PREPAREDNESS

In a war of march and maneuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a good defensive position. Most natural positions are not sufficient to protect an army against superior numbers without recourse to art. [XVII]

Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect each other. [XXXV]

The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded or liable to be turned, and as far as possible, the guns should cover and command the surrounding country. [XXII]

Infantry, cavalry, and artillery are nothing without each other. They should always be so disposed in cantonments as to assist each other in case of surprise. [XLVII]

There are five things the soldier should never be without his firelock, his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days), and his entrenching tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest size posible, but the soldier should always have it with him. [LIX]

An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the day and night, to summon all the resistance of which it is capable. With this view, the soldier should be invariably complete in arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions of the army should be constantly in a state to support and to be supported. The troops, whether halted or encamped or on the march, should always be in favourable positions, possessing the essentials required for a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and all the artillery so placed as to have free range and to play with the greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as to enable ,the main body to deploy into position. [VII]

A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day, What should I do if the enemy's army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these questions he is ill posted, and should seek to remedy it. [VIII]

You should establish your cantonments at the most distant and best protected point from the enemy, ;especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you. [XXIV]

ADVANCED GUARD

The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or retiring, but in manoeuvring. An advanced guard should be composed of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy, and by battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard should consist of picked troops, and the general officers; officers and men should be selected for their respective capabilities and knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to an advanced guard. [XXXII]

CONCENTRATION

No force should be detached on the eve of battle, because affairs may change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive, and counteract your previous dispositions. [XXVIII]

Never leave intervals by which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, unless it be to draw him into a snare. [XXXIV]

When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A single battalion "sometimes decides the day. [XXIX]

When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an adversary of superior talent, for if you are beaten, even in the midst of your magazines and your communications, woe to the vanquished! [XXXI]

A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary, and if this last shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader profiting by his indecision may even hope for victory, or at least employ the day in maneuvering - at night he entrenches himself, or falls back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority. [XVIII]

When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace him with an offensive movement. By this maneuvre you will prevent him from detaching and annoying your flanks, in case you should judge it necessary to retire. [XXIII]

TACTICAL FORMATIONS

The formation of infantry in line should always be in two ranks, because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain, but frequently dangerous to the ranks in front. In drawing up infantry in two ranks there should be a supernumerary behind every fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five paces in rear of each flank. [XLVIII]

The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank. [XLIX]

THE ROLE OF CAVALRY

Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the flanks of the infantry, especially infantry engaged in front. [L]

It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent the beaten army from rallying. [LI]

ARTILLERY

Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon, whether /when attacking, rallying, or in position. [LII]

In march or in position, the greater part of the artillery should be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles. [LIII]

Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions, and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry, without compromising the safety of the guns, as possible. Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and left, but have free range in every direction. [LIV]

A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles of each branch of service, since he is called upon to supply arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed. This correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the advanced posts should put him in possession of all the movements of the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of artillery should depend upon this information. [LXXV]

RETREAT AND REORGANIZATION

When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns should always rally sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster than can happen is when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction. [XXVII]

FLANK MARCHES

Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile. [XXX]

DEFILES

It is contrary to all the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In case of retreat the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost. They should be left in position under a sufficient escort until you are master of the opening. [XXXIII]

BRIDGES

When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a bridge, while the other has the circumference of a circle open, all the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should show boldness, strike a decided blow, and ameuvre upon the flank of his enemy. The victory is in his hands. [XXV]

When the enemy's army is covered by a river, upon which he holds several têtes de pont, (bridge-heads) do not attack in front. This would divide your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In the meantime let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy. [XXXVI]

From the moment you are master of a position which commands the opposite bank, acquire the facilities for effecting the passage of the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive, place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished if the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards) in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed about five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force. Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to establish a cross fire upon his works. In this case the island or angle forms a natural tête de pont, and gives the advantage in artillery to the attacking army. When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of your artillery that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case, the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing, usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge by forming a semicircle round its extremity as round the opening of a defile, and remove to the distance of three or four hundred toises from the fire of the opposite side. [XXXVII]

It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from crossing a river. When the object of an army which defends the passage is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive before the enemy at an intermediate position between the river he defends and the place he desires to cover. [XXXVIII]

In the campaign of Turenne was attacked with his army before Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and the place to establish his camp. [In the construction of a fortress] a space should always be left between the fortress and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security. An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy is necessarily compromised. Two hundred toises should have been left between Mayence and the Rhine. It is essential that all têtes de pont before great rivers should be constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army. Têtes de pont, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short. [XXXIX]

 

Part One: Leadership  Part Two: Strategy