Questions & Answers

[kzucker]

From: Andrea.TOLETTI@consultant.vodafoneomnitel.it
1) Rule 127 states that "a force in an enemy ZOC (...) may only move by initiative": does this rule apply also to a besieging force, since a besiged army still exert a ZOC in the surrounding hexes?
2) Rule 50 of the exclusive rules booklet states that "the total attack strength of a force attacking into a mountain hex may not exceed 9 SP": is this an hex or an hexside limit? I think it should be an hexside limit, since the defending army exert a ZOC in all the six surrounding hexes... Is there any such a limit for the defending army? If not it would be quite difficult to dislodge an enemy from a mountain hex.
3) Rule 21 states that "the force leader (...) is only revealed when in the ZOC of an enemy force...": does this rule apply as soon as a force enter an enemy ZOC, or at the end of the movement phase?
4) Since rule 131 states that "if the repulse is not successful, the exact strength of the enemy force is not revealed", how should using vedettes to attempt repulse help to reveal enemy strength before the end of the movement phase, as suggested by the playing notes? By ending their movement in the ZOC of an enemy force, a vedette reveals the enemy leader identity anyway, isn't it? (see question number 3).
5) During a counterattack, which terrain hex should be used to determine the column of the CRT? The hex of the original defender, or the hex of the attaccking force that is being counterattacked?

Finally a brief comment. It seems to me that more often than not players fight too many battles with the same army, even if defeated in the field. What about introducing a rule on army morale that forbid an army in engaging in offensive operation after suffering a major defeat? Maybe army morale could be tested with a secret die roll, so that the opposing player is not aware wether the enemy will be able to mount another attack in the following turn.

[Nico[PL]]

CONSOLIDATED RULES HOUSE ERRATA :-) 5.02.2005

Gathered from ConsimWorld forum and OSG Forum

* * *

[35.] Force Leaders
Clarification : subordinate leader cannot have his own subordinate leader.

* * *

SOA rulebook is newer than BII so it should be like that:

[157.] Vedettes Out of Dispatch Distance
Vedettes that cannot trace a Dispatch Distance to a Center of Operations, Supply Source or active friendly Depot during the Administration Phase of the Player-Turn, are immediately removed from play until the Organization Segment of the next Friendly Player-Turn. They return to play as described in 319.

* * *

[223.] Repairing Bridges
Exception: In Napoleon at Bay if an enemy force occupies any hex adjacent to a force repairing a bridge, add "three" MPs if the bridge spans a primary river but only one MP if it spans a secondary river.

* * *

Pontoon Deployment
[228.] Add : Deploying pontoon bridge adjacent to the enemy cost additional 3 MP.

* * *

[262.] Combat Procedure
Add in Step 2: The non-phasing Player reveals the Leaders of the Force defending hex(es).

Clarification: Word "reveals" in step 1&2 is not in conflict with rule [29]. Reveals here means that ?you know who is in face of you when contact is made, for instance Murat and Davout, but enemy reveals whose leader he uses to attack you during step 1. When these two leaders are in contact, you don't know who will attack you and you make your forced march as you see fit, concentrate all you can against Davout. But, in fact, its perhaps Murat who will lead the attack.?

Clarification: A counter attacking force can attack only one attacking hex but it must withheld half the strength of unattacked hex. Reserves can fulfill this condition.
Example : Enemy has 10 and 15 SP. I have 25 SP with 5 in reserve I attack enemy 15 SP with my 25 SP with my reserve to watch at other enemy hex.

* * *

[274.] Cavalry in Reserve
House Rule / Clarification : I think that in pursuit battle cavalry differential is not counted if it was not in reserve. Exception: If attacker / defender wins in the very first round of battle, then cavalry (I think) should be counted.

* * *

[275.] Entering the Reserve
Clarification: Artillery is not counted toward 20SP allowed to attack per hexside.
Clarification: A force with less than 20 SP can choose pitch battle if it put in reserve one quarter of its strength or 8 SP.

* * *

[282.] Commitment of Reserves
Clarification: You must pass an initiative die roll only for units which want to move (from an EZOC or at 1 hex).

* * *

[285.] Reserve and Battle Type Selection
Clarification: Artillery is counted toward this rule.

* * *

[302.] Artillery Bombardment
Clarification: Modifiers are not used in case when a multi-hex force has 30 SP or 40SP. Modifier is per hex.
Clarification: Reserves are counted toward Force strength per hex.

* * *

[311.] Woods Effect on Combat
Add: Cavalry Strength is halved when defending in or attacking into wood hexes (rounding fractions up).

* * *

[346.] Critical Battles
Exception: In Napoleon at Bay the battle can be critical if the loosing side lost more than five (5) SPs.

* * *

[350.] Override option
Clarification: In case when defender (winner) retreats and attacker (losser) stays and make no pursuit, both sides loss SP equal to defender CRT result.
Result of a combat is 3 losses for attacker (pitch option) and 1 for defender (pursuit option). Defender wins but choose override; He retreats 1 hex. If attacker doesn?t or cannot pursue they both loss 1SP.

* * *

Home Rule [382.] Rearguard
In order to prevent the "flypaper" problem that can occur in pursuit situations (this is when a pursuer does well enough on his pursuit roll to finish the pursuit adjacent to the defeated force), a force could expend its own troops as a DRM to gain additional favorable die modifiers on the Pursuit table. One SP gives -1 DRM, 2 SP = -2 DRM, and so on.

However I think Optional Rearguard Battle Type should be deleted when using [382]. This new rule simulates some detachments that are left, sacrificed to allow to escape main body. I think this 'new rule' is already rearguard and old rule is not needed.

* * *

Home Rule [383.] Pursuit & Attrition
"Or make pursuits subject to attrition. It is probably true that there was less attrition by a pursuit force than for a normal march." - Kevin Zucker, OSG Forum.

Home rule to be made !?

* * *

Home Rule [384.] Pursuit & Retreat & Disorganization
Forces that had pursued & retreat for:
- 7 or 8 hexes cannot receive movement command in their next command phase and they get -1 for initiative roll for movement
- 6 hexes get -1 for initiative roll for movement

* * *

[Brian Laursen]

can you use the cannons up front rule were artillery is doubled in all of the 1x and 5x series games?

Brian

[kzucker]

Brian, In all the 1X games, sure.

[Brian Laursen]

But not in Highway to the Kremlin despite the fact that the artillery table has a collumn for 3-4 SPs of artillery and both sides only have 2 SPs?

[kzucker]

Brian,

That's right. Remember that strengths are factored-up by five, so that is about 80 guns per SP., which would be a lot of guns to move up into the line. (It was an extremely rare occurrence.)

[Brian Laursen]

Are vedettes eliminated when they are forced to retreat after they have been repulsed?

Kevin could you please list the rulesections rules were there are rules differences between the 1x and 5x series. It is a very slow procces to read the two ruleset simultaneus to spot diferences so I do not carry rules from one system over to the other.

Brian

[kzucker]

Para. [74.] makes no mention of what happens after a vedette is repulsed. Para. [78.] says "A Vedette which is forcd to retreat or suffers any combat strength loss on the CRT is removed from the map ..."

Since it is so difficult to get rid of vedettes, I am inclined toward the idea that the Repulsed Vedette is removed. However, I wonder how other people have played it, and if there are any opinions as to whether playing it this way could cause any problems.

[kzucker]

A. The Entire Introductory Section of the Exclusive Rules is different. In Highway to the Kremlin this is para. [1.] through [28.]

B. Para [32.] applies only to HtK.

C. [34.] 'Note' (last sentence) applies only to HtK.

D. [69.] "All other vedettes are placed in the available 'Vedette Pool.'"

E. [69.] "You may only bring into play Vedettes in the available vedette 'pool.'

F. [77.] "First, by atempting a repulse, to determine the identity of the enemy leader (the vedette may retreat before combat)."

G. [no G]

H. [79.] Corresponds to SuA [78.] "...force made up solely of Cavalry..." is removed. It is incorrect to have a force of more than one Vedette.

I. [79.] This paragraph was brought back into the 1X system in SuA, as indicated by underlining in SuA para [78.]

[kzucker]

This list goes on through letter 'AA.' Even with that, there are lots more small changes over and above the listed ones. This list was the initial group.

I appreciate your interest in this, but I wanted to make sure this is really going to be of value since it will take several hours away from other projects.

[kzucker]

Brian,

I have just run a "Document comparison" in Word, that resulted in a text file that is mostly red (meaning different). It looks like about 10% of the text is actually the same between the two. I will be happy to send you this file (it is too large to post on this board). Let me know by email.

[Brian Laursen]

Para. [74.] makes no mention of what happens after a vedette is repulsed. Para. [78.] says "A Vedette which is forcd to retreat or suffers any combat strength loss on the CRT is removed from the map ..."

Since it is so difficult to get rid of vedettes, I am inclined toward the idea that the Repulsed Vedette is removed. However, I wonder how other people have played it, and if there are any opinions as to whether playing it this way could cause any problems.

This will affect the french in a big way in HttK, but I think it is a good rule, especially in the 1x games

[kzucker]

Brian,

What will be the effect for the French, do you believe? Will that make it worse for the French?

[Brian Laursen]

It will hurt the french as any vedette eliminated east of the weather line is permanently eliminated, and not put in the vedette pool.

Brian

[daniel]

kevin
A question about determining cavalry differential :
in exclusive rules of SOA, n° 126, you says that we count cavalry that is not in mountain or swamp.
I think its a big difference with old rules (1807) where cavalry in non clear terrain was not counted for calculation.
I think that if a player choose to deploy in rough terrain or in town, he will benefit from its protective bonus. But cavalry will have difficulty to take part to combat or to an efficient pursuit in case of victory.
Wouldn't be better if we keep old rules with more restrictions for cavalry in non clear terrain, or which are reasons for this change
daniel

[kzucker]

Daniel,

I think you are right.

[vlozanof]

The player may select zero "hexes retreated" in a Rearguard ??

If this is possible then Rearguard option works like a Pitched option if the player wants. :eek:

Or is mandatory a minumum of 1 hex in the retreat when Rearguard is used ?

[kzucker]

Victor,

If he selects "Zero" hexes retreated, then the players will interpret the battle type as Pitched Battle and not Rearguard.

[vlozanof]

ok, but in this case is absurd to play pitched chit.
(warnning : I'm playing without reserves rule)

The player always may play a rearguard option, and never he needs to play a pitched chit, because his rearguard option may work like a pitched battle if he wish.

In other words, rearguard is not a additional option, is a new option that overrides the pitched option. :eek:

I am wrong? :confused:
there is some advantage when using pitched option with respect to rearguard option? (in the case that reserves rule is not used)

[vlozanof]

I have continued searching in the rules.

I think that the unique possible (small) advantage to use Pitched option versus Rearguard option is the possibility of a "Pursuit Override" (if the attacker uses a Rearguard battle then there is not pursuit override ).

Does not exist any other reason that makes preferable use the Pitched chit before the Rearguard chit?

I see very useless to play the Pitched battle because playing the Rearguard battle the losser obtains the same result (and more options to choose), and with more flexibility (the lossser may choose in that moment that the battle works like pitched battle or like pursuit battle or mixed).
The losser, having chosen the Rearguard chit, may choose what to do when it already knows the attack result. What reason has this player to choose the Pitched chit if with the Rearguard has more flexibility and control ?

I have forgotten something?
Certainly the Pitched option is so devaluated with respect to the Rearguard option ?

[kzucker]

Victor,

Now I can see that my original answer was a bad one. The correct answer was suggested in your original question:

A force MUST retreat at least ONE hex when Rearguard is selected.

[vlozanof]

Thanks Kevin. :)
Other question : repulse in mountains.

SoA rule 50: "force attacking into a Mountain hex may not exceed 9 SPs".

Standard rule 129 : "To do this requieres odds of at least 7:1"

My question is : the limit of 9 SPs is applied to the determination of 7:1 ratio in repulse ? :confused:

With a literal interpretation of the rule I think that no. But is logical that yes (is not logical that a unit cannot attack with more than 9 SPs, and nevertheless yes can do a repulse with 48 SPs).

Also, if the answer is yes, then a force in mountain with 2 SPs cannot be repulsed never. :o

[kzucker]

"a force in mountain with 2 SPs cannot be repulsed ever..." Yes!

[vlozanof]

question on rule 107 : if the active leader is adjacent to more than one enemy force. And these forces are not one Multi-hex force.
Then , to determine the Cavalry Differential, the enemy cavalry SPs of all enemy forces are counted ? or only is counted the enemy cavalry SPs of the enemy force with highest initiative ?

More, I understand that enemy player cannot declare at this moment a multi-hex force (rules 81 and 83 in SoA) if still they was not a multi-hex force.

example :
Active Leader A is adjacent to two enemy forces , B and C. It is the Forced March Segment. These are two forces, not one, because they have moved being two forces (not like a multi-hex force) in his previous movement phase. The force leader C has a highest initiative than B. Force C has 1 cavalry SP, and Force B has 3 cavalry SPs.

By rule 107, the initiative of leader C is used. And to determine the Cavalry differential ?? what value of enemy cavalry SPs is used ?
4 SPs ? (total enemy cavalry SPs)
1 SP ? (only cavalry SPs of Force C)

[vlozanof]

A note, in my previous question I am asking on the calculation of Cavalry Differential for Resistence Modifier when a force tries to exit from enemy ZOC.

[kzucker]

Hi Victor,

Good question. Only count the cavalry in the force that belongs to the leader with the highest initiative.

[vlozanof]

Thanks by the previous answer, Kevin.

Other question, now on standard rule 156 of SoA (or equivalent rule in other volumes). And rule 154 is vinculed too.

If a Force attack to two hexes (case of rule 154). Then, in the battle, what value is for the non-phasing player the max number of revealed Pitched/Rearguard battles possible if his two forces have two different initiatives ?

example :
Phasing player has force A. Non-phasing player has Force B and Force C in ZOC of force A. Force B leader has initiative 1, and Force C leader has initiative 4. Begins the battle. The non-phasing player must choose a battle option. His limit of Pitched/Rearguard options (rule 156) will be 4 ? or 1 ?

[kzucker]

Victor,

To make one blanket statement, always decide such things with the highest initiative leader. The man who would be commander if it were possible.

A possible addition to the rules: After the first round of combat during the consolidation segment, allow a capable commander to re-constitute a defending force.

To tell you the truth, there is a long standing problem with Multi-Hex Forces, which might well be addressed at this point.

This long-standing rule insists only the phasing player may constitute Forces, therefore it is impossible for the non-phasing player to have such a thing as a Multi-Hex Force. But creation of such should be allowed to both players in the joint consolidation segment.

[vlozanof]

ok, I will play using the highest initiative in this case (like the rule 107 in the Resistence Modifier determination).

The other solution is more complex and I prefer to wait to a new set of official rules with this change.

[Cundiff]

There are units designated as either Light Infantry or Elite Troops. However, I can find no mention of those designations being anything but cosmetic as far as the rules go.

Is there some special meaning in combat, attrition, movement, Something, Anything that makes these unit designations important? I can't find it.

Thanks Much,
Tom Cundiff
Old Soldiers Magazine
tgunslinger@excite.com
http://www.strategyzoneonline.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=179

[Nico[PL]]

Generals got their iniviative points according 'how good' they were during this campaign. Sometimes lower ranking officers will have more initiative points then some famous army leaders, but those officers can only command 1-3 units and famous leader many units and here is diffrence.

I only disagree with Wellington and Blucher in The Emperor Returns. Wellington deserves 4 (hardly without bonus star) and Blucher 5 with bonus star !!! :cool:

[kenmore3233]

']Generals got their iniviative points according 'how good' they were during this campaign. Sometimes lower ranking officers will have more initiative points then some famous army leaders, but those officers can only command 1-3 units and famous leader many units and here is diffrence.

I only disagree with Wellington and Blucher in The Emperor Returns. Wellington deserves 4 (hardly without bonus star) and Blucher 5 with bonus star !!! :cool:

Nico:

In the 1812 campaign, Jerome receives 6 initiative points, while Russian commander Bagration receives 4 points.

You say that you agree with the initiative points awarded to these respective leaders, because it is a reflection of "how good they were during this campaign". Your remark is not consistent with the demonstrated truth about Bagration and Jerome in 1812.

In 1812, Jerome proved himself totally incompetent in commanding the army group facing Bagration. Jerome understood nothing about strategy, he failed completely to comprehend Napoleon's plans, and he failed completely to communicate his plans to his subordinate generals. Not in any way whatsoever was Jerome competent in this campaign.

Bagration, on the other hand, totally outmanuevered Jerome and frustrated Jerome's attempts to encircle him and destroy his army. Bagration's performance in this campaign was nothing short of brilliant.

Clearly, in this face-off between Bagration and Jerome, Bagration outgeneraled Jerome. There can be no doubt about this fact. In the manuevering around Minsk in July 1812, Bagration realized his strategic goals, and Jerome failed to realize his own. Hence Bagration demonstrated his superiority of Jerome.

Bagration's performance throughout the entire Napoleonic wars --not just the 1812 campaign-- was utterly superior to Jerome's performances. I do not understand how anyone can possibly see things differently.

Bagration performed brilliantly as a general in Suvorov's 1799 campaign, leading a column flawlessly in helping to win the Battle of Novi. In the Swiss campaign later that same year, Bagration excelled as a battle commander again during rearguard and advance guard actions. In 1805 Bagration distinguished himself during the famous rearguard action at Schoenbrabern, successfully repulsing Murat's 30,000 French with just 4,000 Russians. In 1806-07 Bagration fought well in the East Prussian campaign, and in 1809 he fought successfully against the Turks and later the Swedes. Bagration's outmanuevering of the French in the summer of 1812 and his excellent performance later at Borodino were the final performances of his long and distinguished career.

It is not unrealistic to say, that had Bagration not been mortally wounded at Borodino, that his presence among the Russian leaders later in the campaign might have resulted in the total destruction of Napoleon's forces and the capture of Napoleon himself. Bagration was simply that kind of decisive and aggressive leader.

What history tells us about Jerome is much less impressive.

Jerome was not a competent general in any sense of the word. In addition to his poor performance in 1812, Jerome demonstrated his inadequacy again in the Waterloo campaign of 1815, when he half-destroyed his own division through fruitless, repeated attacks against a strongly entrenched enemy --attacks which were executed against the explicit orders of Napoleon himself.

In reviewing numerous history books, it is apparent to me that Jerome did not often take part in Napoleon's campaigns, and when he did, if he was given any degree of authority, he did not perform well.

Jerome was vastly inferior to all French marshals, and he was probably inferior to most leading French generals. Not in any way whatsoever was Jerome worthy of the company of these great French leaders.

That Jerome was a corps and divisional commander in the first place was a result of nepotism, not merit.

Jerome was incompetent and he deserves no more than 1 initiative point...to have given Jerome 6 points --more than many capable army commanders of the era-- is incomprehensible to me.

Bagration was an excellent battlefield tactician and a fairly good strategist. He probably deserves more than 4 initiative points, although I do concede that the matter is at least open to question.

(Kzucker: please don't take offense at my message...it is not meant as an attack on you and your associates. You guys make great wargames. I'm just trying to generate what I think is a necessary debate/discussion about the various leaders and their initiative points relative to one another.)

[Nico[PL]]

But where do You have Jerome counter :confused: ... there is no such counter...

As for Bagration he wasnt as good as Davout or Napoleon so he shouldnt have initiative points equal to those two great leaders, I think he was good, but he never showed anything that proved that he is 'worth' 5.

[kenmore3233]

']But where do You have Jerome counter :confused: ... there is no such counter...

As for Bagration he wasnt as good as Davout or Napoleon so he shouldnt have initiative points equal to those two great leaders, I think he was good, but he never showed anything that proved that he is 'worth' 5.+

Yes, you are correct about Napoleon and Davout being superior as commanders to Bagration.

As for your other points, admittedly I have not bought the game yet. I am going on the basis of what I saw on the leader markers on the various games listed on the OSG's homepage.

I may indeed be misunderstanding how the initiative points are distributed, and how one leader marker differs from another.

Please correct me if I'm wrong.

[Nico[PL]]

And so we have misunderstanding :). There is no Jerome counter and no leader has greater initiative rating then 5 (Napoleon and Davout only). The leaders with initiative rating of 4 are: Bagration, Kutuzow, Barclay, Wittgenstein, St.Cyr, Murat, Ney, Poniatowski and McDonald.

As for Bagration I think he was the greatest general of all Russian officers although Barclay de Tolly understanded the best in which way the Russian have to fight with Napoleon.

[kenmore3233]

']And so we have misunderstanding :). There is no Jerome counter and no leader has greater initiative rating then 5 (Napoleon and Davout only). The leaders with initiative rating of 4 are: Bagration, Kutuzow, Barclay, Wittgenstein, St.Cyr, Murat, Ney, Poniatowski and McDonald.

As for Bagration I think he was the greatest general of all Russian officers although Barclay de Tolly understanded the best in which way the Russian have to fight with Napoleon.

I'm surprised that no leader has more than 5 initiative points because there was obvious such a vast difference in ability between Napoleon and any other commander, with the possible exception of Wellington.

How else besides initiative is a general's ability represented on the markers. I've seen "command" and "subordination" ratings, but they don't seem that different from one leader to another.

[Nico[PL]]

Playing TETE 1807 and SoN 1813 showed me that from 1 to 5 is really enough :).

Wellington? Near good as Wellington? This was average general long after Napoleon, Davout, Bagration, Charles, Suchet ... even such Blucher in operational scale was more worthy then this Wellington. He was superb at tactical level, but much more worse at operational scale.

Wellington had his serious limitations; for example he was only efficient when he had deployed his infantry into a strong defensive position. Then he simply would wait and see what the enemy will do. That's all, nothing else. At Waterloo his whole strategy was to stand to the last man like the Russians at Borodino. According to Andrew Uffindell "The Eagles Last Triumph" (publ. in London, 1994) "Wellington excelled at defensive tactics but was less sure at campaign strategy."

Wellington didn't use his artillery in a modern way, that means of big batteries handled aggressively as did the French, and later on some Allies. For example in 1815 Wellington rejected Sir Frazer's proposal for grouping of 6 batteries of horse artillery into a Grand Battery. The batteries were assigned to cavalry brigades but they spent very short time together. Furthermore, the conservative Wellington was suspicious of artillery officers and stated that they were 'the type of officers who had "revolutionised other armies."

Wellington was no Napoleon. Nor was it in Wellington's nature to risk his troops for his Allies. When in 1815 Prussian officer Müffling asked "poor Arthur" on the lack of speed of his army, Wellington answered:
"Do not press me on this, for I tell you, it cannot be done. If you knew the composition of the British Army and its habits better, then you would not talk to me about that. I cannot leave my tents and supplies behind. I have to keep my men together in their camp and supply them well to keep order and discipline." [Hofscshroer p. 191]. The Prussians were faster than the British, despite the fact that they had more cannons that slowed down the speed of their march. For example Blücher got 3/4 of his men "to the right place at the right time", while Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces. Thus the "rush fool" Blucher was almost twice as fast as the cunctator Wellington.

He doesn`t deserve more then "3" in The Emperor Returns and Blucher should have full "5" :).

Leaders have command span (how much troops & general they can command) and subordinate rating (how much command span do You need to command this general).

[Cundiff]

Does anyone have an idea about the question below?

There are units designated as either Light Infantry or Elite Troops. However, I can find no mention of those designations being anything but cosmetic as far as the rules go.

Is there some special meaning in combat, attrition, movement, Something, Anything that makes these unit designations important? I can't find it.

Thanks Much,
Tom Cundiff
Old Soldiers Magazine
tgunslinger@excite.com
http://www.strategyzoneonline.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=179

[kenmore3233]

']Playing TETE 1807 and SoN 1813 showed me that from 1 to 5 is really enough :).

Wellington? Near good as Wellington? This was average general long after Napoleon, Davout, Bagration, Charles, Suchet ... even such Blucher in operational scale was more worthy then this Wellington. He was superb at tactical level, but much more worse at operational scale.

Wellington had his serious limitations; for example he was only efficient when he had deployed his infantry into a strong defensive position. Then he simply would wait and see what the enemy will do. That's all, nothing else. At Waterloo his whole strategy was to stand to the last man like the Russians at Borodino. According to Andrew Uffindell "The Eagles Last Triumph" (publ. in London, 1994) "Wellington excelled at defensive tactics but was less sure at campaign strategy."

Wellington didn't use his artillery in a modern way, that means of big batteries handled aggressively as did the French, and later on some Allies. For example in 1815 Wellington rejected Sir Frazer's proposal for grouping of 6 batteries of horse artillery into a Grand Battery. The batteries were assigned to cavalry brigades but they spent very short time together. Furthermore, the conservative Wellington was suspicious of artillery officers and stated that they were 'the type of officers who had "revolutionised other armies."

Wellington was no Napoleon. Nor was it in Wellington's nature to risk his troops for his Allies. When in 1815 Prussian officer Müffling asked "poor Arthur" on the lack of speed of his army, Wellington answered:
"Do not press me on this, for I tell you, it cannot be done. If you knew the composition of the British Army and its habits better, then you would not talk to me about that. I cannot leave my tents and supplies behind. I have to keep my men together in their camp and supply them well to keep order and discipline." [Hofscshroer p. 191]. The Prussians were faster than the British, despite the fact that they had more cannons that slowed down the speed of their march. For example Blücher got 3/4 of his men "to the right place at the right time", while Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces. Thus the "rush fool" Blucher was almost twice as fast as the cunctator Wellington.

He doesn`t deserve more then "3" in The Emperor Returns and Blucher should have full "5" :).

Leaders have command span (how much troops & general they can command) and subordinate rating (how much command span do You need to command this general).

Interesting analysis.

A potentially excellent commander who has not gotten his dues in history is Barclay de Tolly. Barclay was a skilled battlefield tactician and an excellent strategist. Had Barclay remained in command of the Russian army after the Smolensk, Napoleon probably would have been beaten even more decisively than was the actual case.

Not many people realize that it was Barclay who was responsible for entrenching the Russian left wing at Borodino. The other leading commanders, such as Kutusov, Bennigsen, and Bagration, totally overlooked the value of constructing the two fleches which proved to be so important in breaking the back of the French army in that great, terrible battle.

Barclay would never have let the French escape at Krasnoi, had he been in command during Napoleon's epic retreat.

After the 1813 campaign, Barclay distinguished himself at the Battle of Kulm, when in command of a force of Russians, Prussians and Austrians, he forced the French under Vandamme to surrender.

I understand that Barclay, in "Highway to the Kremlin", gets 4 initiative points and 9 command points. How does this compare to the best French marshals of the game, such as Davout, Eugene, Ney, Murat, Poniatowski, Oudinot, St. Cyr and, in fact, Napoleon himself?

The Russians beat the French hollow in 1812. They outmanuevered and outfought Napoleon's troops. A good, comprehensive history of 1812 will address the many smaller battles and dozens of important skirmishes, most of which the Russians won.

The small skirmishes especially went in favor of the Russians. The Russians routinely forced enemy formations of 500, 1000 or even 2000 French to surrender en masse. These small scale Russian victories wreaked havoc in Napoleon's rear, which is one of the reasons Napoleon accepted his defeat in the vicinity of Moscow and retreated, instead of trying to turn the tide against the victorious Kutusov.

Read "Napoleon against Russia", by Digby Smith, published by Pen & Sword Military, 2004, for a good chronicle of the many small engagements that contributed so greatly to the course of the 1812 campaign.

A great analysis of the 1812 war is "1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign", by the Richard K.Riehn.

I am one of a small but growing group of laymen and professional historians who regard Borodino as a French defeat and a Russian victory.

The practical results of Borodino were that the French were no longer capable of offensive operations. This is the real reason that Napoleon retreated from Moscow in the face of the resurgent Russian threat in the weeks following Borodino. Napoleon's forces were broken to the point where they could not risk another major confrontation with the victorious Russians.

Do you know how Napoleon might have saved himself in 1812? Simple. By acknowledging his defeat at Borodino and retreating to Smolensk for the winter.

The Russians could bring tremendous resources, military and non-military, to bear in a defensive war on their own territory in 1812. This is the real reason that they crushed the French, and not because of Napoleon's mistakes or the breakdown in the French supply system.

That the French ran out of essential supplies during their retreat from Moscow determined the magnitude of their defeat, and not the fact that they were defeated. The Russians had already defeated the French when the French retreat began.

Napoleon's forces were no match for the Russian war machine in a war on Russian territory.

[Nico[PL]]

Great post about Barclay, I feel about him the same way. He is very underated general. However at Kulm it was also St.Cyr fault, he was supposed to be supporting Vandamme and he hasnt done it at all...

Borodino was tactical French victory, but strategical defeat.

If Bagration or Kutuzow were in command from beginning I think this campaign could go better for Napoleon. They would fight him rather to adopt Barclay plan. Bagration was even saying that Barclay is traitor and gives dishonor to Russian uniform.
Neverless campaign was not to be won in one year. Napoleon should take Smolensk and stay there for winter and with spring move again...

In my opinion he should play it completly other way ;). In 1812 he should enter Prussia and declare that "Kingdom of Prussia is dissovled". Prussia could not make anything having 400,000 French, Polish, Rhine, Saxons, Italian troops on their land. This would lead to war with Austria and Russia, but Austria wasnt ready, so Russia would have to help Prussia imediatly and give large battle or leave it. Anyway it would left Napoleon with only two enemies :). Of course it is easy to plan this after 200 years.

As for French marshals in game:
Davout 5-2-8 (initiative-subordinate rating-command span)
Murat 4-3-7
Ney 4-2-6
St.Cyr 4-3-6
McDonald 4-3-5
Poniatowski 4-2-5

vs
Kutuzow 4-4-10
Barclay 4-3-9
Bagration 4-3-6
Wittgenstein 4-3-5

Only those with 4...

[kenmore3233]

']Great post about Barclay, I feel about him the same way. He is very underated general. However at Kulm it was also St.Cyr fault, he was supposed to be supporting Vandamme and he hasnt done it at all...

Borodino was tactical French victory, but strategical defeat.

If Bagration or Kutuzow were in command from beginning I think this campaign could go better for Napoleon. They would fight him rather to adopt Barclay plan. Bagration was even saying that Barclay is traitor and gives dishonor to Russian uniform.
Neverless campaign was not to be won in one year. Napoleon should take Smolensk and stay there for winter and with spring move again...

In my opinion he should play it completly other way ;). In 1812 he should enter Prussia and declare that "Kingdom of Prussia is dissovled". Prussia could not make anything having 400,000 French, Polish, Rhine, Saxons, Italian troops on their land. This would lead to war with Austria and Russia, but Austria wasnt ready, so Russia would have to help Prussia imediatly and give large battle or leave it. Anyway it would left Napoleon with only two enemies :). Of course it is easy to plan this after 200 years.

As for French marshals in game:
Davout 5-2-8 (initiative-subordinate rating-command span)
Murat 4-3-7
Ney 4-2-6
St.Cyr 4-3-6
McDonald 4-3-5
Poniatowski 4-2-5

vs
Kutuzow 4-4-10
Barclay 4-3-9
Bagration 4-3-6
Wittgenstein 4-3-5

Only those with 4...

Interesting post...it's also interesting to see the iniative/subordination/command points associated with these various leaders.

I wonder why Murat gets as many initiative points as the others...my impression of Murat is that he was a rather poor commander, even though he excelled as a leader of cavalry charges.

I don't believe that Ney, who has 4 initiative points, was the equal of many other French marshals. Ney was personally brave and he excelled as a front-line leader under fire, but he was no chief executive. In my opinion 4 initiative points is too much for Ney.

Wittgenstein, with 4 initiative points, is probably overrated as well. Although a competent corps commander, Wittgenstein was irresolute as a leader of armies.

I am very interested in knowing how Mr. Zucker decided on the initiative points he gave to these various commanders. What are the historical sources he used?

On the other hand, Davout gets 5 initiative points, which I agree with. Davout was a great leader...he excelled as a battlefield tactician, as campaign strategist, and as an organizer/chief executive of large bodies of troops.

As a kid I often played the old SPI Napoleonic wargames, such as "The Grand Armee", the 1812 campaign (can't remember it's name), and "Leipzig".

I remember quite well the combat points given to the many leaders in those games. I always thought the people who engineered the old SPI Napoleonic games gave too many combat points to the French marshals, and too few combat points to some of the better Allied commanders.

The old SPI games gave two categories of combat points to the leader markers, one for offensive operations, and the other for defense.

Napoleon, for example, had 25 points each for offense and defense (25/25). Davout was second highest, with 13/16. Ney and Lannes each had 9/16. Eugene had 6/9, Bessieres had 9/9, Lefebvre had 7/9, Soult had 13/13, and Poniatowski had 9/13. St. Cyr had 2/9.

Ney's high rating by SPI is something I find very puzzling. Ney was a great leader of advance and rearguards, and nothing more.

French marshals with low combat ratings on the old SPI games were: Oudinot, who had 1/3 and MacDonald, 1/3. Bernadotte had only a 1/3.

Massena was given 3/7, surprising to me as I was under the impression that Massena was one of Napoleon's best marshals.

As for the allies, Kutusov had 3/7, Archduke Charles had 3/7, Blucher had 4/7, Barclay had 3/4, Bagration had 1/3, Wittgenstein had 4/4, Bennigsen had 3/3, Platov had 3/1, Bulow had 7/7, Brunswick had 2/2, Hohenloe had 1/1, and Mack had 4/7. Schwarzenberg was given 3/5.

In my opinion, Bagration certainly deserved more than 1/4, and the Archduke Charles probably deserved more than 3/7. And of course Barclay is very seriously underrated with a 3/4.

An Allied leader vastly overrated by SPI was Tshitagov, the Russian admiral who cost the Russians the battle at the Berezina on Nov. 26-28, 1812.

Tshitagov is given 7/1 by SPI, which indicates that the creators of those games regarded Tshitagov as being superior offensively to almost all other Allied leaders, including such greats as Blucher and Archduke Charles. This seems very, very unrealistic to me, as Tshitagov had very limited experience leading troops on land (his entire prior career was spent in the navy) and was most likely a poor battle commander.

There were many other leader markers in the SPI games besides the ones I just mentioned.

I have always wondered how the architects of the SPI games decided how to award combat points to the various leader markers. What research were they doing? Which historical texts did they read?

I understand that Kevin Zucker was an employee of SPI during the early '70s...I would love to hear what he has to say about SPI's leader markers.

[Nico[PL]]

Initiative rating is not showing 'how good general was in battle', but how much he was 'active', moving with without orders, wanting to 'do something' and not sitting and waiting for orders from CinC. That is why for example Benningsen has 5 initiative in TETE as I remember. He was active commander in that campaign.

Like Kevin said once: "The operational level was critical in Napoleonic times. It is the scale for looking at the workings of Napoleon's method. Because of his success as an operational strategist, because of the way he set his forces in motion to arrive on the battlefield, the battles themselves were, if all went according to plan, merely a matter of taking advantage of the situation prepared in advance."

Initiative is not 'battle skills', but just 'initiative' and nothing else. Battle skills are shown by "bonus star".

From SoN rules:

The Initiative rating represents the effects of troop motivation in a particular force and that force Leader's interactive effect upon it. Initiative die roil can be modified by Army Morale. Initiative is the mental debate within the officer and among his immediate staff, among two courses of action in an unexpected situation when the Commander-in-Chie/is not nearby. The first is to stick to the letter of the Commander's instruction; the second is to take advantage of other opportunities arising out of the unforeseen circumstances. Reason demands obedience to the former, intuition pleads an attempt at the latter. Initiative is a rating of intuition, clarity of imagination, as well as simple bravery.

[kenmore3233]

']Initiative rating is not showing 'how good general was in battle', but how much he was 'active', moving with without orders, wanting to 'do something' and not sitting and waiting for orders from CinC. That is why for example Benningsen has 5 initiative in TETE as I remember. He was active commander in that campaign.

Like Kevin said once: "The operational level was critical in Napoleonic times. It is the scale for looking at the workings of Napoleon's method. Because of his success as an operational strategist, because of the way he set his forces in motion to arrive on the battlefield, the battles themselves were, if all went according to plan, merely a matter of taking advantage of the situation prepared in advance."

Initiative is not 'battle skills', but just 'initiative' and nothing else. Battle skills are shown by "bonus star".

From SoN rules:

The Initiative rating represents the effects of troop motivation in a particular force and that force Leader's interactive effect upon it. Initiative die roil can be modified by Army Morale. Initiative is the mental debate within the officer and among his immediate staff, among two courses of action in an unexpected situation when the Commander-in-Chie/is not nearby. The first is to stick to the letter of the Commander's instruction; the second is to take advantage of other opportunities arising out of the unforeseen circumstances. Reason demands obedience to the former, intuition pleads an attempt at the latter. Initiative is a rating of intuition, clarity of imagination, as well as simple bravery.


General Bennigsen was a terrible army commander. Terrible. His poor tactically vision and bad planning was the one and only reason that the Russian army was destroyed at Friedland in June, 1807.

Bennigsen is given 5 initiative points? The maximum? I have a problem with this.

The points on the leader markers, in my opinion, should be an accurate reflection of that commander's full and complete range of influences on any combat in which he is a participant or overall commander.

It is one thing to have initiative and bravery. It is something else altogether to translate that initiative and bravery into positive results on the field.

It is one thing to have a seemingly sophisticated and far-reaching operational plan...it is something else altogether for that operational plan to be sound, and for it to produce positive results.

Bennigsen's initiative rating is probably a reflection of the fact that once he took command, he crashed the Russian army head-first into the French at Pultusk, obtaining a draw, and then he did the same thing a few months later at Eylau, again obtaining a draw.

That Bennigsen had the initiative to be that aggressive does not necessarily make him a good general. In truth, Bennigsen's initiative was more dangerous to the Russians than to the French. This is because Bennigsen's initiative was not well-concieved operationally, it was not tactically sophisticated, and it reckless.

Do you know what happened at Friedland? Bennigsen stupidly ordered his army to cross a river and to attack the French on an open plain on the other side. This is was a terrible tactical concept...because it meant that the Russians, with the river to their back, would have nowhere to retreat in the event that they were under severe pressure and needed to make a strategic maneuver to the rear.

Napoleon at Friedland recognized Bennigsen's stupidity immediately, and ordered a massive frontal attack on the Russians. The result --predictably-- is that the Russians were cornered and crushed. All because of Bennigsen's mistake.

As for Pultusk and Eylau, the semi-successful outcomes enjoyed by the Russians in those battles had little to do with Bennigsen's generalship. The Russians' performance was due entirely --and I mean entirely-- to the awesome obstinacy and staying power of the Russian infantry.

If anything, Bennigsen's generalship at Eylau robbed the Russian's of a great victory, as at one point in the battle Marshal Augereau's division was nearly destroyed in the combat and the Russians, if they had only attacked forcefully at that moment, would have rolled up the entire French line. Poor leadership on Bennigsen's part cost the Russians the chance to capitalize on this opportunity.

Hence, Bennigsen's presence as commander of any large body of troops had a detrimental effect on the army's combat potentialities, not a positive one. This truth about Bennigsen's generalship, in my opinion, is not accurately reflected by the initiative points given to him in this game.

']
Like Kevin said once: "The operational level was critical in Napoleonic times. It is the scale for looking at the workings of Napoleon's method. Because of his success as an operational strategist, because of the way he set his forces in motion to arrive on the battlefield, the battles themselves were, if all went according to plan, merely a matter of taking advantage of the situation prepared in advance."

This is true, but it will only work in reality if the commander is talented at planning, organization, strategic and tactical conception, and if he has a very sound, prudent grasp of battlefield realities. Napoleon had these qualities to an extraordinary degree, which is why he was almost always successful. Bennigsen, on the other hand, lacked these qualities, which is why his "initiative" translated into recklessness, and ultimately, the needless destruction of his army.

']
Initiative is the mental debate within the officer and among his immediate staff, among two courses of action in an unexpected situation when the Commander-in-Chie/is not nearby. The first is to stick to the letter of the Commander's instruction; the second is to take advantage of other opportunities arising out of the unforeseen circumstances. Reason demands obedience to the former, intuition pleads an attempt at the latter. Initiative is a rating of intuition, clarity of imagination, as well as simple bravery.
Even so, that a commander intellectually and in terms of character exhibits all of the qualities mentioned above does not necessarily translate into a boost for his army's combat potentialities. As I pointed out earlier in this threat, unless the qualities described above are combined with good judgment, the result could be disaster.

One final thought on Bennigsen: did you know that he was notorious for corruption? It's true. He awarded military logistics contracts to whatever industrialists paid him the biggest bribes. This had a negative effect on Russian logistics; supplies during the 1807 foodstuffs, equipment, munititions and clothes were wanting because the suppliers were selected by Bennigsen not on the basis of ability and the Russian army's best interests, but on the basis of graft. This is not good.

[Nico[PL]]

Exactly like You said - Benningsen had poor tactically vision and was planning bad and so he has lost. But look, Blucher lost almost every battle when he met Emperor, still he was victorius general. Why? Cause he was active, both of them were active. Benningsen was eager to fight and made in early 1807 first offensive then he made second. Same to Blucher - forward marshal. They were active, they were doing something not sleeping like Schwarzenberg, Mack and many others. In HttK 1812, SoN 1813, NaB 1814 Schwarzenberg has 2 initiatiave. He has won some battles, but he was slow.

Kevin`s games are not tactical, but operational. He belives (as I remember he was saying that on CW - sorry Kevin if I am wrong) that during exact battle, commander had little to do in reality. If he was good and managed to bring more troops, in better position with better subordinate generals that he was more probably to won.

In my opinion Kevins system is great, played 1807 full campaign and even 5 initiative for Benningsen havent saved me. I made same mistake as he and attacked enemy having river behind me...the whole russian artillery was lost...

Kevin simulates 'activity' of generals, if some where really great 'fighters' they got bonus star, but whole rest is up to You and mistakes.

Initiative also shows why French troops were faster then Coalition. Not that they have marched faster, but had better generals that were capable to move without orders. Cause in Kevins system You give orders by AP points and You dont have enough to spend for few turns just giving everyone orders. So mostly You move under initiative (general is trying to execute some general plan) and here You see that most Coalition generals are VERY slow. In this very simple way Kevin made mechanism that explained why Napoleon was able so many times be faster then enemy.

I hate when in old games like Empires at Arms they just give French more movement points...

[kenmore3233]

Nico:

I successfully downloaded your zip file, but so far I've been unable to open the games themselves. I get some kind of message saying that Windows doesn't recognize the software, that I need an extension, that I should search the web for it, etc.

Do you recognize the message I'm describing?

Also, since you are a Pole, I was wondering what you know about Poniatowski. I'm interested in knowing his abilities relative to other commandes of the time.

Was Poniatowski a potentially good commander of armies, or were his talents better suited to commanding corps and divisions under the direction of a more senior marshal?

[Nico[PL]]

Run Cyberboard and from this programme open those files :).

Therw was no better commander in Polish army at that time, that is for sure. Poniatowski spent many years in Austrian army before 1792 and so in battle he fought more 'austrian style'. Neverless he fought well in 1792 against Russian commanding half of Polish army. In 1809 he commanded again Polish army in field and altough being outnumbered 1:2 (starting with 16,000 troops against 32,000 Austrians) he managed to win campaign of 1809 on Polish theater of war and capture a big part of Galicia with Lwow and Krakau.
Again in 1812 he commaned the whole Polish corps. He was suggesting Napoleon to take Ukraine and make uprise. Smolensk, Borodino all the way to Moscow. At Borodino he was fighting with his shattered corps on right flank attacking through deep forrest. Then in Moscow he saved Murat ass ;) when his cavalry was caught off guard.
From 36,000 troops of his corps only 650 returned in december 1812, but he managed to bring all guns back !!!
1812/1813 he was trying to reorganized Polish army as much as possible before Russian takes whole Duchy. With about 20,000 troops he managed to get to Napoleon after armistice. During that time Tsar was trying to bring Poniatowski on his side giving false hope for restoring Polish Kingdom under his rule.
He wasnt happy receiving marshal position, it was given him in wrong time and it looked like Napoleon was trying to 'bribe' Poles to not betrey him. They felt bad about it cause no one would betrey him and it looks like Napoleon dont trust them.

I think he was good commander altough never done anything like Davout at Auerstadt he was one of the best. For sure better then those commanders at Grossberen and Dennewitz.

[Cundiff]

Received an answer from Clash of Arms on this question. There is NO purpose to the designation of troops as being either Light or Elite. The designations on the counters are cosmetic only. They have no impact upon game play.


There are units designated as either Light Infantry or Elite Troops. However, I can find no mention of those designations being anything but cosmetic as far as the rules go.

Is there some special meaning in combat, attrition, movement, Something, Anything that makes these unit designations important? I can't find it.

Thanks Much,
Tom Cundiff
Old Soldiers Magazine
tgunslinger@excite.com
http://www.strategyzoneonline.com/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=179

[kenmore3233]

']Run Cyberboard and from this programme open those files :).

Therw was no better commander in Polish army at that time, that is for sure. Poniatowski spent many years in Austrian army before 1792 and so in battle he fought more 'austrian style'. Neverless he fought well in 1792 against Russian commanding half of Polish army. In 1809 he commanded again Polish army in field and altough being outnumbered 1:2 (starting with 16,000 troops against 32,000 Austrians) he managed to win campaign of 1809 on Polish theater of war and capture a big part of Galicia with Lwow and Krakau.
Again in 1812 he commaned the whole Polish corps. He was suggesting Napoleon to take Ukraine and make uprise. Smolensk, Borodino all the way to Moscow. At Borodino he was fighting with his shattered corps on right flank attacking through deep forrest. Then in Moscow he saved Murat ass ;) when his cavalry was caught off guard.
From 36,000 troops of his corps only 650 returned in december 1812, but he managed to bring all guns back !!!
1812/1813 he was trying to reorganized Polish army as much as possible before Russian takes whole Duchy. With about 20,000 troops he managed to get to Napoleon after armistice. During that time Tsar was trying to bring Poniatowski on his side giving false hope for restoring Polish Kingdom under his rule.
He wasnt happy receiving marshal position, it was given him in wrong time and it looked like Napoleon was trying to 'bribe' Poles to not betrey him. They felt bad about it cause no one would betrey him and it looks like Napoleon dont trust them.

I think he was good commander altough never done anything like Davout at Auerstadt he was one of the best. For sure better then those commanders at Grossberen and Dennewitz.


You say Poniatowski fought in the "Austrian style"? What was the Austrian style and what made it different from other army's styles?

I know that the Austrian army was enfeebled in 1805 by bad organization and slightly outdated tactics, and that between 1805 and 1809 the Austrians reorganized and modernized their system. Beyond that, I haven't read too much about Austria's army. At least not yet.

I read most about the Russian army and Russian commanders.

I will get Cyberboard set-up soon.

As to a game...be warned: I am extremely aggressive! My approach to wargaming is based on the theories of the great Marshal Alexander Suvorov himself!

[Nico[PL]]

As I remember 'Austrian style' was to attack in echelons. This was minimalizing losses if things goes wrong, but from other hand when attack was succesfull it was harder to exploit fruits of victory. That how was it written in this book about him... of course with years he was changing and learning Napoleon tactics, so in 1813 he was good corps cmdr that was able to conduct his own 'campaign'. Ney always had problem with this ;)

I am waiting ;). So which game 1807 or 1813 and which side?

[kenmore3233]

I can't open/run Cyberboard...or any of it's component files. When I try, I get an error message telling me that "Windows can't open the file", and that "Windows needs to know what program created it". It offers a web service to try to find the program online, and when I try to use that, I get the message below.

Does anyone recognize the problem here, and can you tell me what do to so I can get Cyberboard and the games running on my computer?

This is the message I get:

Microsoft Windows File Associations
Windows Home Pages |


Windows has the following information about this file type. This page will help you find software needed to open your file.



File Type: Unknown

Description: Windows does not recognize this file type.

The following Web sites have a comprehensive list of file extensions. You might be able to find information about this file type there:
CKNOW.COM




Have questions? See these Frequently Asked Questions.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright (c)2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use | Disability/accessibility | Privacy Statement

[kenmore3233]

']As I remember 'Austrian style' was to attack in echelons. This was minimalizing losses if things goes wrong, but from other hand when attack was succesfull it was harder to exploit fruits of victory. That how was it written in this book about him... of course with years he was changing and learning Napoleon tactics, so in 1813 he was good corps cmdr that was able to conduct his own 'campaign'. Ney always had problem with this ;)

I am waiting ;). So which game 1807 or 1813 and which side?

I will play both games and I can play either side. I know enough about each campaign to be interested in any alternatives.

I need to find a way to get the files opened first though.

[Nico[PL]]

You run cyberboard 2.0 by cb.exe then "open file" and choose any *.gsn file and it always work...

:eek:

[kenmore3233]

I'm working my way through the general rulebook now.

I've noticed however that the cyberboard TET and SON maps don't have numbers in their hexes. How then will we be able to track movements, as well as communicate them to opponents?

I thought hex numbers were essential for this purpose.

[Nico[PL]]

On right-down corner of CB You can see CB-ID Number for this hex when You point mouse, so when rolling during initiative for unit on hex You write number of hex, for example " 55, 44 " and roll :) it works ok

[kenmore3233]

']On right-down corner of CB You can see CB-ID Number for this hex when You point mouse, so when rolling during initiative for unit on hex You write number of hex, for example " 55, 44 " and roll :) it works ok

I'm still working on the rulebook...there's an lot of stuff there.

[Nico[PL]]

+ Exclusive rules :D , but the whole Grand Campaign is waiting ;)