The History as Game

[kzucker]

The First Engagement at Landshut, 16 April.
Follows Jack Gill's account in "With Eagles to Glory," pp 73-79.

Deroy's Bavarian Division, including Seydewitz's cavalry brigade, held the north bank of the Isar opposite the Austrians' intended crossing place at Landshut.

Deroy's center of mass was in St. Nicolas (3029), with battalions detached to Altdorf (2929), Am Rennwege (3030) and the Kloster (not shown) in hex 3130. These detached battalions represent Deroy's ZOC into adjacent hexes. There was even a Light battalion stationed on Zwischen den Brücken (between the partially-destroyed bridges) in hex 3131.

The Austrian Mixed Brigade of Radetzky arrived in Landshut in the morning of the 16th, and his engineers set about repairing the bridge onto Zwischen den Brücken under a harassing fire. The Bavarian detached battalions were called in around 14.30 after causing a delay of three and a half hours.

At the same time Austrian forces began crossing the Lendlbrücke into Am Rennwege. By late afternoon the first complete Austrian regiments were forming up on the farther bank.

Under pressure, the Bavarians withdrew from St. Nicolas and vicinity to Altdorf (2929). At about 16.00 as this move was nearly complete, the Karl Uhlans attempted to outflank the Bavarian cavalry (2829). The Uhlans were joined later by the Kienmayer Hussars (both vedettes). Von Seydewitz withdrew his troopers from this engagement and fell back toward Pfettrach (2928) along with Deroy's infantry. Austrian shelling forced the Bavarians out of Pfettrach at 17.00. By nightfall, Radetzky's follow-up was halted by Bavarian heavy artillery and musketry before Weihmichl.

Deroy pulled-back, passing through Wrede's first brigade at Pfeffenhausen early on the morning of the 17th.

Preysing's Bavarian cavalry deployed as vedettes during the 16th and advanced well forward, fighting two small actions: against the Stipsicz Hussars of IV Corps at Postau (4230); and far away upstream at Gammelsdorf (2226) against Rosenberg of VI Corps (who entered the map with Scheibler). These Bavarian vedettes fell back on Neufahrn (4022) and Rottenburg (3120) respectively. "The Rosenberg Chevauxlegers captured several Bavarian troopers near Gammelsdorf and probed almost to Pfeffenhausen," turned back by the König Chevauxlegers about hex 2623.

Only Wrede's 1st brigade reached Pfeffenhausen by nightfall, with the 2nd far behind at Biburg (2810). The Bavarian Prince Royal's Division moved to Pfaffenhofen (0216) with outposts along the Abens River.

[kzucker]

KZ COMMENT: Jack Gill has kindly agreed to join me in the turn-by-turn action. He has gone one better, taking the lead with the narrative and revealing his extraordinary wealth of knowledge about the campaign. To follow along you will need to set up the March Tables for the 17th ...

JACK GILL: Basically, 17 April is a lost day on the Austrian side. Knowing little of the French dispositions, especially about Davout, Charles decides to deliberate and hesitate. The main bodies of the five corps near Landshut do little more than cross the Isar and establish themselves fairly close to the river on the northern bank.

KZ COMMENT: I suspect the Austrians were dealing with a massive traffic jam and trying to reassemble units and sort out the mob. The player will certainly experience traffic problems (if he observes Road March rules).
JG OBSERVATION: There doubtless were traffic jams to annoy the Austrians to some degree, but the key sources do not mention this as a major hindrance. All of the combat elements of III, IV and V Corps were across the Isar by the evening of the 16th. The key was that Charles did not know what to do. So he only demands small exertions from the Hauptarmee on the 17th -- the V Corps main body just moves from the Altdorf area (2930/2929 to Weihmichl (2825), for instance. So I see this as much more of a command hesitancy problem than a traffic/logistics issue. It is interesting, however, that Charles ordered the "grand trains" across the Isar on the 17th, where they are soon forgotten in the press of confusing events -- this will cause major problems several days later when the left wing tries to retreat through Landshut.

JACK GILL: They all send out reconnaissance patrols, however, and there are several small cavalry fights as below:

* V Corps: Radetzky starts at Pfeffenhausen. His men get into a scuffle with Preysing's brigade near Schweinbach (the action flows between approx. 2613 and 2615). The Austrians seem to have had the better of most of the fighting here, but casualties were low (23 Austrians and perhaps 50 Bavarians). He also sends a battalion and a squadron to Rottenburg.
COMMENT: In game terms this scuffle was between vedettes—elements of Bavarian 2nd Chevaxleger vs. Erzherzog Karl Uhlans
* III Corps: No fighting, but a patrol manages to reach the Danube opposite Kehlheim (hex 3405) to discover that the French hold the north bank and that they have destroyed the bridge.

COMMENT: I thought I had read this somewhere, but was unable to locate the citation. We either need to start with the bridge blown or make sure there is a French unit nearby that can do it.
JG OBSERVATION: Yes, you had asked me just before publication, but I did not stumble upon the answer until about three days ago (quite by accident).

GILL: * IV Corps: Patrols push as far as Koefering and Vecsey 's troopers (Klenau Chevaulegers = vedettes) skirmish with French 11th Chasseurs near Geisling (5513). Reports from these patrols and engagements tell Charles exactly what he needs to know -- that Davout is in/around Regensburg (including SOUTH of the Danube) with a substantial force of some 30,000 infantry and a sizable amount of cavalry. Unfortunately for Charles, this information does not reach him until the 18th: that means he issues his "Disposition" for the 18th thinking that Davout is still well north of the Danube concerned about the (lethargic and anxious) Bellegarde.

COMMENT: The game equipment has the Klenau Chev. with II Corps and a different vedette with Vecsey.
JG OBSERVATION: Yes, I noticed this when I was playing the game for the first few tries. Should be:
* Klenau Chevaulegers with Vecsey,
* Merveldt Uhlans with II Corps (as well as the two dragoon regts),
* Vincent Chevaulegers and Stipsicz Hussars with IV Corps.

COMMENT: The main body of IV Corps marched along the Isar River to Essenbach.

GILL: * II Corps: FML Klenau's advance guard skirmishes with French at Reinhausen (5002/5103), but the bulk of II Corps is still back at Nittenau (off map from hex 5201).

COMMENT: Originally I had the lone cavlry unit arrive ahead of the main body of II Corps, but this made me nervous because I thought the Austrian player might exploit this early presence ...
JG OBSERVATION: Yes, the arrival schedule you have is probably unavoidable -- the skirmish on the 17th is very minor anyway...and, as an alternative concern, one wonders if the French might not be able to scoop up the 2-6 cavalry brigade as cheap winnings.

*VI Corps: Hiller simply collects his corps at Moosburg (1731). The normally energetic Scheibler at Nandlstadt (1524) sends a few patrols off towards Pfaffenhofen (0216), but they report little. Off map, Jellacic, is now closed up on the Isar at Munich and his cavalry trades balls with the French 9th Hussars for a time, but they seem to make no serious effort at all to learn what the French are doing on the Lech.
* Also off map: the two contingents of Vienna Volunteers are finally getting close to the Hauptarmee and GM Reinwald departs Passau on the 17th to join the Main Army.

COMMENT: You have Scheibler at Nandlstadt, which he could reach during the day from where the March Tables have him at start of the 17th.
JG OBSERVATION: Herr Scheibler's whereabouts on the night of 16/17 April are not entirely clear. His detachment was rather scattered on the 16th. He should probably start the 17th in Bruckberg (2229) as he more-or-less collected his dispersed elements in Nandlstadt on the 17th. By the way -- an interesting little aside on tactical deception: a squadron of Liechtenstein Hussars was added to Scheibler's detachment on the 17th in order to "show the enemy a different unit." The arcana of uniformology (so disdained by scholars today) was an important part of tactical intelligence in Napoleon's time.

GILL: On the Allied side, this is the last day on which units are still trying to adhere to Berthier's orders. That means: * Off map: Massena and Oudinot are still on the Lech (off map). Massena still has no orders to concentrate his somewhat dispersed cantonments.
* Off map: the Wuerttembergers are between Rain and Neuburg. 1st Heavy Cavalry Division is also at Neuburg. Rouyer is approaching Donauwoerth.
* Demont is at Ingolstadt (0801). Interesting anecdote highlighting the importance of briefing and other interpersonal skills: Davout (unfairly) displays distrust of the Bavarians on 17 April -- largely because of the errors of an unfortunate Bavarian officer. Deroy sent an officer to Davout to report on the engagement at Landshut on the 16th (very professional -- as were almost all interactions among the various Allied commanders). Sadly, the officer seems to have collapsed under Davout's inquisitorial gaze. He apparently became flustered, gave confused answers, and left the Iron Marshal with the impression that the Bavarians were either in panicked flight to the rear or about to defect to the Austrians (both conclusions, of course, exactly mistaken). As a result of this misapprehension, Davout ordered Demont to politely but firmly tell the Bavarians not to linger in Ingolstadt when they retreated (as Berthier had directed). Erroneously fearing that the Bavarians might seize the bridge and give it to the Austrians intact, he ordered Demont to assume sole responsibility for the bridge's security.

COMMENT: Davout doesn't usually make too many mistakes. I guess his interpersonal skills were faulty. I want the Player to experience some of Davout's doubts.
JG OBSERVATION: He seems to have been rather suspicious by nature (Metternich called him "the grand inquisitor" in a letter from approx. January 1809) and Wrede's premature abandonment of Straubing on 9 April seemed odd, raising a marshallistic eyebrow it seems. Moreover, from Davout's letters, he clearly had some other source(s) of intelligence who were telling him (erroneously -- probably reporting rumor, "RUMINT" as we say) that there was panic in the ranks among the Bavarians.

GILL: * The Bavarian 2nd and 3rd Divisions are along the Abens (Deroy arrived there at 0500 after marching all night). Crown Prince Ludwig and his 1st Division area at Reichertshofen (0608).

COMMENT: The March Tables have him setting up at Pfaffenhofen.
JG OBSERVATION: I see (literally, I just looked at the table) -- he should start Reichertshofen (0608) on the morning of the 17th. Pfaffenhofen is correct for the 16th.

GILL: * Davout, of course, trying to comply with Berthier's directives, has most of his men in/around Regensburg. Friant, St. Sulpice and parts of the light cavalry are still off to the north (off map).

[kzucker]

If we have two bridges capable of accommodating 7 men marching abreast and the files were moving at a moderate pace of say 30 paces per minute, you could imagine 200 men per minute crossing each bridge (to say nothing of the wagons). At that rate an army of 60,000 could theoretically cross in two and one-half hours. I doubt the achivement would be that quick, because of the tendency to disorder. With that many people moving through it would probably look more like the aftermath of Woodstock.

This traffic jam might be one of those events left unstated because it would have been obvious at the time. The movements of each column after it crosses the bridge would have to be planned out in detail, with plenty of Gendarmes directing foot and wagon traffic. That would be the mark of great staffwork if traffic snarls were not a major inconvenience.

[kzucker]

KZ COMMENT: To read along you will need to set-up the positions for April 18th.

JACK GILL: Napoleon called 18 April 'a day of preparation' as he expected a major engagement on the 19th or 20th. Charles had a similar view of things: he did not expect any serious contact on the 18th, but wanted to position his army to cross the Danube 'somewhere' between Kelheim and Ingolstadt on the 19th. Note that he had NOT YET discovered Davout's vulnerability when he issued his 'disposition' for the 18th; he still thought Davout was north of the Danube because the intelligence collected by his patrols on the 17th did not reach him until the morning the of the 18th. As you point out regarding the 16th, the Austrian player benefits from knowing a lot more (even with hidden units) than Charles actually did. Similar for the French, but not quite so acute.

This was a day of marching for the Austrians, who by the end of the day had reached the positions below.
* I Corps: still well off map to the north, had hardly moved (advance guard excepted) since approx. 13 April.
* II Corps: after the skirmish at Reinhausen northeast of Stadtamhof on the 17th, II Corps is cumbersomely setting itself up to attack the Stadtamhof bridgehead on the 19th.
* Vecsey is on the Gr. Laaber at Eggmuehl (4415)

KZ COMMENT: The Game's March tables show Vecsey hanging back at Hagelstadt five miles up the road.

JG OBSERVATION: Esposito and Elting just have his 'arrow' a bit too far north. Several points:
a. Vecsey did send patrols towards Hagelstadt (reaching Hoehenberg, approx. 4816), but these were daunted by Montbrun being just south of Alteglosheim (4913/4813) with a mixed infantry/cavalry detachment.
b. The Austrian official history ("Krieg 1809" my key source here) is quite critical of Vecsey for not displaying more initiative and drive in reconnaissance from Eggmuehl. Other than a short fracus near Hoehenberg, he relays news from a butcher who had traveled from Regensburg that day! As it happens, the info he collected from his patrols and the redoubtable Fleischhacker was good (despite this rather lacklustre effort), painted a fairly accurate picture of Davout's strength and his location south of the Danube. The intell reached Charles some time during the 18th (evening probably).

KZ COMMENT: Petre says it reached him between 06.30 and 07.00 (p. 102).

c. So, yes, Vecsey's main body remained around Eggmuehl.
d. Some of Vecsey's other patrols skirmish with Pajol way off on the
right near Pfatter (very approx. 5915).

GILL: * IV Corps: advance guard is at Langquaid (3714), but the bulk of the corps is stacked up with III Corps, and I Reserve Corps at Rohr and to the south.
* III Corps: advance guard is at Bachl.
* V Corps (minus Lindenau): has outposts along the Abens from Siegenburg to Mainburg, but the main body of the corps is at Ludmannsdorf.
* Already disregarding the corps establishments (to which such importance was attached), Charles has tacked Lindenau's division onto I Reserve Corps. But Lindenau is down to nine battalions (from 12) because two have been detached to guard the army's trains (vic. 2626) and III/Stain is so fresh-baked the men had not fired a shot, even in training. EH Ludwig does not trust them in the battle line, so he holds them back.

JG OBSERVATION: the Austrian ORBAT becomes very mixed and confused starting on the 18th, especially the ad hoc command given to Liechtenstein: his own I Reserve Corps, the cuirassier brigade from II Reserve Corps, Lindenau's division of V Corps (only nine battalions as noted previously), and Vecsey.
* The Levenehr Dragoons had been detached to III Corps from II Reserve Corps on 17 April (they will be consumed in the disasters of 19 and 20 April).
* That means II Reserve Corps was left with only six sqdns (= one heavy regt = Knesevich Dragoons) and its five grenadier battalions on the 18th -- hardly worthy of Kienmayer's talents.

* Scheibler is out at Pfaffenhofen (0216) where his men will scuffle with Massena/Oudinot on the 19th. Nordmann at Zolling (1027).
* Bulk of VI Corps is STILL at Moosburg. Hiller sees no need to move until the19th.
* Jellacic, curiously enough, is at Freising (0629) minus his advance guard, by the evening of the 18th. Hiller had taken advantage of Charles' orders to call his subordinate up from Munich. In this case Hiller had the right idea: unfortunately for him and the Austrians, Charles immediately sends Jellacic BACK to Munich. So, the game designers wisely left Jellacic out of the finished product, but for the detail-mongers who enjoy alternatives: have Jellacic arrive as reinforcements at 0133 on the afternoon turn of 18 April as a 6-5 Infantry (Ettinghausen) and 1-7 Cavalry (most of the O'Reilly Chevaulegers). Maybe roll a 1 or a 1-2 to make them arrive? One could then have a 2-5 Mixed unit (Provencheres with most of the advance guard) show up at 0133 on the morning turn of 20 April.

KZ COMMENT: We left Jellacic out of the mix just to avoid having him appear and disappear. He had no chance of encountering the enemy at Freising for the time he spent there... There was perhaps some chance that Jellacic would obey Hiller and not Charles, since Hiller was his immediate superior. However, Jellacic was left at Munich because we felt that Charles was correct in his orders and that Munich was an important base for supplies that needed protecting. The city would have reverted to Bavarian control without an occupying force, and its Supply Source would then be removed from Austrian control.

JG OBSERVATION: fully agree with the sensible design decision to leave him out of the game. My thought was that, as with Bellegarde, the alternative-junkies, and those who like to produce their own counters could have him show up on a low die roll -- assuming a change of heart by Charles. As for Munich as a supply source: could cease to function as such after the entry of Jellacic's advance guard (Provencheres) from Munich on the 20th.


GILL: Napoleon has turned the Army of Germany around.
* The Bavarians are gathering south of Neustadt after beginning to retire over the Danube.
* Davout is now assembled south of Regensburg (minus Guyon's command) and minus Friant, still marching south.
-- Napoleon wanted him to march on the 18th, but Davout decided to wait for Friant to come south of the Danube (N would have been content for Friant to retire on the northern bank).

JG OBSERVATION: The game's march tables are correct about Friant arriving on the northern map edge in the afternoon of the 18th. He did cross the Danube on the 18th, but not until evening -- bivouacked for the night of 18/19 'a cheval' the Neustadt/Landshut roads (approx. 4705/4805).

* Demont is at Vohburg (he must have rolled that '1'!).
* Nansouty (finally reached his division on the 17th) is en route.
* The Wuerttembergers and Napoleon are at Ingolstadt; Rouyer at Donauwoerth/Rain.
* The Massena/Oudinot force is stretched out just off map from near Pfaffenhofen to Augsburg.

As to Kehlheim -- maybe one could make a special exception for this bridge: allow the French to destroy it on a roll of 'x' or 'y'?

KZ COMMENT: I prefer the simplest way; probably just make it blown at start.

[kzucker]

KZ COMMENT: Set up positions for the 19th

JACK GILL: This day the tide turns against Austria: they lose the initiative and despite much tough fighting, are thrown off-balance operationally for the rest of the campaign in Bavaria. Charles changes his plan from attempting to cross the Danube to attacking Davout, whom he now knows to be south of Regensburg and isolated. He sends three "columns" towards Regensburg (general direction): III Corps (3908), IV Corps (4211-4409), and Liechtenstein (4415-4909).

The connecting link between IV Corps at Duenzling (4211), and III Corps at Hausen-Teugn (3810), is Stutterheim at Schneidhart (3912) -- one battalion and three squadrons (a 1-5 or 2-5 mixed unit in game terms). As IV Corps passed Langquaid, flank patrols encountered French forces north of Schneidhart (vic. 3911) and Stutterheim was detached to contain them. IV Corps even halted its march for a time and deployed. The corps eventually marched on, but Stutterheim was left behind and told to head for Abbach(!) -- so he ends up in a confused fight with parts of Gudin and later parts of Friant's division through most of the day.

Prince Liechtenstein commands Lindenau's division (V Corps), all of the army's cuirassiers (the three brigades of I and II Reserve Corps), and Vecsey. Charles retained the 12 grenadier battalions of I Reserve Corps as a reserve vic. Grub (3812). Also near Grub are three squadrons and one battalion left behind by Rosenberg as a link to Charles' reserve. (II Reserve Corps was still over near the Abens with V Corps; this "corps" now reduced by detachments to its five "organic" grenadier battalions and a lone regiment of dragoons.)

A grand meeting engagement (or series of meeting engagements) ensues as these "columns" encounter Davout's divisions marching west from Regensburg. The most important fighting is between Hausen and Teugn (hence the name attached to the day's struggles in most accounts). Austrian III Corps bumps into St. Hilaire in the woods at 3809 and fighting surges back and forth for several hours with the French, growing in numbers, gaining and retaining the upper hand.

KZ COMMENT: St. Julien and Kayser, starting in Rohr, must have come up later. That leaves Vukassovich to face the division of St. Hilaire alone for a time…

JG OBSERVATION: Other than Thierry and Pfanzelter, most of III Corps fights at Hausen-Teugn. Vukassovich and Kayser were supposed to march direct to Abbach, so they are the first to encounter St. Hilaire (vic. 3810); but St. Julien's two brigades, who were to divert off to Kayser's right towards Peising, are soon drawn into the struggle as well. The French troops here are St. Hilaire and, later Friant's Divisions. Morand and Gudin had already passed Teugn on the Abbach road (vic. Unter-Saal 3606) by the time Vukassovich made contact with St. Hilaire.

KZ COMMENT: Petre says that Thierry was sent toward Kirchdorf.

JG OBSERVATION: Thierry marches off more-or-less towards Kirchdorf, but his outposts are pushed ahead towards Abensberg and, when they report the Bavarians apparently moving east towards Regensburg, he sends a portion of his command to intercept them. The resulting small engagement goes badly for the Austrians (they are lucky that the Bavarians do not pursue with more vigor) and they retire to Offenstetten, with other bits'n'pieces on the left tied in with V Corps near Biburg. So Thierry is left scattered, much reduced in strength and much shaken by the day's events. Hard to show in game terms because Thierry's lone brigade is spread so thinly over a large area (four or five hexes probably). (Remember that Thierry has the Levenehr Dragoons with him from II Reserve Corps.)

KZ COMMENT: We could use a couple of Brigade breakdown counters (say, 'A' and 'B' both at reduced strength) and a vedette …

JACK GILL: Hohenzollern sends Pfanzelter to Bachl (3312) to be a link to Thierry, but he only has one battalion of Grenzer and two squadrons (so just a 1-5 or 2-5 mixed unit in game terms).

A tremendous thunderstorm intervenes to halt combat (as shown in the weather rules) and the Austrians retire to Hausen (3711) leaving the French in possession of 3809 and, more importantly, leaving Davout with a clear path to the Abens and the rest of the Allied army via 3407. Austrian IV Corps knocks around with flank elements of Davout's main body between 3912 and 4211, but spends most of the day accomplishing little against GD Montbrun's superbly-handled small screening force of light cavalry backed up by the 7th Leger. Liechtenstein encounters the enemy not at all but only reaches the Eggmuehl-Altegloffsheim area (4415-4913) with outposts toward Regensburg (e.g., vedettes at 4910). As a side note: two of corps commander Johann Liechtenstein's younger brothers were badly wounded in the severe fighting against St. Hilaire vic. 3810 (Moritz and Alois, both in III Corps with the rank of General-Major -- GM Bieber is also wounded here -- tough day for Austrian generals).

Charles sends a few grenadier battalions towards Hausen very late in the day (too late to influence the battle), but otherwise does little to ensure a n outcome favorable to the Habsburg cause. Meanwhile Austrian GM Thierry attempts to interfere with a Bavarian advance to assist Davout and brings on a small engagement at Arnhofen (3109). He takes rather the worst of things and retires towards Offenstetten (3111), badly outnumbered and badly positioned for the morrow. Other elements of Austrian V Corps spread out along the Abens and spar by cannon with the Bavarians (nothing of consequence). Hiller marches via Au (1321) to reach Mainburg (1917) with some elements of VI Corps in the evening, but his advance guard and GM Hohenfeld end the day at Au. His detachment under Scheibler has a brief skirmish with Oudinot's advance guard at Pfaffenhofen (0216) before withdrawing in the face of extremely daunting odds. Jellacic returns uselessly to Munich. In other southern news: the first three Vienna Volunteer battalions (those assigned to V Corps) arrive in Landshut by evening and GM Reinwald is still well off-map.

North of the Danube, Kolowrat makes an abortive attempt to attack Stadtamhof, but achieves nothing against Col. Coutard's 65th Ligne (hence the specific counter for this regt. in the game). Kolowrat sends a detachment just off-map (vic. 4401/4501) under Crennewile. Bellegarde halts at Amberg.
As for other French units:
* Massena/Oudinot are gathered at Pfaffenhofen and east by the evening of the 19th (on and off-map), having left one Hessian and one Baden regt. in Augsburg as garrison.
* The Wuerttemberg contingent and Nansouty's heavy cavalry (the three 2-6 heavy brigades) are west of the Abens in the general vicinity of Neustadt (2508-1908).
* Demont is at Vohburg (1708).
* Rouyer is still off-map at Rain/Donauwoerth.
* Guyon is off-map to the north along the Altmuehl River.

[kzucker]

We are planning to finish this history as game narrative in the next days. Things get quite interesting as major battles loom. John Kranz of Consimworld is working with Jim Anderson to produce a set of jpegs of the AM situations for each day that will help to illustrate this narrative.

Purchase The Seven Days of 1809 at http://www.napoleongames.com/store.html

[kzucker]

KZ COMMENT: Please set-up the situation for 20 April.

JACK GILL:

20 April sees the Austrian "Hauptarmee" (Main Army) broken in half during the course of the Battle of Abensberg. Better viewed as a series of interconnected engagements than as a grand battle in the style of Jena or Austerlitz, the "battle" nonetheless ends with the Austrian left wing (V Corps, VI Corps and the rump of II Reserve Corps) badly shaken and weakened by serious losses. Worse, the Allies chase the Austrian left wing from the Abens to the Gr. Laaber, driving a wedge between that wing and the rest of the army as can be seen from the evening situation below. Charles, curiously incommunicado for much of the day, may have suffered from an epileptic seizure or other malady (hence the game provision for this eventuality), but there is no evidence to give us a definitive answer. What is certain, is that he seems to vanish from the battlefield. Furthermore, owing to poor command/control arrangements and French interception of couriers, Charles (whatever his physical condition) and the rest of the Main Army have no idea of the disaster that has befallen the left wing. They remain in this inexplicable state of ignorance for several days.Napoleon suffers from his own misperceptions -- especially his erroneous conviction that he has beaten the principal Austrian force -- but he can recover from his mistake; the Austrians will not enjoy this luxury.

Charles and his staff, evidently anxious, perhaps stunned, after the events of the 19th, decide to withdraw most of army to the Gr. Laaber on the 20th, while Liechtenstein presses on to secure Regensburg. Charles is focused on the Danube valley (Abbach/4107, etc.), no one seems to notice the danger building between Siegenburg (2812) and Reissing (3407) until it is too late.

During the day of the 20th:

* The Bavarian 1st Division (Crown Prince Ludwig, 7-5 and 1-7 in the game) defeats Thierry (6-5) at Offenstetten (3111).

* But when Thierry and his men flee east, they find that an ad hoc French corps (two of Davout's divisions and some cuirassiers under Marshal Jean Lannes as featured in the game) has already driven Pfanzelter out of Bachl (3312), thus cutting off Thierry's retreat. Recall that Pfanzelter, owing to detachments, would only have been a mixed unit of 2-5 or so in game terms at this point.

* Lannes pursues a l'outrance through Rohr (3215), overrunning the unfortunate Schustekh and the remnants of Thierry's command (Thierry is captured). Schustekh, had only a small force here (would be a 2-5 in the game). The pursuit continues to near Rottenburg where the French overwhelm advance elements of Hiller's VI Corps late in the day after a costly fight in the woods (approx. hex 3018). Napoleon has his HQ in the post house at Rohr for the night with the 1st and 3rd Bavarian divisions and most of St. Sulpice's cuirassiers bivouacked from there to Offenstetten (3111). Austrian VI Corps ends near Tuerkenfeld (3222).

* Meanwhile, Wrede and Vandamme's Wuerttembergers (principally the crack Light Brigade of four battalions = 3-5) chase V Corps over hill and dale from Biburg-Siegenburg to Pfeffenhausen (2721). Bessieres (also featured in the game as an ad hoc commander) puts in an appearance leading several cavalry charges with German light horse. The Germans perform very well tactically against stiff resistance (it is no cake walk). That night, Wrede storms over the burning bridge into Pfeffenhausen, disrupting any Austrian thought of holding along the Gr. Laaber and almost capturing Ludwig. Ludwig and his men (plus II Reserve Corps) retire towards Landshut.

* All is quiet for Davout near the Danube (Abbach to approx. hex 3811).

* General Oudinot arrives around Neustadt (2508) with Tharreau's division, Boudet's division, and Colbert's light cavalry. Rouyer has detachments from Donauwoerth to Ingolstadt. (The March Tables have Boudet along the Isar with the rest of IV Corps. He should be up at Neustadt with Oudinot. Massena had to send two divisions north and picked the two easiest to divert rather than adhering strictly to the II Corps structure.)

* Massena's men continue their epic forced march (recall that some of his regiments covered 100 kilometers in approx. 48 hours on 18 and 19 April!). Marching along the chausee just off-map to the west between Pfaffenhofen (0216) and Freising (0629), by the evening of the 20th, Marulaz is vic. 1431 with Claparede just behind at Langenbach (1331); Carra St. Cyr is entering Freising; Legrand and Espagne are west of Freising.

* Col. Coutard and the 65th Ligne lay down their arms at 1800 after Liechtenstein appears south of Regensburg (recall that Kolowrat is north of Stadtamhof). The Austrians thereby gain the invaluable stone bridge across the Danube.

* Curiously, Kolowrat (II Corps) is ordered NOT to join the Main Army south of the Danube. Rather, he is sent north off map towards Hemau (via hex 4501).

* By evening, the Hauptarmee is generally as follows: III Corps mainly south of the Gr. Laaber vic. 4015; IV Corps around Duenzling; advance detachment at Schneidhart (3912); grenadiers (12-5) near 4316; Army HQ at Altegloffsheim (4913); Liechtenstein's ad hoc command between Regensburg, Gebelkofen (Lindenau from 4710 to 4909), and Penting (4405 - Vecsey).

* Austrian I Corps is at Neumarkt (off map).

[kzucker]

KZ COMMENT: Please set up the 21 April positions.

Jack Gill: April 21st can be viewed as two separate but related engagements. The principal combat takes place around Landshut as Napoleon continues the pursuit of the broken Austrian left wing (Hiller commanding V, VI, and II Reserve Corps) with the bulk of the Army of Germany. The secondary combat is between Davout (with part of his own III Corps, one Bavarian division and other attachments) and Archduke Charles in the area north of the Gr. Laaber river.

Landshut action.
Napoleon drives south in two columns: Lannes (two of Davout's divisions and attached cavalry) along the road from Rottenburg (3120) and Wrede on the road from Pfeffenhausen (2721) followed by Vandamme. On the Austrian side, Hiller attempts to cobble together a defense north of the river to cover the inchoate withdrawal of trains, pontoons, and other impedimenta (not shown) across the Isar. After heavy and confused fighting north of the Isar (generally 3030 to 3230), the hasty Austrian defense collapses and a desperate retreat across the river heightens the prevailing confusion and disorganization at the bridges and in the city.

However, Hiller's hopes to hold the line of the Isar are dashed when Massena's corps appears around 2832 having crossed at Moosburg (1731). From the north bank, French infantry led by General Mouton storms the burning bridge and breaks into the city at 3132; Bavarian General von Zandt (1st Division cavalry 1-7) is killed at the crossing (hex 3131). The Austrians manage to hold off Massena's lead division (Claparede, 8-5)—largely because the French are too tentative in the absence of Massena—long enough to retreat off map in considerable disorder during the afternoon and evening. Radetzky covers the retreat. Austrian losses are significant and include their bridging train and over 300 wagons of baggage and supplies. Napoleon detaches Marshall Bessieres with Marulaz's cavalry (part = 2-7) to pursue Hiller; Bessieres and Marulaz exit the map on the 21st (evening). Bessieres will be given Molitor's division (7-5) and Wrede 's Bavarians as well (8-5 and 1-7), but these are still on map on the evening of the 21st (Molitor and Preysing at Moosburg and Wrede at Landshut).

Most other French forces are also in and around Landshut on the evening of 21 April. Napoleon, Lannes (Morand, Gudin), St. Sulpice, Massena (St.-Cyr, Claparede), Wrede (Bavarian infantry), Jacquinot, former von Zandt (1-7), two of the French heavy cavalry brigades (2-6 each), three other light cavalry regiments from II and IV Corps, Vandamme (= approx. 1-7 in game terms) and the Wuerttembergers. Legrand is at approx. 2132 and Espagne's heavies at approx. 2332.

Crown Prince Ludwig (7-5) is to the rear at Rottenburg (3120). Napoleon believes he has defeated the Austrian Main Army and won another Jena.


Davout and the Archduke
Meanwhile Davout, heavily outnumbered, has advanced against the bulk of the Austrian Army under Charles north of the Gr, Laaber. In a series of small engagements around Schneidhart (3912), Paring (4113), Lierendorf, etc. he slowly pushes back parts of the Habsburg III and IV Corps. Charles, thinking to prepare himself for a major French offensive from the west and utterly unaware of the disaster that has befallen his left wing, conducts a slow, orderly withdrawal and calls Kolowrat (II Corps) to join him south of the Danube. Kolowrat does not receive the order until 1700 on the 21st and his men march through the night. The other Austrian elements (III, IV, I Reserve Corps with Schneller's brigade and Lindenau's division) end the day stretched (generally) between Gebelkofen (4710), Weillohe (4410), the Laichlings (4414), and Buchhausen (4217). Vecsey is around 4306 (March Table says 4410).

Lefebvre with Deroy's division near Schierling (4215), Demont south of the Gr. Laaber, Davout (St. Hilaire, Friant, a cuirassier brigade) north towards Paring and Duenzling (4113, 4211). Montbrun (Pajol - March Table says 4211) covers the French left from Abbach (4107) to Peising (4208) with light cavalry and the 7th Leger.

(JG: Regarding discrepancies in locations of Montbrun/Vecsey, this is difficult in game terms because both units were covering large areas. Key is to keep them in places where can neutralize one another and not allow the Austrians some kind of end-run along the Abbach road. I am confident that the bulk of both forces was further north than shown in the march tables, but the table locations are fairly close and probably work in simulation terms.)

To Davout's rear and placed under his authority is Oudinot with Tharreau (7-5) and Colbert (part = 1-7) near Abensberg (2909) and Boudet (5-5) at Neustadt (2508).

Guyon (1-5) and Austrian I Corps are still well north of the Danube.

Davout sends repeated messages to Napoleon during the 21st arguing that the Austrian Main Army and Charles himself are in the north near Regensburg. Napoleon remains unconvinced until approximately 0200 on 22 April.

[kzucker]

KZ Comment: please set up March Tables for 22 April

Jack Gill: With the defeat of the Austrian left wing, action in the campaign comes to focus once again on the area immediately south of Regensburg. Here Charles awaits events in considerable uncertainty: convinced that the French will attack him soon, but unsure of enemy locations and unaware of the calamity on his left. He resolves, however, to launch his own offensive and Kolowrat's II Corps, ordered south the previous day, arrives from Hemau (road at hex 4501) in an exhausted state during the early morning hours. Charles intends to attack the French left (generally from 4107 to 4211) with Vecsey, Kolowrat, Liechtenstein's ad hoc command and parts of III Corps (Hohenzollern) supported by the reserve cavalry and grenadiers, while Rosenberg's IV Corps holds the Austrian left near Eggmuehl (4415). The Austrian order of battle is now thoroughly scrambled ('total durcheinander') with Vukassovich (III Corps) south of the Laaber near Buchhausen (4217) and Bieber's Brigade (St. Julien's division of III Corps) on Rosenberg's extreme left (shown in the game by the reduced St. Julien counter), not to mention the tangled mix of units under Liechtenstein. Charles does not expect an attack from the south. Given the tired state of Kolowrat's men, he elects to delay his attack until midday. That will prove to be too late.

In Landshut, Napoleon finally recognizes the true state of affairs around 0200 when General Pire arrives from Davout with the sixth of Davout's missives for the day (Lefebvre had sent two others). Reacting instantly, the Emperor shoves the great mass of French combat power from the Isar up the road to Eggmuehl (3629 to 4415) with all possible speed, the Wuerttemberg Light Brigade in the lead (3-5). He instructs Davout to occupy the Austrians but not to attack until his own force arrives on the Austrian flank.

The morning fog is heavy and little can be done effectively until it burns off. But as the mists dissipate, Napoleon arrives. The Austrians are quickly chased out of Buchhausen and the Wuerrtemberg light battalions storm over the little bridge at Eggmuehl to capture the manor house that dominates the road north. At the end of their tether after leading the advance since the 20th, they watch as the battle unfolds: French heavy cavalry and Seydewitz's Bavarian brigade (1-7) charge a battery of 16 Austrian guns above Eggmuehl (4514) while the two divisions under Lannes flood north over Rogging (4615). In the meantime, Davout has pressed forward toward Ober- and Unter Laichling (4414) and Sanding (4513), capturing Oberlaichling and the hill above it with the support of Deroy's Bavarian 3rd Division. Rosenberg's Corps breaks and flees north in great confusion, Stutterheim and the cavalry performing well in efforts to slow the French pursuit. A famous cavalry battle takes place just after sunset at Alt-Eglofsheim (4913) as a brigade of Austrian cuirassiers courageously attempts to stem the French tide. They fail in the face of overwhelming French strength and overrun one of their own grenadier battalions as they retreat north. The exhausted but exhilarated French pursue as far as the line running from Koefering (4910) to Thalmassing (4611).

Situation, Evening 22nd April

Napoleon lodges in Alt-Eglofsheim in the manor where Charles had spent the night of 21/22 April. Charles seems to have done little to contribute to or manage the battle during the day, leaving half or more of his army unengaged (the attack never got rolling).

Massena, Oudinot, and other French forces close up on the Gr. Laaber by evening, but do not arrive in time for the battle. Most of the Wuerttemberg line infantry (approx. 7-5 in game terms) is stretched out from Lindhart (4221) to Landshut and Molitor (though allotted to Bessieres) is at Ergolding (3229).Boudet is still at Neustadt (2508), Rouyer at Ingolstadt (0801), and Preysing (1-7) at Freising (0630) to observe Jellacic off-map at Munich (off 0133).

Of Austrian II Corps, two battalions and two squadrons are still off-map to the north (heading for Regensburg), and I Corps has finally come as far south as Hemau (off 4501).

Hiller and the remnants of V, VI and II Reserve Corps are retreating to the south off-map with Bessieres in pursuit (Wrede's infantry, Marulaz, and Jacquinot).

[kzucker]

KZ COMMENT: Please set-up March Table positions for 23 April

JACK GILL:
Charles, personally demoralized, sends his brother the Kaiser a grim assessment of the Main Army's condition. Even if he overstates the recent losses and consequent drop in morale, however, it is clear that the Main Army's only hope lies in rapid withdrawal and he issues orders to begin moving III and IV Corps across the river early in the morning (most of the trains crossed during the bright moonlit night). To assist in this process, his sets his pontooneers to work erecting a bridge vic. hex 5004/5105 (thus the importance Austrian historians attach to Kolowrat's decision several days earlier to hurry the approach of the bridging train to Regensburg). The bridge is completed by approx. 0800 and III and IV Corps infantry and artillery are soon north of the Danube, albeit in a deplorable state of confusion. Other units begin to move towards the pontoon bridge and the stone span in Regensburg (4904-5003) and considerable disorder arises around the entrances to both. GM Foelseis, detailed to defend Regensburg with five battalions (curiously, none of these are from his brigade), begins to put the city in a state of defense. This includes blockading all of the city gates except the one on the Ingolstadt road (4803). As a result (and highlighting the prevailing confusion on the Austrian side), Hohenzollern has to march around the outside perimeter of the city when he finds the mass of troops and vehicles at the pontoon bridge too daunting and decides to take his corps to the Regensburg bridge.

Meanwhile, a tremendous cavalry fight has erupted south of the city as the French begin to advance (approx. 08.00-09.00). Each side brings approximately 55-60 squadrons to the battle for something like 6,000 horsemen on each side of the field (the cuirassiers of II Reserve Corps are conspicuous by their absence during this fight -- whereabouts unknown, but evidently north of the Danube). Note that the Austrians have very little infantry left on the south bank by 09.00-10.00. Nansouty's heavy troopers (the three 2-6 heavy cavalry counters) bear the brunt of the battle on the French side; the Austrians counter with the cuirassiers of I Reserve Corps (3-6) ably assisted by the (much reduced) light cavalry of III and IV Corps. The Austrians display great courage and tactical skill at the regimental level, but lack unified direction and coordination. Their attacks and counterattacks are isolated and thus have little enduring benefit as the French, well orchestrated in mass, press steadily ahead. The Austrian sacrifice does delay the French pursuit, however, especially as the fight drifts west towards Regensburg and away from the pontoon bridge. This the French do not discover until it has been in use for several hours (some Austrians sources contend that their cavalry cleverly lured the French away from the pontoon bridge on purpose). The cavalry fight concludes around midday as the last Austrian squadrons retreat across the pontoon bridge or through Regensburg. The French are pursuing so closely that the city's defenders shut the gates before all of the Habsburg troopers can escape. Some Austrian hussars locked-out attempt to swim the Danube, but apparently 50 drown in the attempt. At the pontoon bridge, French horse artillery increase the confusion, but cannot destroy the bridge, so most of the Austrians slip away. Unfortunately for Charles, the proximity of the French does not permit a proper recovery of the bridge: the men cut the anchor ropes on the north bank but are unable to recapture the span and the current quickly carries most of it to the French side of the river (the Austrian thus lose both bridging trains: one at Landshut and the second here. Someone thought it a good idea to leave an infantry battalion in the "superb position" at Burgweinting (4806); the only result of this decision was that III/Erzherzog Karl Infantry No. 3 is "encircled and ridden down" by the French cavalry.

The fighting now focuses on Regensburg. The French (7th Leger) make an abortive attempt to storm the city at 1300, but turn to more formal measures when this fails. Quickly assembling ladders and fascines, Gudin's division assaults a breach created by a battery of twelve 12-pounders (18.00-19.00). An alert French unit locates a poorly blockaded postern gate and blue-coated infantry is soon storming through the burning city. Efforts to capture Stadtamhof fail, but Foelseis and his five battalions are captured almost to a man (Austrian regiments No. 15 and No. 25 are essentially eradicated).

The fighting ends at night with the Austrians making good their disorganized retreat after losing some 8,900 men and their bridging train during the day (but only eleven guns and few other vehicles). French losses are unclear but probably less than 1,500, mostly from Nansouty and Gudin.

Of other forces:
Napoleon, realzing that he had more infantry than he needed at Regensburg, sends Massena to Straubing to control the bridge over the Danube there. Fourth IV Corps (Legrand, Carra St.-Cyr, Claparede, Espagne) arrives by evening. He also sends the 1st Bavarian Division infantry south to Ergoldsbach (3925). Molitor and Preysing march off map to join Bessieres. Boudet ends the day at Abbach (4107); the Wuerttemberg corps at Alteglofsheim (4913). Rouyer remains at Ingolstadt and along the Danube. Leaving a rear guard at Hemau (off map), Austrian I Corps rejoins Charles (off-map) as does FML Crenneville with a detachment from II Corps (two battalions, two squadrons) that had stayed north of the river when Kolowrat marched south on the night of 21/22 April.

The stage is now set for the drive to Vienna that ends with the Battle of Aspern-Essling on 21-22 May.

[kzucker]

KZ Comment: A side discussion on the performance of Massena's IV Corps in this campaign.

JACK GILL: In General Bonnal's opinion, (to paraphrase) Massena is 'no longer the man of Rivoli, Zuerich, or Genoa' in 1809. The corps was assigned a higher percentage of conscripts than III Corps. But Massena is still a first-rate commander and the regiments are solid old formations with plenty of veterans for the most part. The German contingents of Baden and Hesse with Massena are among the best.

Marching: On 18 and 19 April, IV Corps completed a 100 km march in two days through dreadful weather (rather like that we have today, but much colder). Great credit to the men, but also implies good staff organization and leadership. That few of them get into combat is a result of circumstances in the operational situation. Massena personally should probably be faulted (as he has been) for not being with his advance guard (Claparede in this case) on 21 April south of Landshut to urge greater aggressiveness. His absence allowed Hiller to fight another day. Some fault Massena for not having his divisions more tightly assembled on 17 April when Napoleon's urgent orders reach him. I disagree. Massena had good reason to be dispersed (logistics) and had received no word indicating that a major march was to be demanded instantly. Indeed, all of his orders to that point (from Berthier) indicated that he would stay on the Lech and he knew the enemy to be some days distant (and not an immediate threat).

Neumarkt (24 April): This is really a fight for Wrede and Jacquinot after Bessieres irresponsibly leaves them on the wrong side of the Rott. Molitor's division is present, but only covers Wrede's withdrawal (not a IV Corps action).

Crossing the Inn: Seem to me the corps did very well in the drive to the Inn and the crossing.

Ebelsberg (3 May): Troops and leaders from division down perform very well (including Badeners and, again, Claparede — the latter, of course, not strictly IV Corps in this case). Massena can be faulted for attacking at all when other French forces had already forced the Traun further south. Result was heavy casualties and the appalling scenes in the town after the battle.

Aspern/Essling: I rate the performance of the corps very highly at all levels (one can argue about Napoleon putting them in that situation in the first place, but the men from Massena on down do very well in a very difficult situation).

Hungary: Marulaz and the Baden brigade perform well during opns in Hungary in June, but these hardly constitute a "IV Corps action."

Wagram: generally very good in my view with two major exceptions (below). It woudl be hard to think of anyone other than Massena or Davout who could have turned an entire corps 90 degrees and marched coherently across the front of a powerful enemy.

Examples of poor performance:
-Losing control of the attack on Aderklaa, giving a fine opportunity for Austrian counterattack.
-Boudet's losing his artillery near Aspern.

Pursuit/Znaim: It seems to me IV Corps does quite well with limited forces in the pursuit to Znaim. Some units are temporarily broken at Znaim in the Austrian grenadier attack, but Massena keeps his cool and handily shatters the Austrian attack with a timely attack by a regt of cuirassiers. Part luck (that the regt was on hand), but also cool-headedness and good combat instincts.

[kzucker]

http://talk.consimworld.com/WebX?14@@.ee6cd4c/602

View the positions of the armies on each day. We used close-ups on towns such as Landshut, Eckmühl, Abensberg, Regensburg, etc. There are between 3 and 7 jpegs for each of the seven days, all of which are based on the Set-up Tables.

The images have brief captions, but can be used to illustrate Jack's History as Game narration.