Questions & Answers

[Nico[PL]]

Generals got their iniviative points according 'how good' they were during this campaign. Sometimes lower ranking officers will have more initiative points then some famous army leaders, but those officers can only command 1-3 units and famous leader many units and here is diffrence.

I only disagree with Wellington and Blucher in The Emperor Returns. Wellington deserves 4 (hardly without bonus star) and Blucher 5 with bonus star !!!

[kenmore3233]

Originally Posted by Nico[PL]

Generals got their iniviative points according 'how good' they were during this campaign. Sometimes lower ranking officers will have more initiative points then some famous army leaders, but those officers can only command 1-3 units and famous leader many units and here is diffrence.

I only disagree with Wellington and Blucher in The Emperor Returns. Wellington deserves 4 (hardly without bonus star) and Blucher 5 with bonus star !!!

Nico:

In the 1812 campaign, Jerome receives 6 initiative points, while Russian commander Bagration receives 4 points.

You say that you agree with the initiative points awarded to these respective leaders, because it is a reflection of "how good they were during this campaign". Your remark is not consistent with the demonstrated truth about Bagration and Jerome in 1812.

In 1812, Jerome proved himself totally incompetent in commanding the army group facing Bagration. Jerome understood nothing about strategy, he failed completely to comprehend Napoleon's plans, and he failed completely to communicate his plans to his subordinate generals. Not in any way whatsoever was Jerome competent in this campaign.

Bagration, on the other hand, totally outmanuevered Jerome and frustrated Jerome's attempts to encircle him and destroy his army. Bagration's performance in this campaign was nothing short of brilliant.

Clearly, in this face-off between Bagration and Jerome, Bagration outgeneraled Jerome. There can be no doubt about this fact. In the manuevering around Minsk in July 1812, Bagration realized his strategic goals, and Jerome failed to realize his own. Hence Bagration demonstrated his superiority of Jerome.

Bagration's performance throughout the entire Napoleonic wars --not just the 1812 campaign-- was utterly superior to Jerome's performances. I do not understand how anyone can possibly see things differently.

Bagration performed brilliantly as a general in Suvorov's 1799 campaign, leading a column flawlessly in helping to win the Battle of Novi. In the Swiss campaign later that same year, Bagration excelled as a battle commander again during rearguard and advance guard actions. In 1805 Bagration distinguished himself during the famous rearguard action at Schoenbrabern, successfully repulsing Murat's 30,000 French with just 4,000 Russians. In 1806-07 Bagration fought well in the East Prussian campaign, and in 1809 he fought successfully against the Turks and later the Swedes. Bagration's outmanuevering of the French in the summer of 1812 and his excellent performance later at Borodino were the final performances of his long and distinguished career.

It is not unrealistic to say, that had Bagration not been mortally wounded at Borodino, that his presence among the Russian leaders later in the campaign might have resulted in the total destruction of Napoleon's forces and the capture of Napoleon himself. Bagration was simply that kind of decisive and aggressive leader.

What history tells us about Jerome is much less impressive.

Jerome was not a competent general in any sense of the word. In addition to his poor performance in 1812, Jerome demonstrated his inadequacy again in the Waterloo campaign of 1815, when he half-destroyed his own division through fruitless, repeated attacks against a strongly entrenched enemy --attacks which were executed against the explicit orders of Napoleon himself.

In reviewing numerous history books, it is apparent to me that Jerome did not often take part in Napoleon's campaigns, and when he did, if he was given any degree of authority, he did not perform well.

Jerome was vastly inferior to all French marshals, and he was probably inferior to most leading French generals. Not in any way whatsoever was Jerome worthy of the company of these great French leaders.

That Jerome was a corps and divisional commander in the first place was a result of nepotism, not merit.

Jerome was incompetent and he deserves no more than 1 initiative point...to have given Jerome 6 points --more than many capable army commanders of the era-- is incomprehensible to me.

Bagration was an excellent battlefield tactician and a fairly good strategist. He probably deserves more than 4 initiative points, although I do concede that the matter is at least open to question.

(Kzucker: please don't take offense at my message...it is not meant as an attack on you and your associates. You guys make great wargames. I'm just trying to generate what I think is a necessary debate/discussion about the various leaders and their initiative points relative to one another.)

[Nico[PL]]

But where do You have Jerome counter ... there is no such counter...

As for Bagration he wasnt as good as Davout or Napoleon so he shouldnt have initiative points equal to those two great leaders, I think he was good, but he never showed anything that proved that he is 'worth' 5.

[kenmore3233]

Originally Posted by Nico[PL]

But where do You have Jerome counter ... there is no such counter...

As for Bagration he wasnt as good as Davout or Napoleon so he shouldnt have initiative points equal to those two great leaders, I think he was good, but he never showed anything that proved that he is 'worth' 5.

+

Yes, you are correct about Napoleon and Davout being superior as commanders to Bagration.

As for your other points, admittedly I have not bought the game yet. I am going on the basis of what I saw on the leader markers on the various games listed on the OSG's homepage.

I may indeed be misunderstanding how the initiative points are distributed, and how one leader marker differs from another.

Please correct me if I'm wrong.

[Nico[PL]]

And so we have misunderstanding . There is no Jerome counter and no leader has greater initiative rating then 5 (Napoleon and Davout only). The leaders with initiative rating of 4 are: Bagration, Kutuzow, Barclay, Wittgenstein, St.Cyr, Murat, Ney, Poniatowski and McDonald.

As for Bagration I think he was the greatest general of all Russian officers although Barclay de Tolly understanded the best in which way the Russian have to fight with Napoleon.

[kenmore3233]

Originally Posted by Nico[PL]

And so we have misunderstanding . There is no Jerome counter and no leader has greater initiative rating then 5 (Napoleon and Davout only). The leaders with initiative rating of 4 are: Bagration, Kutuzow, Barclay, Wittgenstein, St.Cyr, Murat, Ney, Poniatowski and McDonald.

As for Bagration I think he was the greatest general of all Russian officers although Barclay de Tolly understanded the best in which way the Russian have to fight with Napoleon.

I'm surprised that no leader has more than 5 initiative points because there was obvious such a vast difference in ability between Napoleon and any other commander, with the possible exception of Wellington.

How else besides initiative is a general's ability represented on the markers. I've seen "command" and "subordination" ratings, but they don't seem that different from one leader to another.

[Nico[PL]]

Playing TETE 1807 and SoN 1813 showed me that from 1 to 5 is really enough .

Wellington? Near good as Wellington? This was average general long after Napoleon, Davout, Bagration, Charles, Suchet ... even such Blucher in operational scale was more worthy then this Wellington. He was superb at tactical level, but much more worse at operational scale.

Wellington had his serious limitations; for example he was only efficient when he had deployed his infantry into a strong defensive position. Then he simply would wait and see what the enemy will do. That's all, nothing else. At Waterloo his whole strategy was to stand to the last man like the Russians at Borodino. According to Andrew Uffindell "The Eagles Last Triumph" (publ. in London, 1994) "Wellington excelled at defensive tactics but was less sure at campaign strategy."

Wellington didn't use his artillery in a modern way, that means of big batteries handled aggressively as did the French, and later on some Allies. For example in 1815 Wellington rejected Sir Frazer's proposal for grouping of 6 batteries of horse artillery into a Grand Battery. The batteries were assigned to cavalry brigades but they spent very short time together. Furthermore, the conservative Wellington was suspicious of artillery officers and stated that they were 'the type of officers who had "revolutionised other armies."

Wellington was no Napoleon. Nor was it in Wellington's nature to risk his troops for his Allies. When in 1815 Prussian officer Müffling asked "poor Arthur" on the lack of speed of his army, Wellington answered:
"Do not press me on this, for I tell you, it cannot be done. If you knew the composition of the British Army and its habits better, then you would not talk to me about that. I cannot leave my tents and supplies behind. I have to keep my men together in their camp and supply them well to keep order and discipline." [Hofscshroer p. 191]. The Prussians were faster than the British, despite the fact that they had more cannons that slowed down the speed of their march. For example Blücher got 3/4 of his men "to the right place at the right time", while Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces. Thus the "rush fool" Blucher was almost twice as fast as the cunctator Wellington.

He doesn`t deserve more then "3" in The Emperor Returns and Blucher should have full "5" .

Leaders have command span (how much troops & general they can command) and subordinate rating (how much command span do You need to command this general).

[Cundiff]

Does anyone have an idea about the question below?

Originally Posted by Cundiff

There are units designated as either Light Infantry or Elite Troops. However, I can find no mention of those designations being anything but cosmetic as far as the rules go.

Is there some special meaning in combat, attrition, movement, Something, Anything that makes these unit designations important? I can't find it.

Thanks Much,
Tom Cundiff
Old Soldiers Magazine
tgunslinger@excite.com
http://www.strategyzoneonline.com/fo...play.php?f=179

[kenmore3233]

Originally Posted by Nico[PL]

Playing TETE 1807 and SoN 1813 showed me that from 1 to 5 is really enough .

Wellington? Near good as Wellington? This was average general long after Napoleon, Davout, Bagration, Charles, Suchet ... even such Blucher in operational scale was more worthy then this Wellington. He was superb at tactical level, but much more worse at operational scale.

Wellington had his serious limitations; for example he was only efficient when he had deployed his infantry into a strong defensive position. Then he simply would wait and see what the enemy will do. That's all, nothing else. At Waterloo his whole strategy was to stand to the last man like the Russians at Borodino. According to Andrew Uffindell "The Eagles Last Triumph" (publ. in London, 1994) "Wellington excelled at defensive tactics but was less sure at campaign strategy."

Wellington didn't use his artillery in a modern way, that means of big batteries handled aggressively as did the French, and later on some Allies. For example in 1815 Wellington rejected Sir Frazer's proposal for grouping of 6 batteries of horse artillery into a Grand Battery. The batteries were assigned to cavalry brigades but they spent very short time together. Furthermore, the conservative Wellington was suspicious of artillery officers and stated that they were 'the type of officers who had "revolutionised other armies."

Wellington was no Napoleon. Nor was it in Wellington's nature to risk his troops for his Allies. When in 1815 Prussian officer Müffling asked "poor Arthur" on the lack of speed of his army, Wellington answered:
"Do not press me on this, for I tell you, it cannot be done. If you knew the composition of the British Army and its habits better, then you would not talk to me about that. I cannot leave my tents and supplies behind. I have to keep my men together in their camp and supply them well to keep order and discipline." [Hofscshroer p. 191]. The Prussians were faster than the British, despite the fact that they had more cannons that slowed down the speed of their march. For example Blücher got 3/4 of his men "to the right place at the right time", while Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces. Thus the "rush fool" Blucher was almost twice as fast as the cunctator Wellington.

He doesn`t deserve more then "3" in The Emperor Returns and Blucher should have full "5" .

Leaders have command span (how much troops & general they can command) and subordinate rating (how much command span do You need to command this general).

Interesting analysis.

A potentially excellent commander who has not gotten his dues in history is Barclay de Tolly. Barclay was a skilled battlefield tactician and an excellent strategist. Had Barclay remained in command of the Russian army after the Smolensk, Napoleon probably would have been beaten even more decisively than was the actual case.

Not many people realize that it was Barclay who was responsible for entrenching the Russian left wing at Borodino. The other leading commanders, such as Kutusov, Bennigsen, and Bagration, totally overlooked the value of constructing the two fleches which proved to be so important in breaking the back of the French army in that great, terrible battle.

Barclay would never have let the French escape at Krasnoi, had he been in command during Napoleon's epic retreat.

After the 1813 campaign, Barclay distinguished himself at the Battle of Kulm, when in command of a force of Russians, Prussians and Austrians, he forced the French under Vandamme to surrender.

I understand that Barclay, in "Highway to the Kremlin", gets 4 initiative points and 9 command points. How does this compare to the best French marshals of the game, such as Davout, Eugene, Ney, Murat, Poniatowski, Oudinot, St. Cyr and, in fact, Napoleon himself?

The Russians beat the French hollow in 1812. They outmanuevered and outfought Napoleon's troops. A good, comprehensive history of 1812 will address the many smaller battles and dozens of important skirmishes, most of which the Russians won.

The small skirmishes especially went in favor of the Russians. The Russians routinely forced enemy formations of 500, 1000 or even 2000 French to surrender en masse. These small scale Russian victories wreaked havoc in Napoleon's rear, which is one of the reasons Napoleon accepted his defeat in the vicinity of Moscow and retreated, instead of trying to turn the tide against the victorious Kutusov.

Read "Napoleon against Russia", by Digby Smith, published by Pen & Sword Military, 2004, for a good chronicle of the many small engagements that contributed so greatly to the course of the 1812 campaign.

A great analysis of the 1812 war is "1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign", by the Richard K.Riehn.

I am one of a small but growing group of laymen and professional historians who regard Borodino as a French defeat and a Russian victory.

The practical results of Borodino were that the French were no longer capable of offensive operations. This is the real reason that Napoleon retreated from Moscow in the face of the resurgent Russian threat in the weeks following Borodino. Napoleon's forces were broken to the point where they could not risk another major confrontation with the victorious Russians.

Do you know how Napoleon might have saved himself in 1812? Simple. By acknowledging his defeat at Borodino and retreating to Smolensk for the winter.

The Russians could bring tremendous resources, military and non-military, to bear in a defensive war on their own territory in 1812. This is the real reason that they crushed the French, and not because of Napoleon's mistakes or the breakdown in the French supply system.

That the French ran out of essential supplies during their retreat from Moscow determined the magnitude of their defeat, and not the fact that they were defeated. The Russians had already defeated the French when the French retreat began.

Napoleon's forces were no match for the Russian war machine in a war on Russian territory.

[Nico[PL]]

Great post about Barclay, I feel about him the same way. He is very underated general. However at Kulm it was also St.Cyr fault, he was supposed to be supporting Vandamme and he hasnt done it at all...

Borodino was tactical French victory, but strategical defeat.

If Bagration or Kutuzow were in command from beginning I think this campaign could go better for Napoleon. They would fight him rather to adopt Barclay plan. Bagration was even saying that Barclay is traitor and gives dishonor to Russian uniform.
Neverless campaign was not to be won in one year. Napoleon should take Smolensk and stay there for winter and with spring move again...

In my opinion he should play it completly other way . In 1812 he should enter Prussia and declare that "Kingdom of Prussia is dissovled". Prussia could not make anything having 400,000 French, Polish, Rhine, Saxons, Italian troops on their land. This would lead to war with Austria and Russia, but Austria wasnt ready, so Russia would have to help Prussia imediatly and give large battle or leave it. Anyway it would left Napoleon with only two enemies . Of course it is easy to plan this after 200 years.

As for French marshals in game:
Davout 5-2-8 (initiative-subordinate rating-command span)
Murat 4-3-7
Ney 4-2-6
St.Cyr 4-3-6
McDonald 4-3-5
Poniatowski 4-2-5

vs
Kutuzow 4-4-10
Barclay 4-3-9
Bagration 4-3-6
Wittgenstein 4-3-5

Only those with 4...