Allied raids but the French LOC to a supply base was never "cut". The stockpile of supplies he created at Dresden established this as his supply base so that Napoleon is quoted as saying "I care very little if he severs our communications with France." Only if Allied armies cut him off from the Elbe and Dresden would his LOC have been cut. Many times during the campaign we see significant Allied forces west of Napoleon seemingly in a position to cut his presumed LOC to France. So much for armchair generals.
e. YES. French forces in 1813 were "markedly inferior in quality to the armies of earlier years." (Chandler) In particular the inferiority of Napoleon's cavalry in Germany prevented Napoleon from inflicting decisive defeats on his opponents and turned battles such as Lutzen and Bautzen into bloody "ordinary" victories. In effect at the operational level he lacked the ability to use "pursuit mode" and "advance after combat" to obtain the decisive victory he needed to get out of the strategic dilemma he was in.
f. No. Napoleon may at times have looked worn but his genius was not "burned out" and any physical problems that appeared did not materially effect the campaign. He was not the beaten, hunted animal seeking escape from his hunters. He constantly maneuvered to obtain advantage and sought decisive victory. The subsequent campaign of 1814 should be sufficient evidence that Napoleon was not "burned out."
g. No. But I guess this would be the correct choice if one was Czar Alexander for it was due to his majesty's guidance and direction that the ogre was defeated.
h. No. A cursory look at the Battle of Leipzig might have one inclined to also say YES to items d and f and therefore say "All of the Above." But this is to only go by the results of the battle and looking for excuses as to why Napoleon lost. Napoleon was not short of supplies during the battle, was not sick, and not "burned out" or resigned to his fate. He fought intelligently but was beaten.

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Operational Studies Group News******* AUGUST Page Eight
#3 Christopher Newell
ANSWER: a, b, e and f, with a and f being dependent on b.

a) The theatre was too large.
Yes and no. It was too large for Napoleon on his own, but would not have been a problem had he been able to rely on his subordinates on the secondary fronts
b) Napoleon's subordinates were unable to function independently.
Quite clearly true. Virtually none of them were successful on their own. The Allies recognized that fact and used it to full advantage.
c) Napoleon was too attached to fixed points such as Dresden and the Elbe.
No. The Elbe was his LOC and therefore extremely important. As for Dresden, he could have abandoned it and moved his center of ops to the rear, but that would have enabled the coalition armies to concentrate sooner against him. As long as he held Dresden, he occupied a central position from which he hoped to defeat the Allied armies individually.
d) Napoleon's LOC was cut.
No
e) Man for man French troops were not as good as in previous campaigns.
Yes, after the disaster of 1812, Napoleon was forced to rely on massive conscription, including the class of 1814, to make up for his losses. The veterans of the Grande Armée from previous years had all disappeared. Also, he suffered from a massive shortage of cavalry horses.
f) Napoleon's old genius was burned out and he was ill.
Yes and no. His talent was still there, but he was overwhelmed by the scale of operations and let down by his subordinates.
g) None of the above.
h) All of the above.

[kzucker]

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Operational Studies Group News AUGUST Page Nine
#4 Bart Brodowski

a) The theatre was too large.
Geographically, not really, but Napoleon's commitment to trying to hold onto too much territory stretched his armies too thin.

b) Napoleon's subordinates were unable to function independently.
Yes. Davout was holed up in Hamburg instead of being given an independent field command, while many of the others did not seem to know how to function independently AND with each other.

c) Napoleon was too attached to fixed points such as Dresden and the Elbe.
Yes. The political situation required it. Had the French been more flexible, many of their German allies would have deserted to the allies much sooner than they historically did.

d) Napoleon's LOC was cut.
Not really, but it easily could have been had there been a German revolt behind his lines, or had the coalition troops been able to drive south from Hamburg and north from Bavaria more effectively.

e) Man for man French troops were not as good as in previous campaigns.
True. Most of the veterans died in Spain or in Russia, or were wounded or simply worn out.

f) Napoleon's old genius was burned out and he was ill.
Possibly. He still had his moments of brilliance, but 1812-1813 were definitely not his best years. Still, the other factors (listed above) could have contributed to him not being as effective as before, and thus making it look like he had lost his genius.

g) None of the above.
No, although his lack of cavalry horses was not mentioned, and it was certainly a big factor.

h) All of the above.
Yes, To varying degrees.

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Operational Studies Group News AUGUST Page Ten
#5 Mikolaj Lenczewski

b) Napoleon's subordinates were unable to function independently.
c) Napoleon was too attached to fixed points such as Dresden and the Elbe.

All other answers are either secondary-importance-
a) and e)- or a result of those mistakes d) above.


#6 Davide Magnani

e) Man for man French troops were not as good as in previous campaigns.


#7 Richard Hartland

(c) - Napoleon was too concerned with fixed points
such as Dresden and the Elbe. However, other factors contributed - B and E particularly with A too. However, I would disagree that Napoleon was ill and his genius was burned out at this stage. He still displayed genius during this and the succeeding campaign in France.


#8 Dan Huffman
A, B, E, F


#9 Edgar Gallego
B, C