Initiative Ratings in 1809

[kzucker]

The evaluation of unit Initiative in Seven Days of 1809 was looked at as a combination of Leadership and troop quality.

Whether or not a unit will move by Initiative is largely a function of the leader's ability (as modified by troops quality). On the other hand, a unit's ability to stand up in a firefight is primarily a function of troop quality (as modified by leadership).

"Leadership" includes general competence as well as the ability to inspire the troops. There is a strong connection there: troops won't be taken in by a rousing fellow who doesn't understand what he is doing. On the other hand, they will follow an uninspiring guy like Davout, whom they trust.

"General Competence" means, basically, understanding your role in the drama: are you a flank guard or the main assault? Should you hold your ground at all costs or just delay while gradually withdrawing? What are the important points in the theatre? What are the overall objectives of the Commander-in-Chief? All of these give the executive of an individual unit the general understanding of what's going on around him and the abilty to judge the significance of orders he receives, so that, when his orders are late in arriving he knows which way to go.

The baseline for Troop Quality in this era means a unit with prior experience in battle. If there is an admixture of conscripts who barely know how to load and shoot, then that has to lower the overall performance of the unit. Veteran units have seen several campaigns, and then there are Elite units such as the Imperial Guard, so hard as to become sometimes brittle.

As an example, in the Abensberg Campaign, General Claparède has a motley crew of barely-trained conscripts. Claparède had commanded a brigade of fine troops in Suchet's Division of Lannes V Corps in 1806-07, so he knew his craft. On the other hand, he was commanding a division for the first time. If he were commanding a division of III Corps, he would probably be rated a (3). But given the poor quality of his troops, combined with his inexperience at division command, he was rated a (1).

Part of the reason for the low Initiative Ratings in the Austrian force is the fact that Charles - the commander-in-chief- did not have the authority to choose all his subordinate officers, or even to get rid of officers when they performed poorly. He was subject to the orders of his brother, Francis II, and the Aulic Council, that provided many opportunities for politics and intrigue.

The question is: who would Charles have promoted to Corps Leader if he had had a free hand?

I wrote to author John Gill, to ask him whether there were two 'schools' in the Austrian Army, and if so, if it were possible to track down the membership of 'schools' on the Army staffs- new school officers, led by Charles, against old fogeys such as Hiller and Mack, and the Aulic Council. John replied as follows:

"I am instinctively wary of making an old school/new school distinction here. First off, because I suspect there were VERY few 'new schoolers' at all. Maybe I have spent too much time with the 1800-1809 Austrian Army, but there are few who stand out as truly understanding what is going on about them. I am also cautious about the so-called "Aulic Council." I have not studied the Hofs-Kriegsrat, but I think it is MUCH more complex and much less 'institutional' than often depicted.

"Another aspect of this question, of course, is Charles himself. Much less of a reformer and open-minded thinker than most people suppose. Delbrueck makes a humourous crack about the equestrian Charles statue in front of the Hofburg in Vienna, something referring to it being no accident that Charles is depicted looking backward over his shoulder.