THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF

A General-in-chief must be guided by his own experience or genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties of an engineer or an artillery officer may be learned in treatises, but the science of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the campaigns of all the great captains. Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick. Model yourself upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders. [LXXVIII]

They have all acted upon the same principles—to keep their forces united, to leave no weak part unguarded, to seize with rapidity on important points. Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain discipline and secure subjection. [LXXVII]

The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head—that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by good news, or depressed by bad. The impressions he receives, either successively or simultaneously in the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy since it is upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different impressions that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.

Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything through a highly coloured medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military operations. [LXXIII]

The general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and resolution. [LXVI]

The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and councils of war will follow at all times. They will terminate in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a general is determined courage. [LXV]

Never do what the enemy wishes you to do ... A field of battle which he has previously studied and reconnue should be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to fortify or entrench. Never attack a position in front which you can gain by turning. [XVI]

A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when they are both distant from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things.

Hence it follows that every general is culpable who undertakes the execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan—in short, to give in his resignation rather than allow himself to become the instrument of his army's ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing it, is equally blamable.

In this case the general ought to refuse obedience, because a blind obedience is required only to a military command given by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes his order. [LXXII]

INTELLIGENCE

To know the country thoroughly; to be able to conduct a reconnaissance with skill; to superintend the transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated movements intelligibly, but in few words and with simplicity: these are the leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected for the head of the staff. [LXXIV]

To reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description, to provide guides that may be depended upon, to interrogate the curé and postmaster, to establish rapidly a good understanding with the inhabitants, to send out spies, intercept public and private letters, and translate and analyze their contents in a word, to be able to answer every question of the general-in-chief when he arrives at the head of the army these are the qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts. [LXXVI]

All information obtained from prisoners should be received with caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees anything beyond his company and an officer can afford intelligence of little more than the position and the movements of the division to which his regiment belongs. On this account the general of an army should never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference to the position, etc., of the enemy. [LXIII]

Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge acquired in the service of his country to deliver up her frontier and her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle of religion, morality, and honour. [LXXI]

The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render the abuses and vexations inseparable from war the more intolerable. A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice, and mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition, or prevent it. [LXX]

MORALE

The first consideration with a general who offers battle should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss is often equal to two battles. For this reason we should never despair while brave men are to be found with their colours. It is by this means we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it. [XV]

A good general, a well-organised system, good instruction, and severe discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good troops, independently of the cause for which they fight. At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, and a sense of national honour, will operate upon young soldiers with advantage. [LVI]

When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organise an army. [LVII]

The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation; courage is only the second. Hardship, poverty, and want are the best school for a soldier. [LVIII]

Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colours. This is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service. It is the height of injustice to give a veteran no greater advantages than a recruit. [LX]

It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful during the campaign, it is to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of the day should keep these objects in view. [LXI]

RAPIDITY

The strength of an army, like power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity. A rapid march augments the morale of an army, and increases all the chances of victory. [IX]

When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement the want of artillery by the nature of the manoeuvres and the inferiority in cavalry by the choice of positions. In such circumstances the morale of the soldier does much. [X]

Part Two: Strategy Part Three: Tactics