OBJECTIVE

All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be con-ducted according to the rules of art. War should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome. [V]

In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum; according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country. [II]

LINE OF OPERATIONS

An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity. [XII]

Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command: for this reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be only one army, acting upon one (base, and conducted by one chief. [LXIV]

The line of operations should not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful maneuvres in war to know how to change it, when circumstances authorise or render this necessary. An army which changes skillfully its line of operation deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or upon what weak points it is assailable. [XX]

DISTANCE BETWEEN CORPS

An army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings either resting upon neutral territories, or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported, and in others that both are exposed. Where both wings are protected, a general has only to guard against being penetrated in front, and the line of operation may tend indifferently to the right or to the left. Where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing. The line of operation should be directed towards the wing in support. Where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; and his line should be perpendicular to the centre of the army's line of march. [III]

When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which each have their separate line of operation until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, ... the junction should never take place near the enemy, because, in uniting his forces, the enemy may not only prevent it, but beat the armies in detail. [IV]

The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view. [XIII]

It is contrary to all true principle to make corps which have no communication act separately against a central force whose communications are open. [XXVI]

To act upon lines far removed from each other, and without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth to a second. The detached column has its orders for the first day only. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have happened to the main body. Thus the column either loses time upon emergency, in waiting for orders, or acts without them and at hazard. ... An army should always keep its columns united so as to prevent the enemy from passing between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in their operations. They should move towards a point fixed upon for their future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without waiting for fresh orders, and every means should be concerted to prevent their being attacked in detail. [XI]

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

It is necessary every five or six days to have a strong post, or an entrenched position, upon the line of march, in order to collect stores and provisions, to organise convoys, to form a center of movement, and establish a point of defence, to shorten the line of operations. [III]

ADVANCE AND RETREAT

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration, but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manoeuvres, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats cost always more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements, with this difference, that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only. [VI]

The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war. [XIX]

When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depots. [XXI]

TERRAIN

The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and large rivers occupy the third place. [I]

Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain warfare the assailant has always the disadvantage. Even in offensive warfare in the open field the great secret consists in defensive combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack. [XIV]

CONDUCTING A SIEGE

There are only two ways of ensuring the success of a siege. The first, to begin by beating the enemy's army employed to cover the place, forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains or large river. Having accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the place taken. But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army without risking a battle, then the whole material and equipment for a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of heights, woods, marshes, and inundatations. Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depots, it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For this purpose an army of observation should be formed, whose business it is never to lose sight of the enemy, and which, while it effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a march.

It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy. Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in presence of an enemy's army, it is necessary to cover the siege by lines of circumvallation. If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day's march from the place, but if it is inferior in numbers after providing for the siege as above stated, it should remain only a short day from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines if necessary, or receive succour in case of attack. If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the greatest activity. [XLI]

Feuquiéres says that we should never wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation, but that we should go out and attack him. He is in error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the lines of circumvallation. [XLII]

Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary, which is never injurious, almost always useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted at the same time, that the principles of field fortification require improvement. This important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it on a level with the rest. [XLIII]

FORTRESSES

Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It is true they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening, and annoying a victorious enemy. [XL]

If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend a fortified town which contains a hospital and magazines, at least every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a coup de main. [XLIV]

A fortified place can only protect the garrison and arrest the enemy for a certain time. When this time has elapsed and the defences are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All civilised nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the same time there are generals, Villars among the number, who are of opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable to blow up the fortifications he may always retire, they say, with his garrison and save the men. Officers who have adopted this line of conduct have often brought off three-fourths of their garrison. [XLV]

The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of a garrison, when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this principle it is always wiser to grant an honourable capitulation to a garrison which has made a vigorous resistance than to risk an assault. [XLVI]

SURRENDER

To authorise generals or other officers to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution. The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances of assistance or of success. How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose only resource was death! [LXVII]

There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field, and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions, favourable to the contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large. To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in greater perils, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All generals, officers, and soldiers who capitulate in battle to save their own lives, should be decimated. He who gives the order and those who obey are alike traitors, and deserve capital punishment. [LXVIII]

There is but one honourable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, being cut off entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case there can be no conditions, for honour can impose none. We yield to an irresistible necessity. [LXIX]

BIVOUACS

A general should never put his army into cantonments when he has the means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus providing for the wants of the soldier in the field. [LV]

Tents are unfavourable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs, because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the ground on which he lies. A few planks and a morsel of straw shelter him from the wind. On the other hand tents are necessary for the superior officers, who have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should therefore be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy's staff. They afford information of your numbers, and the ground you occupy, while an army bivouacking in two or three lines is only distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds. It is impossible to count the number of the fires. [LXII]

Part One: Leadership  Part Three: Tactics