by Kevin Zucker

All-too infrequently, in the course of designing a game, can one lay claim to adding to the historical record. While writing the back of box copy for "1806," I found such an opportunity in F.L. Petre's assertion that Napoleon could see the Prussian campfires from the Dornberg. Using several modern topographical maps, I constructed a terrain profile (cut-away view) and found that a ridge at 345 meters above sea level in the vicinity of Vierzehnheiligen (hex N1731) obstructed his line of sight to the north (he could see only their campfiresÕ glow). Petre further asserted that Napoleon misjudged the size of the Prussian Army, assuming that the whole Prussian Army was nearby. The set-ups for "1806" show that the Prussian Army was, in fact, all present between Jena and Umpferstedt on the evening of the 13th of October. Thus, Napoleon was quite correct in his assessment of the enemy forces near the battlefield.

I immediately called Ed Wimble, whose design, "Iena," covers the same terrain as "1806." Ed was surprised when I mentioned the Prussian Main Army being encamped on the south bank of the Ilm, on its way past Apolda to Auerstadt. His game shows this force marching by way of Buttstedt on the *north* bank.

It was a bit late in production to make a change, so I turned to my source material to double-check my set-ups. My first reference was Chandler's "Jena 1806," which has been staying on my desk next to the computer:

p. 23 "A council of war early on the 13th had decided against an all-out confrontation with the French at Jena. Instead the main army was to retreat north through Apolda towards Halle, covered by Hohenlohe ... serving as a flank guard near Jena." [italics added]

p. 69 "Unbeknown to [Davout] the main Prussian Army had been marching north all day, bypassing Apolda and heading for AuerstŠdt and Eckartsberg ... en route for distant Freiburg and ultimately Halle ..."

The following from EltingÕs ÒMilitary History and Atlas of the Napoleonic WarsÓ clinches the question of the route (Maps 62 and 63)

"The concentration of the Prussian-Saxon armies briefly revived the confidence of some senior Prussian officers. They considered defending the line of the Saale River, but 13 October brought second thoughts: Davout's position astride the Saale at Naumburg imperiled their communications; without WŸrttemberg and Saxe-Weimar, their forces were too weak for a major battle. Also, morale was low; the Saxons, who had received almost no food for four days, threatened to leave the army. A coucil of war decided that Brunswick's army would withdraw immediately, marching up the west bank of the Saale through Freiburg and Merseberg."

The situation shown on map 62, for Late 13 October, has RŸchel in Weimar, while three arrows show the last three divisions of Brunswick's army marching in column on the road from Umpferstedt toward Apolda. A circle indicates a concentration of the other three divisions just shy of Eckartsberga, and with vedettes pushed beyond the town.

This becomes clearer on Map 63, which is focused down on the area from Weimar to Auerstadt and Jena. This shows the situation at Midnight of 13/14 October, the same situation depicted in the previous map, but in more detail. RŸchel is a bit short of Weimar; BlŸcher is just past the turn at Umpferstadt, von Arnim is near Apolda, Kunnheim has just crossed the Ilm, while Schmettau, Wartensleben and Orange are encamped in column on both sides of Auerstadt.

Maude clears up any lingering doubt.

p. 91-2 "Ruchel and Blucher ... reached the western outskirts of Weimar during the night of the 11th. The remaining three Divisions which consitituted the main body of the principal Army took up a camp at Umpferstedt, about 3 miles east of Weimar." Brunswick's headquarters were established at Capellendorf.

p. 94 At this moment a panic spread through the troops of Brunswick's Army. "Only a few moments before the very men with whom the panic originated had just marched past their commanding General, and the runaways actually precipitated themselves upon their comrades who were still defiling before him.

"Its extent and completeness should also be noted, for without appreciating its magnitude, the paralysis which overcame the whole Army for the next twenty-four hours [i.e. on the 12th] can hardly be understood."

p. 96 "Finally at 11 p.m. definite confirmation of the presence of the French in [Naumburg] was received, and the news spread consternation everywhere.

"A council was at once summoned for the following morning. Ruchel from Weimar, about seven miles away, was ordered to attend ... What time it actually assembled is uncertain, but the decision to retreat on the Elbe via Freiburg and Taucha ... appears to have been reached in time enough to allow of Scharnhorst issuing the necessary orders about 10 a.m. The actual text of these orders has not been preserved, but Prince Hohenlohe's recollection of them, handed in with his defence before the Commission of Inquiry in 1808 is accepted by Lettow Vorbeck as authentic.

"'The Army marches off on the 13th, with intervals of two hours between successive Divisions, towards Auerstadt. On the 14th, after having cooked, one Division will be advanced to cover the defile of Kšsen, the remainder will file off left in front behind it to the bridge at Freiburg, where they will cross the Unstrut ... General Ruchel moves from Erfurt by Weimar to the Lehnstedter heights and takes up the position evacuated by the Army.'"

The Lehnstedter Hšhe lie at 313 meters above sea level, about a mile south east of Umpferstedt (Hex N1927). Ruchel, in the rear, did not reach that position until the 14th. Napoleon could not see this camp because of an intervening ridge, although he could see the spire of the church in Umpferstedt.

From: Ed Wimble

I think it is important to ascertain the time Napoleon and Lannes had their celebrated picnic there and the approximate time of sunset. They may have been looking at the glow of the campfires as reflected by the clouds (as Zieten did on the night of June 14, 1815), or looking at the twinkling of the fires themselves, the viewing of which would not be inhibited by distance. With all the fits and starts of Brunswick's column, it may have appeared stationary to the French regardless.