Napoleon Bonaparte's Italian Campaign of 1796 marked the appearance of a new system of war, indeed prepared by the novel methods of the Revolution and previous reformers. Among these were changes in the French army's personnel, logistics and tactics. Bonaparte achieved a revolution in strategy to take these changes into effect. Unlike his Austrian adversaries, Bonaparte saw battles as inseparable from marches. The Austrians were oriented toward a single front line, whereas Bonaparte used the mobility of his troops to create a second front. Bonaparte effectively employed the strategy of the central position, shifting his weaker forces from one enemy army to another to achieve a local superiority.

The campaign permanently altered the course of revolutionary France. Bonaparte's successes on the battlefield earned him a wide respect; his growing fame and popularity opened doors into the circles of power. The revolutionary armies carried ideas as well as weapons in their baggage, unleashing forces which shook the structures of the past, and ended in the unification of Italy. The French imposed a centralized administration and a national civil code for the first time. Although these political measures were erased by 1815, there remained a demand for internal reforms of a liberal nature and a growing desire for unification. The idea of a united Italy no longer seemed impossible. As early as 1820-21 there were risings in the Kingdoms of Naples and of Sardinia.

BACKGROUND

"Napoleon's expulsion from Corsica was undoubtedly the turning point in his history. Proscribed in his fatherland, he was stranded, penniless except for his captain's pay, in a country where men had turned on each other like ferocious beasts. It so happened that he had an unrivaled genius for seeing opportunities where others did not and for seizing them unhesitatingly, boldly calculating the risks and then taking them." Without the chaos of the French Revolution, "Napoleon might well have remained an ambitious but frustrated artillery officer." 14 The revolution gave him the opportunity to rise.

"The French Revolution might easily have remained a mere readjustment if it had not been for two closely related factors, both of which were extremely favorable to such climbers as Bonaparte. The first of these factors was the emigration of a large part of the nobility, which began in July, 1789, and gathered momentum with every week; this emigration depleted the officers' corps of all the armed services and created unhoped-for prospects of rapid promotion. The emigration, in turn, set off another event - the outbreak of war in the spring of 1792 - which led to the downfall of the French monarchy, and to the Reign of Terror." 14 Only in war could Napoleon's genius be unleashed.

In April 1791, twenty-one year old Napoleone Buonaparte was appointed first lieutenant in the 4th regiment of artillery, garrisoned at Valence in southern France. 1 At the first opportunity he went to Paris. "Napoleon's stay in Paris coincided with the dramatic events that led to the abolition of the monarchy and the birth of the First French Republic. On June 20 he and his former schoolmate Bourrienne were about to enter a restaurant near the Palais-Royal when they saw a mob of several thousand people armed with pikes, axes, swords, and sticks marching in the direction of the Tuileries Palace. The two decided to forego their dinner and follow the mob. In the ensuing panic the royal family fled toward the border, but were stopped at Varennes and brought back to Paris.

On August 10, 1792, Napoleon witnessed the overthrow of the monarchy. Again a mob, led by the National Guard freshly arrived from Marseilles, invaded the Tuileries. He wrote Joseph at the time: 'If Louis had shown himself on horseback, he would have won the day.' 14

Rejoining his regiment at Nice, Bonaparte was given the task of collecting supplies of munitions in the Rhone valley for the Army of Italy. 1 He obtained the post of battery commander under Massena, and went to reinforce the siege of Toulon, which had been handed over to the British Navy by the Royalists on 27 August 1793. On 19 October, at the age of 24, he was promoted to the rank of chef de bataillon (Major) and took command of all the French artillery. Toulon fell two months later, on the evening of 18 December. 16

BONAPARTE TAKES COMMAND

Following his success in driving the British out of Toulon, Bonaparte gained promotion to the rank of brigadier general, and in March 1794 took command of the artillery of the Army of Italy. He served in that capacity until 20 May 1795. Fate then decreed an important detour. He was ordered to the Vendee on the western coast of France, where a royalist insurrection threatened to create a second front against the revolution. In late May, Napoleon appeared in Paris, surprising his superiors by declining the assignment which he considered of no use in the promotion of his career. As a consequence he was enrolled among supernumerary officers by the Committee of Public Safety, put on half-pay and effectively retired, spending his days plotting wild schemes and hosting parties at his apartment near the Place des Victoires in Paris. Never one for frivolous amusement, he was only half able to indulge in the life of Paris, "frequenting theaters, libraries, salons, admiring the women, and making useful connections in the gaudy, immoral society of the time, among them Paul Francois Barras," 14 whom Bonaparte had met at the siege of Toulon. An ex-nobleman, Barras' appetite for physical beauty was not his least wholesome trait. 'His immorality in both public and private life was notorious,' 16 and his influence on Bonaparte's career would be profound.

Bonaparte met Barras' slightly faded mistress, the widow Marie-Rose-Josephe de Beauharnais. After separating from General Alexandre de Beauharnais, she had been briefly reunited with her husband in prison during the Reign of Terror. The general was guillotined; his widow spared by the timely overthrow of Robespierre by Tallien and by Barras.

Josephine returned home to her son, Eugene, and daughter, Hortense, and spiraled to the summit of revolutionary society, presiding along with Juliette Recamier and Theresa Tallien, the latter sharing honors with Josephine as mistress to Barras. Josephine's femininity and elegance enchanted General Bonaparte.

In time, political events would provide an opening which Bonaparte would seize without hesitation. His friends Barras and Beauharnais had contrived to retain him in Paris. By August Bonaparte had found employment in the Topographical Bureau - the planning section - of the Committee of Public Safety, where he spun his plans of future conquest.

As it happened, the legislators of the National Convention were working that summer on a new constitution, the purpose of which was "to keep the power in the hands of those who had it and to prevent both royalists and democrats from upsetting the status quo." 14 In August they decreed the re-election of two-thirds of their number to the successor assembly. The influential sections of Paris were opposed to the Convention, and rejected the obligatory re-election.

Disturbances mounted throughout September, 1795; the storm burst on October 4th. Throughout the city, the drums of the sectionnaires beat the generale, calling upon the citizens to assemble in arms. Barricades were set up at the Pont Neuf.

General Jacques Francois Menou, the commander of the Army of the Interior in charge of the government troops in Paris, ordered the sectionnaires to disperse; they refused. Menou withdrew and the government, gripped by crisis, promptly sacked him. In the evening of October 4, General Bonaparte was in a box of the Feydeau Theatre, watching a play, when friends informed him of what was happening. He instantly went to the Convention and took a seat in the spectators' gallery. The Convention was extremely agitated: the Republic was in danger. The Committee of Public Safety in desperation named Barras to replace Menou. But Barras was no general. At his recommendation no doubt, several representatives proposed Bonaparte as the man most capable of saving the Republic, and sent for him. 14

With his protege Bonaparte in charge of operations, Barras at once ordered the artillery into the streets. General Verdier was charged with the defense of the National Palace, where the Convention was still in session. "The next day, 13 Vendemiaire, shortly after four o'clock in the afternoon, two insurgent columns moved toward the Tuileries, one from the left Bank, by way of the Quai Voltaire, the other through the Rue St. Honore. General Bonaparte took no chances." 1 Leveling his pieces, he ordered the guns to fire straight into the crowd. They belched forth "point-blank into the rebel columns; about five or six hundred people were killed or wounded, most of them on the steps of the Church of St. Roch. The Republic was saved." 14

The Convention wanted no more bloodshed, and dissolved itself on October 26, 1795 to make way for the new government of the Directory. The regime lasted from November 1795 to November 1799 "because the two chambers, the anciens and the cinq-cents, included representatives of all parties in the country, from royalists to regicides. It was a dictatorship that could remain effective only so long as the people were diverted from politics to war and found in victory abroad a compensation for hardship and repression at home." 22a.

Barras became one of five directors of the executive set up by the constitution of the Year III. As a reward for his ruthlessness, Bonaparte succeeded Barras to command the Army of the Interior. At last his career was in the ascent, his councils were suddenly in demand, and his circle of influential friends secured him a new command, given officially on 2 March 1796.

In all of Napoleon's career there is nothing comparable with the campaign that would follow. Despite the really overwhelming successes achieved later with his Imperial army, historians generally consider this Italian campaign to be his finest. His forces, smaller and faster, were much easier to control.

The strength of an army, like power in mechanics, is the product of the mass by the velocity. [Napoleon, Maxims]

"When General Bonaparte appeared on the world stage in the spring of 1796, France was entering the fifth year of war against the First Coalition." 14 Lazare Carnot, the 'organizer of victory,' continued to oversee grand strategy. He carried the war against Austria on two fronts, of which the Rhine theatre under Moreau and Jourdan bore the principal effort, and the Italian theater received decidedly fewer men and resources. The fact that the Austrian Alps separated the French armies made the whole scheme risky. Should the effort on either front waver, the Austrians could transfer their forces "over the Alpine passes to reinforce their harder-pressed comrades." 17

Bonaparte submitted his plan of the Italian Campaign to the Committee of Public Safety as early as 1794. In January of 1796 he was still refining, calculating everything with his customary thoroughness. Nothing was left to chance. 4 The plan has been attributed to Carnot and others, but there seems little doubt that it bears the stamp of Bonaparte's genius. In broad outline it envisions the march of one force on Ceva to mask the entrenched camp of the Austrians, while another force moved to Acqui against the Piedmontese. 4 It is among the rarest of plans which was carried out to the letter, with extraordinary energy, disgracing the Austro-Sardinian forces under General Jean Pierre de Beaulieu in engagements at Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. 14

Bonaparte married Josephine in a civil ceremony on the 9th, after a courtship of such impetuosity he simply terrified her. At the advice of Barras, she resigned herself to marrying him. 14 Five days later the general departed for Italy. His first care was to stop and check the administration in Toulon well to the rear of the army, to make sure of provisions and recruitment. This support would be essential to the success of the coming campaign. He requested contributions in specie and in kind from the Municipal Administration in Marseilles to fund the coming campaign.

Bonaparte left Toulon on 24 March 1796. That evening he reached Antibes, where he met with his new chief of staff, Alexandre Berthier. Berthier, a 42-year-old engineer, had served as Kellermann's chief of staff during the few months that he was in command of the Army of Italy the previous year. 16 Rather ignorant of the art of war for a soldier of his rank, he nonetheless made a brilliant Chief of Staff. The conference of the two generals being prolonged into the next day, they traveled together to reach Nice on the 27th. 3

To the old soldiers Bonaparte cut an unimposing figure, and no less so for the familiarity he acquired in the campaigns of 1794-95. Vignolle, Berthier's assistant, wrote to Massena of the dissatisfaction among the troops on hearing that their former comrade, who had been comfortably installed at Paris while they endured the hardships of war, would now be guiding their fate. Predicting that Bonaparte would be disgraced, Vignolle begged Massena to save the army by superseding the ambitious young general as Commander in Chief.

General Barthelemy Scherer, disgusted at the lack of support emanating from Paris, submitted his resignation on 4 February. Almost anyone would have been an improvement upon the tired and aged Scherer. But surely Massena, for one, possessed better military credentials than his future master. The former was not alone in his conviction that intrigue brought Bonaparte to command in Italy. The simplest explanation is that Barras had promised the command of the army as a reward for putting down the royalist insurrection. 14

Indeed, as he traveled to army headquarters that March, Bonaparte was an adventurer with no real military reputation. He needed to make an immediate impact on the hungry and cynical veterans. He slept fitfully, gazing out across the intensely blue sky over the gulf of Genoa, as his carriage sped along the coast road on the way to Nice. Somewhere along that road Bonaparte dictated his first order to the cavalry [below] and composed his famous "Proclamation of the General in Chief at the opening of the Campaign," dated 7 germinal an IV (27 March 1796).

Soldiers, you are naked, malnourished; the Government owes you a lot, but gives you nothing. [Corr. 91]

He promised them rewards, the spoils of war for the taking from the "richest provinces in Europe," which happened to be the valleys they were about to enter. So we know what they were fighting for, what motivated the French Army. "Hunger - the belly - rules the world." [Napoleon 19]

On 21 March, the Army of Italy could claim some 52,311 infantrymen, 3394 cavalry and 5596 gunners and sappers. On 9 April its strength was down to 37,705 infantry, 4868 cavalry-organized in two divisions under Stengel and Kilmaine-and 4770 artillery and engineers. "Its original strength when first raised in 1792 had been 106,000 men, but this total had been reduced by desertion, sickness and casualties in action." 17 When Bonaparte took command there were only about 37,600 effectives and some 60 field guns (of which only twenty-four were mounted on sledges and able to be used in the mountains). Replacements had fallen off to a trickle. These troops were formed into six active division totaling 30,000, while two second-line divisions guarded the coasts and the passages to the Rhone valley.

For their sustenance the troops had to depend on entirely corrupt army contractors, 17 in charge of the army's supplies, hospitals, and other services, who amassed fabulous fortunes. 14 The transport facilities of the army, amounting to 200 mules, were entirely inadequate to feed 50,000 men. Forced to fend for themselves, the foragers received meager hospitality amidst the exhausted hills of Piedmont. The French Government, already practically bankrupt, was two months in arrears in paying its soldiers. 17

"On March 18, Serurier's division stationed at Ormea defied orders, and on the 25th - only two days before General Bonaparte's arrival - the 3rd Battalion of the 209th mutinied at Nice. Hunger and neglect were fast turning the army into an indisciplined rabble, and it was evident to the new commander that only a successful offensive could remedy this state of affairs." 17

Scherer departed on the 29th after handing notes on the military situation to Major Junot, Bonaparte's secretary, along with 772,000 francs assignats of the one million received from Kellerman, and 3200 gold livres out of the 20,000 he had been given. 3 Bonaparte immediately issued some back pay to the troops from this war chest.

Bonaparte's aides-de-camps, aside from Junot who had served with him at Toulon, were his brother Louis; Colonel Joachim Murat, the lively Gascon who with superb nerve had suggested his own appointment; Marmont his fellow gunnery student; and Jean Leonord. The new artillery commander was Dujard; commissaire ordonnateur Chauvet was in charge of provisions. Berthier's staff included Dutaillis, Gonnoud, Ballet, Barbut and Bascaille. 3

Characteristically, Bonaparte would not waste time with introductions. Because of rain in the passes through the Apennines, however, the commencement of the campaign was delayed. In the interval 8,000 new muskets were distributed to the soldiers of Massena's advanced guard divisions. 3

On 26 March the brigade of Pijon, 3,000 strong, had been pushed forward to the coastal town of Voltri, a mere 10 kilometers from Genoa. Bonaparte desired Massena to pull this brigade back as soon as possible so as not to alert the enemy of the coming hostilities. Massena's 1st Advanced Guard Division was posted along a front from Montelegino to Toirano, the second from Seigno to Melogno. The enemy was at Dego, reconnoitered in force by General Menard's brigade. 3

Napoleon ordered up his cavalry for the campaign in his first set of march orders, directed to General Berthier on 29 March 1796 [Corr. 99]. "The cavalry will be divided into two groups. The first comprises the first hussars, 10th, 22nd and 25th chasseurs, and the 5th and 20th dragoons." The first hussars would follow the coast road from army headquarters at Nice via Menton, San-Remo, Oneglia, Albenga and Serendra to Toirano; the stages in the marches of the chasseurs and dragoons were then given. These regiments were the most dispersed in their cantonments well inside France. Much of the infantry, by contrast, remained in Italy, in close contact with the enemy. Although it would be inactive until the plains of Lombardy and Savoy were reached, the cavalry would begin to move now in order to be available in the first battles beyond the Apennines.

Finally the weather cleared, and on April 1, Berthier laconically ordered Massena to begin to move. Bonaparte's first campaign was underway. On April 2, 1796, Bonaparte left Nice, taking the simple country road to la Corniche. 18

Bonaparte would avoid the strongly fortified Alpine passes leading into Piedmont, marching instead across a strip of coastal territory owned by Genoa. His objective was to separate the two allied contingents, "and he achieved it by a clever ruse. Faipoult, the French Minister to the neutral Genoese Republic, presented a request to the Genoese Senate for French troops to be permitted to pass through Genoa and the Bochetta pass in order to invade Lombardy. The Senate, greatly perturbed, applied to General Beaulieu for protection." Beaulieu fell into the trap, advancing with his reserve corps through the Bochetta pass. 16

On April 5, Bonaparte moved his headquarters up to Albenga, where he remained five days inspecting the troops and organizing his transport. Thanks to an excellent espionage system organized by Massena and his head agent Pico, the strength and location of every enemy unit was known. 16 Pico brought word of the Austrian advance through the Bochetta Pass and on Sassello and Dego. Bonaparte made no change in his dispositions, cautioning his division commanders to be ready to move at a moment's notice, with a full supply of ammunition. 6

Beaulieu reached the coast at Voltri, pushing back Pijon's brigade, and ordered General Argenteau, commanding his main body at Acqui, to advance by Sassello on Savona and attack the French left flank as they moved up the coast road toward Beaulieu. On 10 April Argenteau ran into Massena's outpost line between Savona and Montenotte. At the same time Bonaparte arrived. The next evening he struck. 16

The campaign was a prodigy of one man. As he complained to his superiors in Paris, 'I arrive tired, I must stay up all night for administrative work, and I must go everywhere in person to restore order. The ill-fed soldiers let themselves go to excesses of cruelty that make one blush for being a man. I shall make some terrifying examples of the looters. Either I shall restore order or I shall cease to command these bandits.' 14 Soon the army's treasury would be bursting with gold, and the troops would be paid in hard cash.

FIRST BATTLES

Between the two allied armies, commanded by the Austrian J.P. Beaulieu and the Sardinian Colli, an atmosphere of mutual mistrust prevailed. Each army maintained an independent line of communications running divergently on Mantua, the Austrian administrative center in Italy, and Turin, the Piedmontese capital. 17 While the Allies were divided, the French army was positioned to quickly merge into a single force and launch a massive attack against one of the enemy corps. The attack came on April 12 at Montenotte - Night Mountain. 18

Montenotte
Advancing unseen through morning fog, LaHarpe's 9,000 French troops attacked Argenteau's 6,000 Austrians at Montenotte. General La Harpe mounted a frontal attack on the position while Massena, at the head of Menard's brigade, worked round the Austrian right flank. As the fog lifted Argenteau realized his peril and ordered his men to retreat. Massena's troops, appearing unexpectedly from the woods above the town, charged and routed the Austrians and formed a defensive perimeter around Montenotte.

Carcare
During the night Argenteau's command dwindled to 700 men. In order to prevent Argenteau's men from joining the Sardinians, Massena required his men to occupy Carcare, but the leading units of Augereau's columns reached the vital crossroads before them.

Cosseria
As the spearhead of Napoleon's assault on the wavering Piedmontese, Augereau's advance on Ceva came to a halt before the ruins of Cosseria castle, defended by Sardinian grenadiers and Austrian infantry under the Austrian General Provera, whose force had originally linked the Austrian and Sardinian sectors. They defied several costly attempts to dislodge them. By the morning of the 14th, however, they were low on cartridges and out of water, and hence entered into negotiations for surrender.

Dego
Massena's strong French division assaulted the village of Dego about noon, and shortly captured most of the 5,000 Austrians and 19 guns. Leaving Massena to hold the town, Bonaparte retraced his steps to the west at the head of La Harpe's Division, hoping to meet Serurier near Ceva.

Massena's men remaining at Dego, hungry and exhausted, scattered in search of provisions. In the early hours of the next morning, five Austrian battalions under General Wukassovitch surprised and routed them, capturing all their guns. Wukassovitch consolidated the position, preparing defenses in the village. La Harpe's worn-out men and the reserve hurried back to Dego. Linking up with Massena's rallied units, they stormed the village and overthrew the Austrians. Thenceforth Colli was on his own.

Ceva
On the 16th, Serurier and Augereau drove Colli out of Montezemolo into the fortified camp of Ceva. As the French prepared an assault on the night of the 17th, the Sardinians withdrew unmolested to a stronger position at the village of San Michele along the Corsaglia River near its confluence with the Tanaro.

Mondovi
Colli escaped during the night toward Mondovi. The divisions of Serurier and Meynier crossed at and above San Michele. They pushed the Sardinians off the heights of Vicoforte and enveloped them in Mondovi. Stengel's cavalry forded the Ellero and rode toward the enemy line of retreat, where their leader, the Army's most experienced cavalry office, was killed in a skirmish with Colli's cavalry screen. The Sardinians had decided to give up the town and its well-stocked arsenal. Now established on the fertile plains of Piedmont, the French feasted in abundance.

Cherasco
On April 23, Bonaparte advanced on Turin. Massena and Augereau crossed the Tanaro River at Cherasco and Alba; Serurier sent part of his force from Mondovi toward the bridge at Fossano. The last major barrier on the road to Turin was passed, and only 12,000 Sardinians stood between Bonaparte and King Victor Amadeus. On April 25, in a downpour of rain, Napoleon left for Cherasco where, the next day, he made his famous proclamation to the Army of Italy. 18

Soldiers, in fifteen days you have won six victories, captured 21 colors, 55 cannon, several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have taken 15,000 prisoners, killed or wounded more than 10,000 men.

On the morning of April 27 the King of Sardinia signed the Armistice of Cherasco, abandoned his Austrian allies and took his forces out of the war. 18 French cantonments were extended to the line of the Rivers Tanaro and Stura, and French garrisons entered Ceva, Cuneo and Tortona.

Acqui
La Harpe arrived on the 30th to find Beaulieu's forces already gone. They had abandoned Alessandria on the 28th, and were safely across the mighty River Po at Valenza, awaiting the onslaught of their adversaries. Bonaparte ordered his widely-scattered forces to concentrate between Tortona and Alessandria.

ENTRY TO THE PO

Rather than attack the Austrians head-on at Valenza, Bonaparte planned to outflank the Austrian position by marching down the Po to cross Beaulieu's lines of communications. Massena and Serurier were to mount diversionary operations appearing to presage a crossing at Valenza and Sale; to distract Beaulieu's attention while a select corps d'elite of grenadiers and carabiniers under Dallemagne marched to Piacenza to established a bridgehead, followed by the remainder of the army.

Piacenza
On May 7 Dallemagne left Stradella, and reaching Piacenza by nine a.m. The grenadiers seized several boats and a ferry and surged across the swiftly flowing river. Austrian General Liptay with a division of infantry prepared a defense in the villages near Codogno. In the night Augereau crossed the Po 10 kilometers upstream. Serurier and Massena, their mission complete at Valenza, approached the bridgehead. Next morning La Harpe and Dallemagne stormed Guardamiglio and Fombio while the Austrians fell back through Codogno to the fortified town of Pizzighettone. By dark, 7,000 men under Beaulieu were approaching Codogno.

Codogno
During the night, however, Beaulieu's advanced guard under Schubirz drove into the town, driving in the French outposts. In the darkness La Harpe was shot by his own men who then panicked. Menard came up with fresh troops and Schubirz retired on Casalpusterlengo, leaving one cannon and sixty prisoners in French hands. Despite his numerical superiority Beaulieu ordered a retreat toward Lodi on the River Adda, whence he intended to rendezvous with Wukassovich and Sebottendorf at Crema. Liptay left for Cremona, detaching a rearguard in Pizzighettone further downstream to guard the bridge over the Adda there.

Lodi
Leaving Menard at Codogno to keep Liptay away from his bridgehead, Bonaparte marched with his advanced guard of grenadiers. Beaulieu's army had already reached Crema, leaving 9,600 men under General Sebottendorf to cover the bridge at Lodi. Three battalions of Austrian grenadiers blocked the road about half-way to Casalpusterlengo, while troops in Lodi hauled supplies back across the bridge. Dallemagne drove the rear guard into Lodi and onto the bridge. Austrian cannon dominated the 250-yard span from the farther bank. Beaumont with 1600 cavalry rode upstream to ford the Adda and outflank them. French guns came in to action one by one as they arrived.

Bonaparte formed the grenadiers and carabiniers into a column, and launched them onto the causeway. Facing a storm of Austrian canister, they reached the center of the bridge before falling back. Again and again the column tried and failed. Finally Massena, Dallemagne, Cervoni and Berthier led the column into the dense smoke, and caught the Austrians by surprise. Some carabiniers jumped from the causeway and opened fire on the Austrian gunners. The defenders reeled back, while Cervoni and Joubert followed Dallemagne across the bridge. Upon crossing, Augereau hit the Austrian center, while a squadron of Beaumont's cavalry appeared on their flank. Sebottendorf retreated in good order toward Beaulieu, leaving behind 150 killed, 1700 prisoners and sixteen guns. The French lost 400, and rested for six days while drawing in stragglers and remounting their cavalry.

It was only after his victory at Lodi, Napoleon declared at St. Helena, that he conceived the first ideas of high ambition. "From that moment, I foresaw what I might be. Already I felt the earth flee from beneath me, as if I were being carried into the sky." 14 "I am a fragment of rock thrown into space."

Milan
Beaulieu withdrew to the Mincio River line, with Lake Garda on his right and the fortress of Mantova (Mantua) on his right, leaving only a small garrison in Milan. Bonaparte entered Milan on the 15th, leaving a force of 5,000 men to besiege the citadel. The army, 30,000 strong, departed a week later toward the Mincio. A large siege train was collected and forced the Austrian capitulation on June 29, as Madame Bonaparte arrived in the city to spend the summer with her husband.

Borghetto
The Austrian general, with 28,000 men, endeavored to guard all possible crossings over the Mincio, leaving only a small reserve at Valeggio. Bonaparte advanced on a broad front in three columns: Massena on the left, Augereau in the center, and Serurier on the right. On the 30th Kilmaine with the grenadiers stormed the bridge at Borghetto, and Beaulieu had no alternative but to fall back along the eastern shore of the lake. Augereau advanced on Peschiera, while Massena seized Verona. Bonaparte turned south with Serurier to invest Mantua.

Valeggio
On June 1st, Bonaparte was nearly captured by patrols of Sebottendorf's division; the general made good his escape by hopping over several garden walls wearing only one boot.

Mantova
An Austrian detachment of 4,500 men, cut off from Beaulieu, fell back to Mantova. The city, surrounded by lakes, was protected by 300 guns and a garrison of 12,700 men. By June 3, Mantova was fully invested by Serurier and Augereau. The grenadiers took San Giorgio, raising hopes of quick success. Bonaparte attempted to take M‡ntova by assault on July 17, but a drop in the water level stranded Murat with one assault force halfway across. Count Canto d'Irles rejected the summons to surrender on terms, forcing a formal siege to reduce the fortress. The siege train of 180 guns was dragged from Milan to batteries along the shore and began their bombardment, but soon an Austrian offensive threatened from the mountains beyond Lake Garda. On July 31 Serurier retreated to the north, spiking the irreplaceable siege artillery.

WURMSER'S FIRST OFFENSIVE

Austrian Field Marshal Dagobert von Wurmser marched with the first of 25,000 veteran reinforcements from the German theatre of operations through the Alps by the Brenner Pass, reaching Trent on the River Adige on June 30th. At once preparations began for a new offensive to wipe away everything Bonaparte had achieved in four months of campaigning. To meet this threat, Bonaparte had concluded his operations in Tuscany and the papal states, returning on July 5th. 7 He received a few thousand reinforcements: a division under General Vaubois from the Army of the Alps, plus three demi-brigades under General Despinois released to the field army when Milan capitulated on June 30th. 2

The French held the valley of the Po River where it joins its tributary the Adige, enjoying the freedom of maneuver afforded by the relatively level valley. They anchored their position on three of the four so-called "Quadrilateral" fortresses, Peschiera, Verona and Legnano. An Austrian garrison held the remaining fortress of Mantua, but they suffered under siege, cut off from the supplies of the countryside. The relief of Mantua would be the object of Wurmser's operations. His field forces occupied the narrow mountain passes leading down from the higher elevations of the Austrian Dolomites. Once a marching column sets out, there are few opportunities to cross over to a different gorge until the flatland is reach ed. This terrain made their lines of advance predictable.

The main French force occupied the stretch of the Adige between Rivoli and Legnano. Massena's 15,391 men were divided between a strong reserve at Rivoli with outposts upstream, and a garrison in Verona with a demi-brigade posted downstream, under Brigade generals Victor, Pigeon, Valette and Rampon. Augereau with 5,368 men under Brigade generals Robert, Pelletier and Beyrand occupied Legnano and guarded the river in its vicinity. Despinois's 5,500 men were divided, with one demi-brigade on the Adige near Arcola and another in Peschiera, under Brigade generals Bertin and Cervoni. Kilmaine with 1535 men of the cavalry reserve awaited orders near Villafranca. 2 The 10,000-man division of General Serurier, under Brigade generals Serviez, Fiorella, Lasalcette and Charton, maintained the siege at Mantua, while Bonaparte at Roverbella watched for enemy movements on both sides of Lake Garda. Four thousand five hundred men of the 12th and 25th demi-brigades were enroute to join Serurier and Despinois respectively. In addition some 9000 men in Lombardy and on the lines of communication could be called forward in an emergency. 7

The Austrians advanced in two main groups. A corps of four mixed brigades 17,621 strong under General Quasdanovich set out from Trent on the 25th toward the west of Lake Garda. The single route practicable for artillery on this side of the lake follows the valley of the Chiese River through the defile at Rocca d'Anfo to arrive in open country near Salo. 2 General Sauret, newly arrived as replacement for General La Harpe, watched this approach with his division of 4462 under Brigade generals Guieu and Dallemagne. Headquartered at Salo on the lake shore, he placed detachments at Gavardo, Desenzano and Brescia. The citadel of Brescia, garrisoned by only three companies, could merely offer token resistance to an open assault.

The main column of seven Austrian Brigades, 24,295 strong, marched down the Adige, making contact with the French outposts near La Corona on the 26th. At the same time Meszaros's 5021 men, following the Brenta River valley, reached Bassano. This diversion prevented the French from knowing where to concentrate, and the Austrians overwhelmed the local screening forces on every front, quickly seizing lodgments on the plain in preparation for a move on Mantua. Moving to link up the separate wings of his army, Wurmser brought the campaign to its crisis. If successful in joining forces south of Lake Garda, the Austrians would outnumber the French about three-to-two, a commanding superiority. 17

On July 29th, Bonaparte summarized this bleak situation to his Division Commander, General Augereau. "The enemy have broken through our line in three places; they are masters of La Corona and Rivoli. Massena has been compelled to yield to superior forces; Sauret has begun his retreat to Desenzano, and the enemy has captured Brescia and the bridge of Ponte San Marco. You see that our communications with Milan are cut off." 6 He concluded that the siege of Mantua would have to be abandoned and ordered Augereau to join him at Roverbella. The next day, Bonaparte directed Serurier to raise the siege of Mantua and fall back to the south and west, taking post with two of his brigades at Marcaria to cover the alternate line of communication via Cremona, and sending the others to Augereau. 7 Although this meant leaving the precious siege guns to their destruction, it gave the French the freedom to unite their forces and engage on battlefields of their own choosing, and bring their full weight to bear against each Austrian wing in succession. 6

Wurmser imagined the French army to be immobilized by the need to defend its siege lines and set-out to attack it in its positions, leaving a brigade to mask Peschiera (as a bridgehead fortification it could be defended by a single regiment) and detaching a stronger force at Castelnuovo to cover his communications.

Away to the northwest, Bonaparte ordered Sauret to return to Salo and relieve Guieu's detachment, which he had left there the day before. Guieu and his small garrison still held out after twenty-eight hours without bread, in constant contact with the enemy. Arriving at the same moment as a renewed Austrian assault, Sauret struck their open flank, capturing flags, cannon and prisoners. 6

Quasdanovich's main body took Brescia with little difficulty, and set out toward the rendezvous area by way of Castenedolo. His advanced guard under Ocskay marched to his left by Rezzato, reaching Ponte San Marco on July 30th. Next day Ocskay marched on Lonato, attacked Despinois and defeated him. Before nightfall MassŽna moved up through Desenzano, defeated Ocskay in turn, and sent him back to Ponte San Marco. During this day two of Quasdanovich's brigades reached Montechiaro further down the Chiese River; the fourth remained at Salo. 2

On July 31st Kilmaine joined Augereau and Bonaparte at Roverbella covering Serurier's withdrawal. 2 Wurmser's main body approached, reaching Valeggio six miles away. His patrols, turned back by the enemy, garnered no clue of what was afoot at Mantua that day. His obsession with Mantua blinded him to the possibility of crossing the Mincio for a direct move on Castiglione. Just General Valette's brigade stood in the way of a quick link-up with Quasdanovich. The later reached the heights of Castiglione only late that afternoon, hurriedly organizing patrols toward Guidizzolo and Borghetto and even sending an observer up into the bell-tower to watch for the enemy. 6

Once Serurier was safely on his way Bonaparte moved to re-open his main line of communications through Brescia and dispatch Quasdanovich. During the night Bonaparte's force of 12,000 men crossed the Mincio at Goito and moved on Montechiaro. 7 Finding Bonaparte gone, Wurmser could not believe his good fortune. Had he followed toward Montechiaro, he might have trapped Bonaparte between himself and Quasdanovich. Moving instead for Mantua, he left Bonaparte a free hand in dealing with his subordinate.

"Moving to Montechiaro in the afternoon, General Dallemagne attacked Quasdanovich in an indecisive combat in which the Austrians lost 600 killed and 600 prisoners." 6 Dallemagne's attack opened the road leading to Brescia. Bonaparte ordered Augereau to advance from Montechiaro with the support of Generals Despinois and Sauret from Ponte San Marco. The few Austrians in Brescia offered no serious opposition. In their surprise and haste they abandoned the magazines and the thousand French and Austrian wounded. General Despinois and his adjutant Herbin threw themselves and their troops into the pursuit of the enemy in the direction of the Chiese River bridges. 6 With the recapture of Brescia Serurier was free to operate on the flank and rear of Wurmser's force approaching from Mantua.

Bonaparte now needed to direct a quick knock-out blow at Quasdanovich, or at least drive him back into the Rocca d'Anfo. Fortunately Quasdanovich failed to unite his force and march with all speed to Castiglione, but instead retired on Gavardo. Bonaparte ordered General Sauret to move his division to Gavardo by the direct road. Augereau's Division returned from Brescia to Montechiaro, while Massena took position between Lonato and the Ponte-San-Marco. Meanwhile General Valette, attacked at Castiglione by Wurmser's advanced guard under Liptay on August 2nd, abandoned the village with the majority of his 1800 men and retreated to Montechiaro. Unaware of the escape of the rest of his troops to Ponte-San-Marco, he claimed they had been taken prisoner, only to be unceremoniously relieved of command in front of his troops. 6

Bonaparte sent Augereau to retake Castiglione while Quasdanovich's delays afforded time to prepare another attack at Lonato. He wrote to Saliceti: "The first clash with the enemy will decide the fate of Italy. If defeated, I will retire to the Adda; if victorious, I will not be delayed by the marshes of Mantua." He demanded that Saliceti press the Army of the Alps to place its forces on an active footing and to assure the provisioning of the fortresses of Milan, Tortona, Alexandria and Pavia. " I am extraordinarily tired; five of my horses have died of exhaustion." At the same time, Bonaparte wrote to the Directory: "We have had enough of reverses; now victory will return to our banners. We will fight a battle at Lonato and recapture Salo." He stated his strength forward of the Adda at 30,000 effectives with 11,000 or 12,000 sick. 6

On August 2nd the French demi-brigades, equivalent to regiments, were re-assigned. General Sauret with the 11th Line, 27th, 29th, and an Ad Hoc Light, was marching from Lonato to Salo. Massena with the 18th & 32nd Line, 4th & 18th Light, and 3 companies /11th Light, was spread between Ponte San Marco and Lonato. General Augereau with the 4th, 45th, & 51st Line, 2 battalions /69th Line, and the 17th Light, stood with General Kilmaine and the cavalry at Montechiaro. Despinois with the 5th & 39th Line and 22nd Light occupied Brescia. General Serurier with the 19th Line, 1 battalion and 4 companies /25th Line, 1 battalion /69th Line, and the 12th Light held Marcaria. 23

"On August 3rd at the crack of dawn, the two armies stood face to face. On the left of the French army stood General Guieu, with orders to attack Salo. He invested the town later that morning. In the center, Massena marched toward Lonato. Quasdanovich, not anticipating an attack for the present, assailed the advanced guard at Lonato. The Austrians captured General Pijon along with three pieces of horse artillery." 6 Massena counterattacked and drove Quasdanovich back with the loss of a complete brigade. Uncertain of Wurmser's whereabouts, his force much weakened, Quasdanovich retired northward. On the right, General Augereau assaulted Liptay in Castiglione, enveloping his left and driving him back into the hills where Schubirz's brigade moved to his support. "Although the Austrians fought extremely fiercely the French retained firm control of the central position between the two Austrian forces (at the height of the double battle only five miles had separated them). The jaws of the Austrian nutcrackers remained open, and the tiring Army of Italy was not a little battered." 17

Quasdanovich was no sooner dispatched than the panting Frenchmen turned about with all haste for Castiglione to meet Wurmser's 25,000 undefeated troops. Wurmser crossed the Mincio only late in the morning of August 3rd, having delayed operations to allow the preparation of a triumphal entry into Mantua. Hoping to join hands with Quasdanovich at Lonato, Wurmser arrived that afternoon on a line extending from Solferino on the right to Medola on the left. 7

Leaving Sauret to follow Quasdanovich, Bonaparte summoned all his other divisions for this operation, recalling Despinois from Brescia to join Massena and Augereau, Marmont the gunner and Beaumont (vice Kilmaine) the cavalry commander on the plain of Castiglione. Massena's division formed the left, Augereau's the right, and the cavalry massed behind Augereau. 7 Simultaneously he sent to Serurier at Marcaria, summoning him to march on the village of Guidizzolo in Wurmser's rear. Bonaparte thus concentrated almost 31,000 men. 17

Still congratulating themselves for their easy success at Mantua, the Austrians did not understand why the French abandoned the siege. With the prize of Mantua in their hands, they felt like conquerors without so much as firing a shot. They would soon be disillusioned. "At daybreak on August 5th ," wrote the French general in exile, "we found ourselves in contact with the enemy; until 6 A.M., however, nothing took place. I then ordered a retrograde movement by the whole army in order to draw the enemy after us - and thus occupy the time Serurier's division (which was expected every second) would take to come up from Marcaria, and thereafter turn Wurmser's left."

"Wurmser swung his right flank forward in an attempt to crush Massena and thus open up a road toward Lonato, for the Austrian commander in chief had received no certain news of Quasdanovich's defeat on the 3rd. Meanwhile, General Fiorella had arrived with Serurier's division at Guidizzolo at about six in the morning; Wurmser still had no clue about his presence, thanks to the effective screening operations performed by the 8th Regiment of Dragoons." 17 "His fire would be the signal for battle," wrote Bonaparte on St. Helena. "We expected a great moral effect from this unexpected onslaught." Serurier's guns took the Austrians by surprise, and the three French divisions fell on Wurmser's army with a rush. Attacked frontally by Massena's and Augereau's troops, and finding Serurier advancing on his left rear, the Austrian general formed his second line at an angle to his first to meet Serurier. Seeing their compatriots executing this maneuver in some confusion, the Austrians nearer Solferino broke ranks and began filing to the rear. Gradually the French pressure overwhelmed old Marshal Wurmser, who had drawn his sword in the thickest of the fight. The exhausted French pursued ineffectively, and 5,000 undefeated Austrian troops from Peschiera did much to cover the withdrawal of their unlucky compatriots. Wurmser sent his men back toward Peschiera and Valeggio, abandoning 20 cannon and 120 caissons and adding 1,000 prisoners en route to the 2,000 killed and wounded on the field. 17

On the following day the French began a belated pursuit. The Austrians held the easily-fordable Mincio line. Massena marched in haste to relieve the French garrison of Peschiera, which nearly surrendered. 2 Defeating the Austrians there, Massena and then Augereau crossed the Mincio and moved toward Castelnuovo. Bonaparte pushed Serurier's troops forward to seize the bridge at Borghetto. With this threat to his communications, Wurmser left 15,000 troops in Mantua, and continued his retreat on Trent unhampered on the evening of August 6th. 7 The French had lost 6,000 men during the campaign.

WURMSER'S LAST CAMPAIGN

The Army of Italy received orders from Paris to pursue Wurmser's shaken legions over the Alps into the Tyrol, in support of the French armies in Germany. Bonaparte informed Moreau, his counterpart in Bavaria, that he would move on Trent on September 2nd. At the same time Wurmser, informed of Bonaparte's plan, was preparing a counter-offensive with one wing, 20,000 strong, shifting east to Bassano, while Davidovitch with 25,000 men remained to defend Trent and watch the Tyrol for signs of Moreau. The powerful force in Mantua continued to confound Bonaparte's plans. Sahuguet had only 6,000 men blockading more than twice their numbers.

Roveredo
On September 3, Vaubois and Augereau began their advance on Trent with the repulse of Wukassovich's advanced guard at Ala. On the 4th, Massena forced the defile of Marco, and Bonaparte's cavalry pursued the Austrians to Caliano, a narrow defile between steep mountains and an impassable river. After a brief bombardment from the opposite bank, Bonaparte launched three demi-brigades into and through the Austrian line. In two days, Wukassovich lost 6,000 men and 20 guns.

Trent
On September 5 Massena occupied Trent. He and Vaubois drove Davidovich back from Lavis on Neumarkt. Bonaparte ordered Vaubois to block the gorges north of the town with 10,000 men - ready to advance to Botzen if Moreau reached Innsbruck - while the remaining 22,000 troops set off to the east and south in pursuit of Wurmser.

Primolano
On September 7, Augereau's advanced guard under Lanusse stormed three battalions of Croats defending the mountain pass at Primolano. Surrounded by French cavalry, 2,000 men laid down their arms. By nightfall, the Army of Italy had reached Cismona, having covered 45 miles in two days.

Verona
At the same time, far to the south, WŸrmser's advanced guard under Meszaros attacked the fortress of Verona, with its tiny garrison of 1200, but was repulsed and asked for reinforcements. Instead, he was ordered back to Montebello.

Bassano
Wurmser posted two divisions on both banks of the Brenta, north of Bassano, to hit the French columns as they debouched from the Alpine passes. The next morning, September 8, Bonaparte hurled his two divisions at Bassano, Augereau on the east, Massena on the west bank. The assault, led by Colonel Lannes, burst through the Austrian rear guards and stormed the town, seizing the covered bridge over the Brenta in the center of town. Despite stubborn resistance, the Austrian forces were cut up, Quasdanovich and 3,000 retreating eastward while Wurmser with a thousand brave troops advanced to meet Meszaros at Montebello. Augereau marched south to Padua to block Wurmser's expected retreat, while Massena pursued directly toward Vicenza. Both places were seized on the 9th.

Castellero To his credit, WŸrmser continued for Mantova. Two squadrons of Austrian cavalry induced the French garrison at Legnano to abandon their position with its bridge intact, leaving Wurmser with 11,000 men free to cross the Adige on the 10th. Leaving 1600 men to hold up Augereau, Wurmser departed for Nogara on the 11th. Massena's advance guard, under Murat and Pijon, clashed with Wurmser's advanced guard near Castellero, but received the worst of the encounter. Any possibility of apprehending Wurmser was now dashed.

Mantova His feint toward Castellaro fairly accomplished, Wurmser overran an outpost of one battalion at Villempenta and entered Mantova on September 13. On the 15th, the stalwart old brawler launched a massive assault against the suburb of San Giorgio and the village of La Favorita. Massena's men supported Sahuguet's division, and after heavy fighting drove the Austrians back within the fortress at a loss of 4,000 men.

ALVINCZY'S FIRST INVASION

Within six weeks a reinforced Austrian army of 46,000 men under the command of Baron Joseph d'Alvintzy was ready to take the field.. Davidovich had 18,400 left over from the last campaign; Quasdanovich near Trieste had 28,700, mostly conscripts and other reinforcements comprising unwilling Poles and ever-reliable Croats and Hungarians. Bonaparte, in contrast, had barely 24,000 fit for duty and no significant replacements.

Trent
Believing the enemy north of Trent to be very weak, Bonaparte ordered Vaubois to advance. On November 4, Vaubois with 10,400 men ran into Davidovich's thrust at San Michele. He was outflanked and overwhelmed, abandoning Trent to the enemy, and took position at Caliano.

Fontanove and Bassano
Alvinczy's plan was to converge on Verona from the north and east and then march to the relief of Mantua. Massena methodically withdrew toward Vicenza before d'Alvintzy's two advanced guards which set out from Bassano and Citadella. On November 6, the divisions of Massena and Augereau turned and drove these advanced guards back to their starting points, but could not budge their supports at Fontanove and Bassano, and they again withdrew to Vicenza.

Roveredo
Davidovich sent a brigade under Loudon toward Torbole at the top of Lake Garda, repulsing the French there. Swinging left, they linked up with another brigade from Davidovich, under Ocskay, to threaten the French flank guard at Mori. Hearing of these Austrians threatening their line of retreat, Vaubois' men decided they had had enough, and fled to Rivoli, where they met reinforcements under Joubert and received a severe reprimand from Bonaparte. Vaubois had lost 5,000 men in four days.

Caldiero
Arrived with his whole force at Vicenza, d'Alvintzi made up his mind to march toward Verona, to threaten the rear of Joubert and Vaubois at Rivoli, before advancing toward Mantova. He crossed the River Alpone at Villanuova with 18,000 men, with another 9,000 men trailing behind. Augereau and Massena with 11,700 men repulsed a probe toward Verona on the 11th, driving d'Alvintzi back on the village of Caldiero. d'Alvinczy posted 3,000 men at Arcole, under Brigido, to watch his left flank on River Adige. Bonaparte sent Augereau's and Massena's divisions forward on the 12th. The attack miscarried, at a loss of 2,000 men killed or captured and two guns. Bonaparte dramatically summarized the situation for the Directory:

The Army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is exhausted. We are abandoned in the interior of Italy. The brave men remaining regard death as inevitable. Perhaps the hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, of Berthier, of my own death is at hand.

Bonaparte decided to attack. Rounding up every spare man from the fortresses, he concentrated at Ronco - where the access road for a pontoon bridge still remained - to force his way across the Adige and take Villanuova and cut Alvinczy's communications.

Arcole A causeway crossed the marshland along the north bank of the Adige. By daybreak on the 15th, Andreossy, the army's chief engineer, had built a pontoon bridge leading to the causeway. Augereau's troops were the first across, while Massena's set off to the left to seize the village of Porcile. They brushed with Provera's advance guard of 3,000, capturing the village to secure the left flank of the bridgehead. As the head of the right flank column, under Augereau, approached the bridge at Arcole, Brigido's flank guard pinned them down from the dike on the left bank of the Alpone, at a range of a hundred yards . Leading Augereau's men forward in a new attack against the bridge of Arcole, Bonaparte fell into a canal, and had to be dragged to safety under the counterattacking Austrian bayonets. Arriving later on Brigido's flank, Guieu's gallant 3,000 captured the town of Arcole at seven in the evening, only to abandon it later in the evening, as Bonaparte judged his troops too exposed on the narrow dikes. Alvinczy responded by reinforcing Provera's command against Porcile and stationed Hohenzollern with 10,000 on his right, while consolidating his remaining 24,000 men at Villanuova and San Bonifacio. The pressure was off of Verona for the moment.

The next morning Bonaparte repeated the attacks on Arcole and Porcile. After a dull battle of attrition among the dikes they recaptured Porcile, taking 800 prisoners, but Arcole stood firm, and General Vial's attempt to bridge the Alpone near its mouth also failed. In the evening, Bonaparte again withdrew his forces to the right bank of the Adige so as to be prepared for any sudden emergency in the north, leaving only a small advance guard on the opposite side. Alvinczy pulled Hohenzollern back toward Villanuova while sending his baggage to safety. Mitrowsky occupied Arcole. That night, Andreossy's engineers build a pontoon bridge across the Alpone, just above its mouth. Bonaparte's plan was to take Arcole from the east, and ordered Vial with 800 men from Legnano to join him next day. On the 17th Bonaparte renewed the attack. Massena's division engaged the enemy among the marshes, sending one demi-brigade toward Porcile and one toward Arcole. Mitrowski's counterattack against the latter ran into an ambush by a third demi-brigade, and 3,000 men stranded on the dike had to surrender. Meanwhile Augereau made for the trestle, but ran into four Austrian battalions blocking their path. Bonaparte sent a mounted patrol toward their rear, who caused their panicked withdrawal.. As Massena renewed the attack on Arcole from the west, Augereau swept forward, linking-up with Vial to take Arcole in the rear. Alvinczy abandoned San Bonifacio and withdrew in good order. Losses for the three days of battle: French 4,600, Austrians at least 6,000.

Rivoli
Alvinczy's second advance was stopped in the foothills above the open plain of the Po, and far from the withering garrison of Mantua. At daylight on January 14 Joubert advanced with 10,000 men and 18 guns to drive back three Austrian columns totaling some 12,000. The French captured San Giovanni, but Koblos checked Joubert's advance while Liptay began to envelop the westernmost French brigade.

Lusignan's column, after a long detour, suddenly appeared along the ridge south of Rivoli, cutting Bonaparte off from his reinforcements. The 18th demi-brigade, newly arrived from Lake Garda, was ordered to reopen communications.

Meanwhile in the Osteria gorge, Austrian grenadiers seized the village at eleven o'clock and threatened to break through Joubert's exhausted force. While his light artillery rained case shot onto the Austrian column at point-blank range, Leclerc and Lasalle launched a charge of 500 infantry and horsemen. The Austrians reeled back, and soon the gorge was clear.

Bonaparte's entire force immediately rushed back to the northern edge of the plateau to face the regrouped columns of Koblos and Liptay. The French splitting the Austrian army into two parts. They were then free to turn their attentions against the Austrian flanking columns. Rey's arriving troops and Massena's reserve brigade from Rivoli. caught Lusignan's division between them, taking 3,000 prisoners.

At five p.m., Bonaparte handed over the battle to Joubert and Rey, and hurried south with Massena's hard-fighting brigades to pursue Provera's column, heading for Mantova.

On the 15th, Joubert executed a planned attack on La Corona, driving Alvinczy far into the Alpine passes. As the French took Carinthia and reached Leoben, the Habsburgs sued for peace. Bonaparte conducted the negotiations for France on his own authority. The armistice of Leoben formally ended the campaign on April 18, 1797.

In the treaty of Campo Formio, signed on October 17, Count Ludwig von Cobenzl yielded the entire left bank of the Rhine to France; since some of that territory did not belong to Austria, a congress was called at Rastatt to discuss a general peace with the states of the Holy Roman Empire. 14

Before the signing at Campo Formio, the basically instable regime found itself challenged by an anti-Jacobin coup. The four Jacobin directors enlisted the support of Bonaparte, who sent troops to Paris to arrest the director Francois de Barthelemy and 53 deputies. From that moment, Bonaparte played an ever-increasing role in politics.

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